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PREF.ACE 
This study has been pursued under the direction. and with 
the assistance. of Mr. Gagliardo of the Department of Economios, with 
the aim of reviewing deoislons or the Kansas.Supreme Court respecting 
labor and labor legislation. The primary aim hos been the review of 
decisions, legislation being studied as a means to this end. 
Tb.e purpose. of snob revie·N has been to ~sho·~1 the s tntus of' 
wage-earners in Kansas industries other than ngriculture, as dotermlnod 
by decisions of The Supreme Courtp This purpose involves some study or 
legislation under which the oases deoided have arisen. ltor this ranson 
a brief history of the different la:.vs has been given, and oases hnvo 
been grouped with respect to these laws. 
The groups or cases have been studied in the order of the en-
aotment of the laws under which the cases have arisen. The groups in 
this order are: Meohanios Lien; Railroad Contreotors Bond; Eight-Hour 
Law; Faator~r Act; Federal Employers' . Lia.bill ty lmv; Kansas };mployers' 
Llabili ty laws; Federal Sa.fety Appliance i~at; worlt:men' s Comr>ensation /"at; 
Industrial Welfare Commission; Kansas Oourt of Industrial Relations; Crim-
inal Syndicalism; Iiflsaellaneous Oases. 
It is evident tbst some groups are more in:portnnt tbt:in others. 
The treatment of the less important, therefore, has been limited. or tbo 
more importvnt, the study has been more thorough. It has been impossible, 
ho~ever, to make an exhaustive review of the most importcnt asses. The 
. plan tollO'~ved b.as been to present 1mportr.nt oases nnd to relate others to 
those. In some groups, however. a fairly thorough study has been at-
tempted. This is especially trae of' the Court of In~tistrial Relations 
Ca.sos. In some groups, as for example, Meoh&?lib5 lien 9a.ses, the study 
hr\s been little more than an annotation of the cases. 
No study has been ~de of. cases. involving merely th.a· question 
ot bronoh of contract. This question is ·fundamanta.l in most cases in 
agricultural industry mid is not,· for the plirposes or this thesis im-
portant. Tho study is confined. to those industries in t~hioh the lal>or 
oondlt ions hove been the subject of legisla.tion. 
A primsry aim therefore has been that' of showing the legality 
of legislntion, regulating conditions a.nd protecting laborers in' such 
industries. This involves ~brogation of previous relations, or broad-
ening them. This question necessitated, f·arther, some comparison 0£ the 
oomrnon•law relations of Master nnd Servant. fellzyn-sorvanoy~ and· doctrines 
of contributory negligence s.nd as~wnption of risk, witb tbese relations 
ss provided under the different la."Vs. 
::·nge 1. 
1 
itaeh311ios' liens are statutory rights bnsed upon aorez:on-ln:v 
rights:. S:ney a.re unknown to tbo £ngl1sh aon:r..on la'-"1 exaopt r~s "retain-
ers rigbta8~ tzhase9 haaaver9 ..,;are enrly in developt:1ent. They beer.~ 
reoogni:;:ed in the civil ltra in tha United Stntes, and all ototoa h~vo 
rn.eobnnies• lien lnwa. 
~be mecbnnioa' 11en ls u oln!m to property, due to non-pa.ynxlnt 
ot wages., or for lnbo:r clona9 or for mnt-0rinls tarnlsho<l. in oonstl-uoting, 
ropa.lrl~g or rer.:oving n b-i.11ld1ng, t:7orlts ·or conatraation. Anyono 13 en-
tltled to n lien ·aho hns m1 de soma improver..ent or addition to tho vcl.uo 
Of property. Tho lion is an sasuro.noo that such person :dll not 1000 
proilotnent or udrlltion to property vr:lue. 
Tho lion etto.obos to the lm;:>rovemontn ond ulso to tbo land uvon 
fltlioh they have been rondo. In anae or a. bnJJding on proporty, toth the 
blil<ling r.md tho lnnd upon whiah lt r., sts r~ro sttl>Joctto tho l ian~ end 
tho property rr.ay be sold tor the ·funds to ~my the lien oltiit:lS. 
?raotioally evory kind of property may be aubjoot to 11ono. 
";lFitb the exception of publla property. rost or the atatea do not hold 
such pronerty s.:1bJeot to n rr.ochimiaa' lion. ~ha Kanso.s lti·~.,. ha~ev~·r, do,·s 
not exar;~pt public property.2 Prlvnte property, ohurahea, oolloge b~il,11.ngs, 
oto., are subjoot to liens. es is GJ.so tho proparty or corporr.tions. Ls 
seen. this lien extent.'s to &ny intor.:.;st 1n lcn<lo.,. including eqnJ:tn.tlo on-
l. Sae Jones On Liens - (Tllird ~ditlon} Volo I • 
.u. .8nrdialt on neel .Property - p.569• :7ote 20. 
l te.tes, and interests in generi~.1. and in most states1 to a leasehold• 
A notice of filing a meohan1os' lien m.ist be given in most 
sta.te.s. In a few this is not reqaired. The time limit for filing var-
ies in the different states. ''Kansas requires no preli1dnary notice 
when the contra.ct is made directly \vith the o-.vriar of the real estate. 
The filing limit is four months af'ter the· lE~st it.am or material is fin-
ished, nnd tbe opera.tor rr::ust sue before expiration of one year af"ter 
tiling in order to enforce oolleatfon. Wilen the· ·sale is ·ma.de to a con-
trr.otor, Kansas requires that he be served notice when 'the 'lien ·1s filed. 
J, sixty-day timo limit ls set for filing, and tho operator must sue to 
eni'oroo his claim 1?11ithin one year nftar :f'il1ng.1• 2 
l'!eohanics' liens,. or lumbermen• s liens, are employed tor col-
looting dt:"bts. ''Some distinguishing e.dvuntages of s. m.ochariic' s lien 
over the orclina.ry method or oolleating a, dobt ares First. 1t is a ola.im 
upon tbe property 1 tself, just as a. mortgage is, but witbont the neces-
slty or tbe om1er signing any papers or e.xplioitly agreeing tbHt it shall 
,. .. , ... 
be such o. olnim, being so by virtue of the :.foot tbnt the o-.mer of the 
land purchased the material or employed the labor to improve the real es-
tnto. second; it attnohes to the real estate, not wb.cn it is filed and 
recorded as do,:s a rnortgsge, not et the end of litigation as does a judg-
mont, but at the monant the first material ls delivered under the contract. 
----no sale or mortgage of the property after the first delivery or the 
·material onn lessen his, (the sell~r' s) ,rights or corr.a a.bead of his claim, 
F-P though it may not be actually :tiled until months later.".::. 
1. Burdick, on Reel Property, P• 569, note 20. 
2. University of Kansas Studies in .Busint~ss, !!umber 4, pp.14, 15. 
3. ~'rank E. Tyler - Lumbermens LBW (Jan. 1926) Quoted in Krmsas Studies in 
Bu Sina l,; s fj:4. 
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A meohnnic• s lien law was enacted in Kansas in 1672 ( L&\"18 
. of 18?2 On. 141). It has bean emended often nnd many or its features 
changed. (See Le.vs of 1909 Ch. 182; Laws 1913 Ch. 242). It is not 
different :front laws of a similc.r nature in other shttes ·except that 
it allows a lien to nttaoh against public property. (?lot sinoe 1913). 
Provisions of the XansDs law and annotations of some oases 
under these provisions are given belcr~v. 
Provisions 0£ Kansas la-~v ancl a.nnotctlons. 
(Old Code, Prior to 1909) 
The lien may be age.inst property and all appurtenances there-
. . 
to. for any ';]Ork of a laborer, his horses Bnd driver, n.uto-truok and 
driver, and for materials. fixtures and rr:aohinery. This lien hns prior-
ity over all other liens and e11oumbrsnoes. The most important ousoa undor 
this provision are: 
Potter v. Conley, 63 Kim. 676; Sha:7 v. Ste 'rs.rt, 43 K:L.11. 572. 
Lwnbor Co. v. Douglas, 89 Xa.n. 308. 
~1enver v. Sells, 10 Kan. 609. 
Crawford v. Bloo1.onen, 30 Kan. 627. 
HathIDvay v. Davis and Rankin, 32 Kan. 693. 
A lien ID!lst be filed within four months from the time of com-
pletion of tne constrnotion; 
Trent v. Sutliff, 24 :Kan. 35; Perry v. Conroy, .22 Kan. 716. 
Sea.ton v. Hixon, 35 Kan. 663. 
A sub1'oontra.ctor may file n lien under a oontro.otor, or, persons 
working under a. sub-aontri· ator may file a lien. ln these oases the limit 
or time of .filing is sixty days: 
Lumber Co. Vo Smith, 84 Kmi. 190; Rankin v. Rankin, 86 Kan. 899. 
Lumber ·co. v. 1.:;ccurley, 84 Kan. 751; Trurrr.ler v. Sells, 87 Kan. 647. 
lo Revised Statutes of Kansas 1923, P<1o 847-850. (See for con:plete 
annotation.) 
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J .. oontrnator or o-.mer may execute a bond ~o the state, to the 
sum of not less than the contract piece. Tbis _is to insure payment of 
olnims rllld to forestall lions. 
Risse v. Planing r ..a11. 55 !{an. 518; Shores v. Surety Oo. 84 Kan. 592. 
Lumber Oo. v. Mills, 86 Kan. 363; Hotel Coo V• Hardware Co. 66 Ken. 489. 
Lumber Co• ·V• Douglas, 89 Kan. 308. 
Any public offloer mu.st require a bond of contractors whom they 
engcge to do work or construction of a public nature, when the amount is 
ovor $100 mid not less than the contra.at price. This provision. made in 
1913, :f'orestlills the posailil.i ty under the Kcmsas law9 or a lien being nt-
tnohod ugainst publ1o property •. Thus it is not now possible for a ineohan-
io' s lien to r:tto.ch against public property. 
Oonunissioners of Jewell Co. v. Mfg. Co•, 52 Ken. 263. 
Freoman v. Chanute, 63 Kan. 673• 
Lumber Co. v. ~lliott, 59 Kan. 42• 
Griffith v. Stuokor, 91 Kan. 47. 
Aotion may be hand in aivil courts to enforce mechanic's liens• 
if' this notion is brour~ht within one year :from tha ·date of filing· the lien, 
or if a note hss been given, one yenr from the (J.nte of the expirt'.'tion or 
the note. 
Gillespie v. Lovell, 7 Kan. 419. 
See.ton v. HL"ron, 35 Knn. 663. 
Sash Co. v. Haima.n, 65 Ken. 5. 
~ oomplete review of the nwnerous onses is not possible, and bence 
tho trontment must be li:rg·.·ly in the noiure o:r annotation with respeat to 




Railroad Oontrsotors• Bond Cases.1 
· Tbe Railroad Contractors' .Bond lw"V rms enacted in 1672, for 
the pur~)ose of protecting lo.borers. meohanioa and others in the aon-
struotion ot railroads. It was intended to ma.1te the railroads liable 
f.or the debts of a contr:;;otor of ·the companio:.), unless they should ro-
quire oontraotors to give a bond for the pnyment. Tbis bond aLsolves 
tho railroads f'rom liability for ~he clobts of oontrnotors·to othors. 
The bond is a type of lien in tho judgment or tho Supreme Oourt, 
in the decision in Wells v. liehl 9 25 Kan. 142. It ";llB.S said in thia opln-
ion that t n the bond binds the aont raotor to pny for vll lalJor done upon, . . 
and matorials used. in tho oonstro.otion of, tho roads, so ·rar as his con-
tract "Nitll the company calls for labor a.11d mnterinls. no matter how rnnny 
sub•contrsots the1·efor may be ma.de• In this respect it is s quaai-rnoohv.n-
io' S lien la;v9 the lion being Upon. the bond instend Of U;')On tho rOO.(\."l 
·~'lheri the· contractor contraots debts for tiny pur·>oso ·outside of 
rail~a.y construction~ he io personally· liable. Tho first onso to be re-
view·ad by the supreme Court under this lt:.w 1s thct of nallroul. co. v. 
Cuthbert, 14 Kenl 168. A cont raotor of the Santa .Fe rCJ.ilroad had con-
treated <labta to Cuthbert, who brought action in the c1istrict court or 
Harvey County, against the railroi.ld. · The basis or the aatlon \7t'.s tho oon-
tent ion thr:-,,t the bond Whioh tlle railroad had required Of tho cont rnctor 
vms i1walirl beaouse it oontainud a olr:usa tb.ut •'the cont rnctors shall ·,1011 
and truly scve, keep, and bear harmless, the said railroad of, nnd :from, 
l. Le:.vs ot Xa;isa.s, 1812, Ch:Jpter 136. 
2. 25 Kan • 143. 
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all trouble. dmnage, oosts, suits, judgments and exeoutions erising or 
to arise by roason or the incurring of such debts.0 
The lo·~er Court ruled the bond invalid a.nd a'71arded CUthbert 
judgment. The Supreme Court- reversed this decision holding the .boncl ,val-
id. :.rhe rules established \Vere: l. That suob. a. olvuse would be .a. legal 
oontrc1ot. 2. That the liability or the railroad ·company under the act 
is purely ll stntutOl"'J liability• and the conditions described in the stat-
ute mnst be shown to exist before that lie.bi~ity can be enforaed. The 
Court held tbnt thoao· conditions ·did not exist bare~ 
~he next cc.so is He.il·:·my Co. v. Bro·.vn, 14 Kan. 423. The oose 
-.ws appealed from Labette dist riet. court i7hich. had· rendered a judgment 
in fr.var or Bro·.m. Bro-;.m had boen ordered by 1:0Lood, a contractor of the 
rn.ilroad company, to £ttriish supplies to oertoin ·.vorkmen in his employ. 
Brown nooentod a noto or t:cLeod ma.do pt?.yo.ble to one of the workmen, in ex-
change for provisions. MoI,eod refused after.vnrd to pay Bro:m, who then 
sued the railroad company. No bond hnd been required by the oompcny of 
1:.oLood tho cont raotor. The railroad lost tile case in just ice cotirt. in the 
district court and finnlly, also. in the Supreme Court. 
The dof'anse offerod by tho company wes that it bad not given any 
order to Drown for supplies a.nd thnt it could not tberefore be held liable 
for the debts of McLeod. The Supreme Oourt overruled this defense, estab-
lishing tho rule or law thnt the company w&s 11a.ble, ur.der. the_ law, not only 
for tbo debts of' the contractor, but also to the persons to whom the debts 
may have been transferred. This wss due to the :failure of tb.e oor:iptmy to 
require the bon_d or McLeod, es prescribed by law. It :;ras further established 
tlla.t a. contra.ct between a contractor and his workmen is a contract of 
the company, when the compaey has ordered the contractor to perfom 
the work for which the contractor retained the workmen. 
The case of' Railway Co. v. Daker,. 14 Kan. 428, established 
~h~ mle that a person employed as a timekeeper by a. railroad ie not a 
f&t'borer in the eenee intended by the law of 1872. Daker failed to re-
Hover 1n an action e-gamst the company for back pay oued to him by a. 
Hontmctor. 
Vl&lls v. l!ahl.,. 25 xan. 142, is a oa.se involving the qneation 
of a sub-contractor,. Mehl fu.mished supplies to a sub-contractor's 
workman. In def'e:a.lt of pg.yment of the debts by tl1e sub-contractor, 
Mehl sned wells the original contractor. The ru.iing of the Supreme 
, . 
Court was. that the lien for the payment Of debts, unda?- the law of 
1872. is on the bond or the contractor with the comPllllY• There beinG 
no bond of the eub-Wcontra.ctor either with tho contractor or with the 
compmey-, the law would not apply to debts of a au.b-contraotor. The de-
1 
cis:lon of the h!aria:n district court. awarding e. judgment in fa.vor of 
The case of Railway co. V·• McConnell. established tl1e rule 
that a bridge builder constru.cting bridges for a railroad company is a. 
contractor in the sense intended by the lav. Here the railroad company 
was held liable tor tha debts of McConnell• a bridge cm.tractor. 
Ra.ilw8.3' co.- v. Cobb, 25 Kan. 270 is similar to Wells V• Uohl 
above. Here, however. supplies were i'a.rnished to a sub-sub-contro.ctor . . 
and the decision followed the Wells v. L1ehl case. Cobb,, ouing the mil-
Paga··a. 
road oompmiy for the debts of a sub-sub-coi~t~D.ctor ~ recovered .tri the 
lower court. The Supreme court following the ~a.soning .. in the 7/t;llls 
case held that there could be no ·recovery,; and t-eversed the decision of 
the lower court. 
The wells v. llehl ·case determined that persOllS tu.rnishing 
supplies to workmen of' a sub-contractor a.re not within the s.ot. The 
workmen themselves, .h~~ver 1> are within the:act and may recover fr0m 
the orig1na.1 contractor. This is th.e 1 rule . established in Mann. v. 
Corrigan, 28 Ran. 137. : It is fll.rther emphas~zed in Bailwq co. fo 
Ritz, 30 Kan. 30,. and is the gover.nlng rnle in Parkinson & Co. 'ff• 
Alexander, 57 Kan. llO• In this case the rule was estab.lished tha.t 
railroad canpanies are not liable for PS\Vl11en't ·of debts ot their cont:ra.et-
ore for mo.ter1nls not used 1n construction of railways~ 
· A laborer ~ recover for wages., but not for the hire of hie 
tenm. If no specification is ma.de ct the amounts due· for the la.borer"s 
work anl for tlw.. t of his team, the whole sum is considered ae being not 
ch~geable to the railroad canpany. This is tlte l'llle in !Jann. V• BurtcJ 
55 xon. 10. However feedstuffs tor animals used in constrn.ction wrk 
may be a debt chargeable .to the compo.ey. according to th& rule in 
Be.ilvm.y Co. v. Grallam0 67 Ken. 791. 
The failure to file a bond as requ.ired by law will not in-
vol.idate it if' it is a proper bond. In the case .of Griffith v. S~ker, 
' . . 
91 Kan. 50, the city of Ottawa let contracts' to Stueker for work" on 
its streets.· stueker su.b•let a part of t11e work to Lightfood Bros.• 
requ.iring a snb-oontractor's bond from tllem. The.latter defaulted 
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e.nd Gri££ith9 a creditor of workt.'en of Ligh.tfoot Bros •• sued stuelcer. 
Tho contention was made that the original bond was invalid because 
. it had not been filedo The lo'Wer court upheld this content ion but tlle 
Supreme court overruled the decision. holding tnat filing or a bond 
was or secondary importanee. 
This aase is not a _railroad contractors' bond case, but is 
under the laws of 1687, ohaptor·179,vthioh is similar to the Railroad 
Contractors• Bot1d Law. The provisions of this ltll7 are thats o. bond 
shall be reqaired for any public work, by any public officer, of any· 
person eontraoting ·,vith him to do public service \Vork. The b_ond pro-
vidos for the payment of snch debts as any oontraotor may oontre.ot 
with persons. for materials and prov1s1011s9 used in tho public sarviae 
v1or1c. The nmou.nt of the· bond is to be a sum not less than the sum 
total in the contract. Action ma.y be he.d in the courts by .anyone, 
_ provided such action i~ 'begu11 within six months of co;::plot1on of suoh 
. publia ·11ork. The bond nust be filed with. the alark of the dlstrlat 
court of the county in which itti~,rovement is bolng me.de.1 
Cotnr"...enting on this lmv the Supreme Court snid in the oa~e or 
Griffith v. stueker. 91 Kan •. 50-57: ''The purpose of the sta.tute wa.s 
to protect the contributions ot laborers nnd materlalrrsn to public_ 
works.o Where mpahanics' liens are allowed, a.s upon public buildin,:.;s, 
ute 
the stat/ fttrnishes additional saouri ty 2- - - where mechanics• liens 
a.re not pO-ssible, a.s upon street ir..iprovements, the purpose was to 
secure laborers and ma.terialmen oga.lnst loss by s quasi-rnoohanios lien, 
1 o Sae Laws of 1687; Ch. 179 o 
2. Commissioners of Jewell County v. Erg. Co.. 52 Xa.n. 253. 
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the lien being upon· the bond· instead. of the property - - - The · . . 
statute under oonsideration9 is analogous to the one enacted.to pro-
toot laborers and others \Vho aid in the· oonstmotlon of railroads. 
which requires railroad; oompanias to take) from contraetora, bonds to 
po.y laborers, mechanics and mater1almen, all Jttst debts incurred in 
carrying on constmction work. 1• There are few cases under this la:.v. 
Asphalt oo. v. Building Oo., 99 Kan. 6670 is one'of these. 
'.l'he mle in this case \Vas that the re&ponsibili ty of ·a surety company 
or. guaranty cor.:pany. as surety to a o~ntraotor's bond does not aea.se 
when the oontra.otor defaults his· bond·;. The sa.:rety oo~a.ny in this 
case is responsible for the debt.1 
The last oe.se of this kind is Tra.otion oo. v. Brick oo. 
It is similar to the Aa_phs.l t Company aaue above, in that the question 
of the liability or the surety company is uppermost.. The oa.se estab-< 
lishod the rule that tha surety OO?n!'atlY' s 11e.bili ty extends to freight 
charges on materials, in default of the contractor. 
Orsne Company v. Terminal Railway oo., 98 Kan. 336, establisb.e\S 
the l'tl.lo that the constiuotion of a terminal railway station is within 
the provisions of the Contraotors llond Law of 1872, since it is a part 
or railway oonstruotion. A further rule established is, that, where a 
sub-contractor makes 9n~nts for his debts to persons tor supplies. be 
has a right to designate the accounts to wh-ich they apply. 
i.~eigen v. Railway Co., 104 Kan. 811, is the la.st oase of this 
group. It 1a similar in facts and in rule to others already given. 
Railroad Oontractors' bond cases sho7l the effeat of protective 
legislation upon the status of mechanics, laborers and materia.lmen. 
The 1811' ot 1867 proteots the state. 
Cases cited ares u.s. v. l!a.tional g.irety co.-, 92 .Fed. 549 
Chaffee v. u.s •. It'idelity & Guaranty co •• 128 Fed. 918. 
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OHAPTER III• 
Ei~ht-Honr Lmv ·aases.1 
The first l&\V in Kansas relating to nours of labor is ronnd 
in th.a ennotments of tne legisla-ture of 1891. This is not' a. general 
statute. hCTnever9 but relates only to industries oondnoted by the 
state9 and work performed for the state. Th.is means also the several 
divisions of the state9 viz •• counties. tmvnsh!ps. and mnnioipalitiee. 
Known as tho Eight-Hour Law·, it provides tbe e1gb.t-hour day 
for all labor, by and for the state or divisions mentioned above. No 
other industries or kinds or labor a.re included in the act. There is a 
!) • . lnw on the Kansas statutes.- providing the eight-hour day in lend and 
zinc mines in Kansas, but this is not a port of the Eight-Hour Law. 
There have been amendments to tho not but these have not been chunges 
in the application of the lav to other indu.strie~·, or to other kinds 0£ 
labor. 
Provisions, in brief, of the· 'law nre: 
section Io Eig~t hours sbnll constitute a dn.yPa labor £or 
all workmen, laborers, mechanics who may be employed by, or on behal£ 
ot, the state.or any divisions thereof, except in ca.sea of extra.o:rnin-
ary e~~rgency0 where the preservation of life and property make such 
labor necessary. In suah oases. labor will be paid on the basis of the 
eight-hour day. The current wages of labor in other industry for n 
day longer than eight hours, will be paid to laborers under the eight-
hour law for the eight-hour day. All laborers of contractors and sub-
contractors shall be included in the provisions of the law. 
1. For L&.~ see LWTs of Kansas, 1891, chap~er 114. 
2 • n ff rt ft t• rt ' 191 7 * tt 242 • 
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section II. All contracts shall be ma.de upon the basis or 
the eight-hour.day • .All contractors are responsible .for providing tila.t 
their laborers do not work more than eight hours per day. 
section III. Any officer of tbe state of Kansas, or any 
. . ' 
or the divisions; any contractor; any city. township or county or the 
stnto of l<:nnsas; or· any other perso.n violating the provisions or the 
act shall be punished for ea.ob. offense by a. fine of $50 to ~~1,000, or 
imprisonment ot not longer than six months, or by both fine and imprison-
tr.ant. 
seation IV. The act shall not appl~ to exi.sti~ contracts. 
The law tvas rutended in 1923, l exempting oi t las Of the second 
class and the third class from the '1rovisions of the aot.. Certain kinds 
or work in counties nnd townshi:os. .and light plants e.nd water plants in 
a! ties of the second and third classes were also e.xenipted from the 
provisions or the act. 
Casas reviewed by the supreme court under this act are not 
numerous, snd few of them are important. The case of Atkin v. Xansas, 
64 Kan. 174, is the most important case. This will be given in its 
proper place. 
The first case under the law, reviewed by the Supreme court, 
In Re Ashby 60 Kan. 1010 grew out or the law regarding the wor'"ging 
of "free labor'' on the public roads in Kansas. Under ~his law all · 
persons who -:vere subject to road duty. \vorked on the roads ten hours 
per day. This was rna.inifestly in conflict with the eight-hour law, pro-
viding eight hours for public. work and labor. The Suprerrs Oou.rt ruled 
the la.-v relnt ing to "free labor0 unconstitutional and the system of free 
1. 11evised Statutes of Kansas, 1923, P. 686. 
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labor \'fa.S abolished. 
The uext oase was In Re Dal ton, 61 Kan. 257, J. 0. Zeigler 
. . 
and J. T. Dalto~. contractors in the oonstTUot1on of publio buildings 
in Geary County., Kansas, allowed their -.vorkmon to .work longer tbon 
eight hours per day. They were oonvioted and sentenced to a term ot 
imprisonment. A writ' of habeas corpus vtas taken but denied. On appeal 
to the Supreme court it was again denied, end tho oontraotors were foraod 
to serve their sentences. There was no ploa ·of unoonst1tuionality in 
the case. 
In the oase ot Bea.rd v. County Commissioners of the County 
of Sedgwick, the supreme Oourt ruled that a person ~vho rece~vos a st1p-
ulated aalary9 instead of wages. is not under the provisions or the lnw. 
Beard was a janitor in a public building in Sedgwick County9 Kansas, 
and received a stipulated salary for his servloes. His duties requir-
ing more then eight hours per day, he entered suit against tho County 
Commiss~oners to obtain the privileges or· the eight-hour day, and to 
recover a bala.noe of pay as based upon eight hours of work. The supreme 
Court denied this oleim, establishing the above rule. 
The most important oase under this law is Kansas v • .A tkln, 
64 Kmt. 174. w. w.· .Atkin was employed, as a contraotor, by the City of 
Y..ansas City. Kansas, i"or the work of paving Q.uinds.ro Boulevard in th.at 
·city. Atkin allowed his men to work longer than eight hours per day. 
He was indicted. tried9 and tined $50 on eaoh of two aounts for violet-
. ' 
ing the Eight-Hour law o He appealed to the Supreme Court on the ground 
that the worlt of paving city streets was not intendacl by the law. The 
Supreme Oourt. ~cr.1ever9 affirmed the decision or the lo·.ver court. 
The case was appealed to the United States supreme court wbioh 
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in a deaision ( 191 U .s. 207 9 124 sup. Ot. Hep. 124} in .1903, affirmed. 
tho opinion of the Kansas courts. The content ion of /i tkin wa.s tllat the 
lir.v was unconstitutional beonuse it denied freedom of contract and equal 
protection of the lmv. The opinion neid th.a.t, on the euth.ority of 
Holden v. Hardy (169 UoSo 366) 9 the state of Kansas bad the legal 
right to pass such an aot as the Eight-hour la;,~1, also that since no 
em~loyeos liberty of contract is absolut~. there was no infringement 
of liborty by the law. The decision v1as not .unanimous. From the 
op1111on, given by 1~r. Justice Harland. 11r. Ohiaf Justice Fuller, Mr~ 
Justice :Brower and Mr. Just ioe Peckham diss~nted. (no opinion ~iven.} 
The last oase reviewed is that of State v. Ottawa. Here, 
notion was brou.ght to compel the 01ty of Ottawa to observe the eight 
hour law in its employment or firemen and engineers at the city water 
plunt and light plant. Tileae were being required to work longer than 
eight hours par day in their datiaa. The district court raled that 
since the work vras performed at intervals during the de.y, there being 
intorvala when no work was necessary, but the presence merely, of the 
worlonen being required during these intervals9 the ai ty ~Ya.s within its 
rights in requiring the workmen to remain at their Jobs twelve hours. 
The supremo court overruled this decision. The f'act that there were 
intervals of idleness in the duties of the workmen, was held not to be 
n relonsa or respo11sibili ty under the eight-hour law, and that the 
intormlttont character of the labor did not(effect responsibility for 
hours of employment. The decision of the lo:ver court was reversed. 
There are no farther cases U"·:der the Eight"'i!our La'JI. ?tor 
nro thore oases under the eight-hour ls.w for lead end zinc mines. The 
provlslons of this law are sir::ilar with respeot to lead and dno min-
ing to the Eight-Hour lt:r.1 in respect to public ~orko 
Factory leg isl at ion began in nt'lgland in 1802. L&.'l.18 '>7era 
passed more or less erratically until the '~:orkahop Ji.ct o.r 1878 {;;hen 
a ta.irly log-1oal system of labor legislation ~-:rns oo~letod., !l1 tbe 
l interim tho oondi Uons or labor leglslntion bad been abaotla. 
''/)dditional legislation took: ·plcme in 1663, lSB99 1091• 1695 and 1897 • 
wh!oh rostorod the old state of chaos and l'en<lo.red :it neoess~u-3 to do 
tho worlt or 1870 o7ar again. Th1s ~s done by the aot ot l9Dl, wnich~ 
stibJoot to tho al tera.tions whioh it in its turn has rctoelved in 19039 
190G and 1907, is tberorore a complete code or the lSW' rol&ting to 
9 £nator1es and workshopa.i' .... 
In tne United States this typo of' legilsatlon bega..?l in 1836 
ln t:B.Gsachnastts. ?rsotically all the states hsvlng !catorles have 
cne.otod legilsa.Uon regulating labor end conditions. The Kansas 
in the United Dtntos. 
so:se ot th.e provisions of the Kansas ltt'·"' are:5 
sootion I. Providing for 1nolosing of elevat-or shaf'ta. :1elI-
boles nnd olavntors in all raatories in Z3?lsns. 
section n. !)roviding for hsndrails for stn!r:Ta.ys D..t"ld regula-
t1ons for closing door:;nys. 
section III. Providing for fire escnpes for -all buildings. 
soct1on IV. All machinery operuted by !}Ullc7s fr~· line 
nnflfta nnst be titted wi tb shifters tor belts open~tad 11ithottt rlangar 
1. Leo /ol. 82• Kansns 3090rts ~ago 613 
2. ~edgroves rnotoey 1~ats llth .Ed. {1909) lntrocluotion ?. iO{lo 
{ q,uotod 1n Vol. 62 X&nsa.s Eeports ?. 6139 b.f).{t foll.oving. 
3. r.ss of Zonsns. 1903. Chapter 356. 
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from mch!n.&17. All dangerous machinery ma.st be gn.o.rded for the 
pa.rpose of preventing or avoiding death ot employees 
.. section v. \~11ere neglect of these safeguards is respons-
sible for the death of e.n employee, .. a. personal representative of the 
· employee may maintain an action 1n the courts for dntnsges. In ca.so 
of ·inJur.r. the employee shall ,have this right. 
Section VI. Proof of failure · ot employer to comp~ w1 th 
. ' 
the law ehall be SUfticient to ·obtain an award for damages• 
section ·vn. Ma.ml£a.ct\1.ring establishments mean, end include, 
all smelters, oil .refineries.· ce~nt works. mills of every kind, machine 
arid repair shops and e.ny 'kind 'or character ot manufacturing establish-
ment vh1Ch cmverta raw products into f'in1ehed products' • 
. section VIII. The word person used 'in the act shall mean 
. ~ l)erson or personae. partnership~ corporation,, or rocei ver, tra.st 
<>l'. trustee• or combinations of persons~· either nattu-a.l or art1fic1nl. 
These provisions h8.v& a bearing to cl~ the opero.tion of 
the fellow-servant rale, and 'the comnon-law doctrines of aa5'Ulllpt1on 
·of 'risk and contributory· negligence. These doctrin~s will be shown 
· 'in tne study of ca.sos which. will follow• 
The first case reviewed; under the act, by the Supreme Court 
is ?t194ison V• Clippinger, ?4 Kan. · 700, appealed from Wyandotte district 
' .. 
court in 1906. Madison, a minor, ~s injured on a riJ?ao.w which he was 
operating,· and which was u.ngua.r'deei. The lower court. Wyandotte county, 
.• . 
in itl:l opinion in Liad.1son•s Stlit for damages, held that ·ma.dison had 
i . 
known the risk in 'the case and ·had voluntezily aasu.ined the risk. 
It held tha.t he was guilty of' contributory negligence-, also, and 
tha.t. he was not entitled to jUdgment, for .these reasons. The 
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supreme Court f'ound there was no error in this judgment and a.!firrred 
the lower court's deois1on. 
The case is important in defining the application ot the doc~ 
trlnes or assumption ot risk snd of contributory negligence. In the 
Supreme Oourt•a opinion. rendered by Er. Justice Smith. it was aaidt 
"That tb.e v1ole.tion of a duty expressly imposed by a statute upon an 
owner or operator of machinery. d8l'.lgerous to employees or to the public, 
ls negligence, whiob.9 prims. faaie. imposes 11ab1U.ty :tor damages result..-
ing therefrom, is \Vall settled law (21 A & E Enoyolopedia of Law P.476) • 
Also that negligence on tb.e part of the party seeking to recover damages, 
which eo far contributes to the injury that it may be said the injury 
would not have oaourred but for such contributory cause. defeats a 
recovery. is equally well settled, (x.o. Ft. soott & G. Rld. oo. v. 
:UoHenry, 24 Kan. 501) ,.l ··· 
~bis mling determines th.at companies may not employ the 
defenses of contributory negligence and assumption ot risk9 when they 
e.re in violation of the la.vt, but on the other hand, if' an ~mployer is 
guilty ot assumption of risk and contributory negligence. his· action 
tor dmusges will be tbereby defeated. or his award of ds.mages will be 
mitigated. 
Msnuf'aotur1ng oo. v. Bloom, ?6 xe.n. 128 is a case involving 
the same question as that in Madison v. Clippinger above, as also does 
the case, Rank, a minor, v. Packing Box oo., 92 Kan. 917. In the .first 
oe.so the opinion of Mr• Oh1ei' Justice Te.ft of the United states supreme 
Oourt. in the case of' :Ra:rramore v. Oleveland1 o.o. and st. L. Rld· co., 
1. Kan. Reports. Vol. 74, P. 700. 
., "' 
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96 Fed. 2989 was quoted. This was that a plea of assumption of risk 
is a waiver 0£ benefit of the statute. sinae tb.is is a tacit admission 
by employers of' violation ot tbe law. 
Fowler Packing co. v. Erngenperger, 77 Kan., 406, is· a case 
involving the qtiestion of ·liability of employers, for naa!dents due to 
open elevators. Emgenperger, while working on a freight elevator of 
the Packing co. was inJured when· a barrel tell upon him from another 
elevator above him, both elevators being merely open platforms. 
The elevators were used in hauling meat in t ruoks from floor to floor 
of the plant. The district court, 7Jyandotte County, awarded Judgment 
to Emgenperger in his action for damages. The supreme oourt aff irmod 
the opinion. There was no question here, except tbe negl1genae of the 
company, both courts ruling that the ooxnpany was manifestly in violation 
of Section 1 of the Factory Aot. 
In Kansas Buf:f' l3rio1::: Ufg. Co. v. Stark, 77 Kan. 652t damsges 
were marded to Eli stark end ll.ary M. stark tor tho death 0£ their son, 
Arthur,~ in the plant of the company. stark was killed when his oloth1ng 
became entangled in an ungaarded line shaft wbiah was near the place 
wb.ere be was working. The decision 0£ · tb.e Supreme court aftinned 
that of the ·lower court. The question here as in above oases was that 
negligence of factory owners·defeats their defenses, if an when they are 
1n violation of the law ·themselves. 
The case of Hensobell v. Union Pao1£io Rnilwny co., 76 Kan. 
411• established the l'llle that railw~ shops era. for the purposes of 
the Factory Act, a "factory". Employers a.re liable' under the pro-
visions of the law 1n oases of injury here. Bubb v. Rail~ay co., 89 
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Kan. 303, considers the same question. and £ollo-vvs tbe rnle of ls.w 
of Henschell v. Ry. Coo Truman v,, Ra.il\vay co., 98 Kan •. 761• is similar. 
See also Slater v. Railway co., 91 Kan. 226. . . . . 
A group 0£ cases determine whether other establishment a are 
''factories". The oase of ?Janke v. Hauber, 99 Kan. 171, is in point,. 
lJ.enke was injured 1 n ma'king barrels in a shop where no machinery was 
used end in whioh the workmen furnished their own tools. He began 
action for dmnsges and recovered in the lower court, but the supreme 
Court overruled this decision on the ground that suoh a shop could not . ' 
be regarded as a ta.otory under the Factory .Act, since there was no 
' 
machinery in the shop•· 
Jeffries v ~ Elevator oo., 102 Ka.n. 8119 established the rule 
that a grain elevator ls a ntaotor~' as intended by the law, overrnling 
the defense. see also :Buchanan v. Blair et. al. 90 Kan. 420. 
Pa.ck v. Grimes, 107 xan. 705, determines the status ot a 
J.,!onument works9 where mtiohinery ~s used, as being a 1•faotory" tor tbe 
purposes of the act. 
Caspar v. Levin, 82 Kan. 605, determines that a works operat-
ing to rednoe sorap-iron to ins.rketable size and torrn is a factory. 
In the above cases the prinoipa.l questions were the staths 
ot these eatabl1shments, that is, whether they are to be considered 
factories. The m1nor questions of negligeno~ or assumption,or risk are 
decided follat'ting the rules established in previous cases. 
A number of oases involve primarily the questions ot nssump-
tion of risk •.. 3ontributory negligence and the negligence of employers.-
These are: Brick co. v. Fisher, 79 Kan. 411; Howell, a minor v. Sola 
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Portland Cement Oo., 86 Xan. 283; Raines v. Stone, 87 Xan. 116; Casillas 
v. Cement co., 89 1ran. 365; Ba.illard v. Grain co.. 193 Kan. 776; smith 
v. Banersoolt, 95 Kan. 96; Florence He.Ckman, rainor, v. Candy co •• 104 
Kan. 94; Gambill Vo Bowen. 92 Itan. 840; Sibley v. Cotton Mills co., 86 
Ken •. 256; 7/eeks v. Seman Pokg. Co., 90 Ken. 305; !iyriok v. t:rg. Co., 
96 Kan. 17, Alkire v. Cudahy. 63-Ke.n. 373. 
The case of Ballenger v • 01 ty of Hill City, 116 Knn. 604, 
involves an unusual oiroamstanoe and., for this res.son, ia given. Be.1-
lenger lo.st his life in the light plant of Hill Oity when his clothing 
beoarne entangled in nngtiarded maoninery. He was not a workman, having 
entered the plant, on the invitation of anthorities, to stndy operations, 
with a view to 'becoming an employee, when he should have beoome suf-
fioiently familiar with the plant machinery. The question in tbo oaso, 
was, therefore. whet.her his status would justify e. claim tor ~es •. 
The ruling held that since he had bean asked to come into the plant, 
. . 
by employers, his status wa.s~-that o:f" an employee end that the oity 
should pay damages for his death. 
Byland v. Powder oo., 93 Kan. 288 involves an unusual 
cirownstanoe also. Byland was injured in a.n. explosion in a po·nder 
factory. The explosion was oausad by bits or metal striking a spark 
into the _po·.vder. The question in the ca.se was whether the explosion 
was due to negligence of the company. Tb.e supreme Court ruled that 
sinoe the explosion could not have been foreseen, and henoe could not 
have been forestalled, the company was in no degree responsible. Byland 
was9 therefore. not entitled to recover damages. 
Shode v. Osment co., 92 Ks.n. 146~ is a case involving conflict 
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with the 7lorkmen•s Compensation La.'3 of 19119 mid !s important in 
defining the 11mi ts or· that ls.w as well as of the Factory .Aat~ Shode 
was injured in the employ of the company9 and entered suit under the 
Faatory Act. Ho did. not eleot not to avail himself of the benefits of 
the Workmen's Compensation Aat. The employers did so elect, bnt after 
the aaaident. The Compensation J:.ot provides that employers- and employ-
ees are .Prosw:aed· to be within its provisions unless they have filed a 
statement not to be governed by i.ts provisions. 
The injury occurred Us.rah· 'i3,. 191Z9 and the Oompensa.t 1on La~; 
'\410nt into foroe March 12, 1913. The statement of election of tb.e 
Cement Company. therof'ore, was made after the accident and injury. so 
that a.t this time neither the employer nor the employee could be with-
011t tho saope of the a.at. The lower court therefore dismissed the 
case because 1 t was begun lJ,nder the Factory Aat rather tban under the 
Compensation Aot. The case wa.s appealed to the supreme Court. which 
ruled thnt the la.var court was r1gbt in that the on.se should have been 
begun under the Compensation law., but thnt the court should not have 
dismissed the onse, but should have tried it under the proper law, The 
case was therefore remanded for a new trial. 
Tho same question is considered in Smith v. Cement co,. 94 
Kan. 601. Srni th. \Vas injured in the employ ot the cement Oompany and was 
wrarded judgment under the Factory Act. It was claimed by tbe defense 
that tbe crorkmen's compensation L~n covered the case rather than the 
Factory Act. The Supreme Court ruled that the Factory .Act was not to 
be regarded a.s repealed by the Workmen's Compensation Act, but that its 
provisions may not be invoked when both employee and employer have · 
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elected to aaoept the Workmen's Compensation LEW"• (see Sbode v. 
Cement oo. above). 
An employee may have right of action in common law l1nb111ty, 
or under Factory Aot provided he shall file a statement not to be gov-
erned by the Workmen~ s Compensation Aot. · This right is also reserved 
to employers. 
The Workmen's Compensation Law in efteot superseded the 
Factory Act, although not ostensibly doing so. For the reason that the 
former law provides more lenient and certain terms of liability, employers 
elect to coma within its provisions. Oases under the Faotory Act 
therefore have been few, since the enactment or the Norlonen's 
Compensation Law. The dif~erenoes oi terms of employer's 11sb111ty 
will be oonSidered further"· in the study o:r workmen• s Compensation oases. 
CHA?TER \T • 
Federal. Eraplo:rer' s L1abili t:v Act Oases.1 
The Federal Employer's Liability Act, passed in 1908. is 
modeled after the English Lord Campbell 1.ct0 passed in 1846. The 
former law provides that compensation will be paid for injuries and 
death of employees of any common carrier in the United states. wben 
suoh inJury or death is due to negligence of the carrier. and when suoh 
employees are engaged in interstate ,commerce at the time of the accident 
cnusing injUrJ or death. 
Concurrent jurisdiction is provided, i.e. action may be bego.n 
in either Federal courts or state courts. When began in either., an 
notion may not lnter be transferred to the other. Employers when neg-
ligent rr.ay not plead tbe defenses of contributory negligence and assump-
tion of risk of emp~oyees. The latter howevert will operate to mitigate 
the amount of drone.gas. 
The first case revievted by the Supreme Court, Barker v. Ry. 
co •• 88 Kan. 767, establishes rules e.s to contributory negligence and 
assumption of risk by employees. Bnrker, a fireman, was injured in an 
engine ~reek. He raoovered demsges in the district aourt 0£ Sed;,&Niok 
County. On appeal, the supreme 00t1rt ruled that the lower oottrt' s 
instraotion was erroneous, since it ral'ed out the defenses of contrib-
utory negligenoe and assumption of risk. The carrier is privileged to 
use them when not in violation of the laN or of the Safety Appliance 
Act. They may be used also when a violation by the carrier does not 
contribute to the injury. The decision was given reversing the l'tlling 
1. 35 u. s. Statutes at .Large 65, Ohnpter 149. 
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. of'. th& lower court. 
,. · The. Supreme Coo.rt defines the difference between the aasump-
,t'tion cf' risk doctrine and that of contributory negligence. in citinG 




~·~"Assumption of risk and contributory negligence approximate 
where the danger is so obvious em imminent, th.at no ordinarily pro.dent 
man would assume the risk ot injury therefrom. But where the danBer, 
thou.gb. presemr and appreciated,, 1,a one which many men are in the ha.bit 
of assuming,. and which pm.dent men who must enm a 11 ving a.re willing 
to assume for extra. canpensation, one vlho assumes the risk ca.n not be 
said to be gtlilty of contributory negligence, if, ba.ving 1n view tho 
risk. of danger assumed. he uses c~re reasonably commensnra.te to the risk 
l 
to avoid injurions conseqnenoea". 
9:h.1S d!St:tnction ie valuable in this case and in genera.1. The 
Qase invol.ved the application of the doctrines and e. distinction was 
necessary. A fn.rther · ~estion of the ease was the application of the 
definition.· o-:t interstate conmerce,.. . This is important but secondary in 
the case. It was established ths.t a railroad transporting water for 
i ta OVnl USea from one state to another• 1a engaged 1n interota.te com-
merce. lt ··'VJeS. therefore held that Barker• in the above case wa.e en-
titled to recover damages for his injury, since he was engaged in work 
of interstate nature st the time of his injury. 
In the case of Thorn.bro v. Railway co.,, 91 xa.n. 684• the doc-
trines o:r assumption of risk and contributory negligence are i\lrther 
1. See Narramore V. Cleveland a.c. & St. L• Ry. Co •• 57 CoC•A• 4991 
See also Mfg. co. V• Bloom. 76 Kan •. 127; Ce.span v. Lewin 82 Kan. 604. 
explained.. . . Thornb;ro, a brakeman was killed while .he was standing be- . 
tween two cars in. order to effect a coa.plil'Jg. . He stumbled and fell ·under 
the wheels and was killed. . The .coupling apparatus of'."' one,. of' the cars 
was d~fec~ive, making it necessary .for him t·o gooetween the oars. r.r.bis 
wa.s. a violat~on of· the Safety Appliance Act and constituted negligence of 
tho company. The district· court mled that. the estate,0£ Thornbro was 
therefore entitled to recover· demages, end awarded Jttdgmmtt there£o~ • 
. . · 'l'he Supreme Court affi:n16d. this· opinion, ovel'Wling the defenses 
of the company ot aeswnption of risk e.nd contr1bu.to?7· negligence•·· ·!he 
• l . ,. 
court held that the compe.ny wae i;tot ~ntitled to employ~ them ·inasm.uch as 
it .was in viola.t~on ot the :Safei;y App].i~e \aw, .emd·.this ·contributed to 
the death of Thornbro. 
A tu.rther ra.ling is ma4e _of the application of the interstate· 
comnerce prov~sion. the court holding .that ~·brakeman on a tm~ which 18 
engaged, 1n interata.te .comne,rce. le· st1ll··w1th1n the purview of the intel'-; 
state .co~rce provision when he is engaged in shuntinf>' ·cs.rs from that 
train .to a siding, even though the, cars me:y be in intrastate .movement. 
(See case.s: Van Brimmer V• ~ems Pacific ny. Co-. 190 Fed· 594J De Atley 
V• Cheee.peatt,e and Ohio Ry. Co.,.. 201 Fed.• ·591; Behrens v• Ill1n-0is central 
:ay •. c~., 192 Fed. 581). The· Supreme Cour? ro.1&d that the status .of· the 
workman was not changed by the temporary ~hang& in the status of' his em-
ploJment •. 
This opinion in entirety w~s rea.ffirmeQ.in tha opinion on re-
he~ring of the case, 92 Kan. 681• , 
The next case, .that of'. Cole v. Railway Co •• 92 Kan. 152. 
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establishes the rule that the Federal Employer's law supersedes state 
laws on the same Stlbject, and tht.l.t the question of whether the federal 
law or the Bte.te ·law Vlill apply depends upon whether the employer and 
emplo:ree were .engaged in interstate carmeroe when injury or death was· 
sustained. In this case• Cole was injured Vlhen he f'all from the top 
of a car• He wae trying t:o· :fasten a defective door, and m:i engine 
shU?l;ted another car against the car upon which he sa standing, with 
such force that Cola was tb.l'mm. to the ground. The lower court ruled 
that tbe company was liable on account. o:t th~ det'ectlve oar, but that 
Cole was negligent in going upon ~ car at night withcro.t te~ling mem-
bers of the switching ·crew th.at he was working there. It theref'om 
awarded damages but did not diminish the cmonnt by whatever smn the 
negligence of Cole my have contributed to tlie injury. The Supreme 
Court sf'firmed the 'Judgmen't .:for damages but remanded the cause for a 
better·adJustment of the &'\Ta.rd of dar.oag-es, due to failure to mitigate 
the ·amount~ 
. This is ln keeping ·with the role that the contributory neg11~ 
genoe of a;n employee. may not be. used as a defense, by an employer vmon 
he (the employer) is in violation of the lnw but that su.ch neB].!cence 
will ~ect a. dimu.n1tion 0£ the mnount of damages. 
Martin V• Ra.:llwa.y co •• 95 Kan. 681, lo a further discussion 
ot the questions in ·the foregoing cases. Uart1n. a brakeman, was 
ordere~ by his .cOllductor to act as fireman, while he- the conductor, 
did th& work of the engineer. The reason for this arrangement WBS ths.t 
the regular fireman and conductor could hD.va time. tor lunch, without the 
necessity for stopping the trsin. tirartin was injured while en-
gBBed 1n this VJOrk• ne beea;n action for damages .am was aw~d 
judgment by the lower 00t1rt. The railroad comp£m$ appealed the case 
on the ground of error in that the brakeman eesmned the risks when he 
went into tho work of the fireman. 
The Supreme Coo.rt ruled. however, that the brakeman was 
working undor orders of tlle conductor at the time ,of the accident. end 
hence could not be ea.~d to ·have aea'll'llG4 the risk•. ~e rnling of the 
lower court was affirmed On the authority of similar cases c1teda 
(Ch1caso &. u.w. Icy". co. V• Bayfield• 57 1i!S.ch. 205• a3'ld. Bodrna,n v. Mich• 
ignn Central n.n. co •• 65 Mich.) 
In· :t;he case ot Roso v. BailVIS7 co., 95 xa.n. 517.- the question 
of m1t!Gati~ of .demo.gee· by neglit..,~noe of employett is considered. again •. 
The case :follaved the above cases having this question, it being re~ter--, 
atod tba t contributory, negligence of an employee could not be plead.eel as 
a complete defense but would operate in diminishing damages. 
· \fiiere equipment of a. railroad comp~ is not inspected, as 1n• 
tended bJ' the Safety- Appliance law~ before being used in interstate com-
merce, the co~ is in violation of the le.wand may not claim contribu-
tory negligence ot arJ'3' employee who .may be injured. This is the rule 1n 
smith v. Railroad. co •• 95 Ke.n. 451. Here smith. a brakeman, was injured 
while repairing a. car which had not been inspected bef'oze being used. 
He obtained .jud@nent in the lower cou.rt and the Supreme Cou.rt affirmed, 
on the ground of the company's negligence. 
Where a workman loses hie life due to his own negligence, 
when ample warning had been given, his estate has no cle.im for recovery 
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of demage-s. 'The c~ being in suoh case e.baolved from all liability • 
. The case of Sp1nden v. Ba.:tlway co •• 95 Kan. 474• establishes this rale. 
Sp1nden we.s working on a ra.ilroad bridge helping repair it. DeinG warned 
of danger by his foreman, end while "planking" the bridge he fell through 
a hole in the bridge and was killed. The Supreme Court rnled that he 
could have no ca.use for action. ~e defense wa.s offered that the company 
was negligent11 and tlmt a.l though Spinden likewise was negligent,,. his es-
tate showed he awarded doma;ges in a mitigated ammmt. The Supreme COllrt 
ruled that the railway was absolved fran liability whan its foreman Md 
given wa.rning·of the danger. 
When· two persons, employees, are negligent• and the negliBenca 
contributes to inJUl"Y • the ru.le · ot mitigated ~s. will operate. This 
was established in Ross v. Ba.ilroa.d co., 93 Ka.n,. 517. In IIackney v. 
:Railway co., 96 Kan. 50,. this question wan considered.. A freight train 
CNW left a nitch open after their train pnlled onto a siding. A pas-
senger train ran into the open switch and being shunted onto the siding, 
collided with the rear end of the freight train. Hackney •. the pe.saS?JBOr 
train f'i:teman was killed. Action was begun for damages. The lower court 
J!tll.ed that this was a case of negligence of' both crews. The freight crew 
was negligent 1n leaving the switch open and the passenger crew was negli-
gent in not observing the danger signs.ls. It therefore mmrded a miti-
gated amount ·of damages for the death o:t llackney. The emaunt of mitiga-
tion ot ~s due to contributory negligence, is to be determined by the 
Jury, in the opinion of the Supreme court. 
1 
The comnon-la.w ru.lm of' f'ellow-servancy a.re not changed by the 
1. For statement of common-law rnlee. see, Wright - Industrial Evolution 
of the United States - Pages 278-279 
Employer' a liability law. The members· of the. two. train crews 110ra not . 
follow-servants., not being engaged .in the ·same work. ltenee the ·railroe.d 
co~ wao liable for negligence ot the crews. In :fellow-sertancy the 
employer is not liable i'o.r their :negtigence causing injury to each other.· 
Assumption ·of riek and. ·contributory negligence wm:e pleaded in 
the case of Brizendine v. Railroad ·Co.~. 96 Kan .. 691.r Brisendine lost hia 
life 1n the employ o:f' the company:. l:lltile working in a coal chute. A 
BytJtem of elevating buckets ran backward when control was lost,, and crushed 
the workman•· In the action :for damages his· estate ·wa.s awarded judgment. . , 
the lower court ruling out ·the company's defenses. since the accident was 
due to the company• s negligence. The SUpl."eme Court on review_. affirmed 
this opinion. 
The case of Pyles v•· Ra.Uway -Co., 97 Kan. 455• ie very similar 
to the llaclmey case above, in that there was negligence of two crews. 
l'yles .. a member of ono crew. wa.s killed in a collision of' two trains. 
The cau.rts aws.rdod dema.ges 1n mitigated amount. The lower court failed 
to mitigate the award but the Supreme, 'Conrt rettmlded the case for this 
adJustment. 
King v. Hallway Co.,. 97 Xen •. 769• involved negligence 0£ one 
train crew in causing a collision in which King was killed. The· lower 
court awarded damage a ·to the estate of' King and the SUpreme JJourt up-
held tho decision. Since the negligence· was entirely of one crew0 
there was no mitigation of the award as in the above ea.see. 
The question of the applicability of the Federal Emplorer's 
liability act is the leading qa.estion in the case ot Giersch v. Railway 
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co.·s 98 xan.455. It is similar to Cole v. ·Railvm.y co. 1 ·92 xatlt 152. 
Gierschtf a. switcllme.n5 we.a killed 'While engngod in interstate conmerca. 
Action was bro~t under the state employers' liability le.we. The 
supreme Court ra.led that for this reason the case could only be brought 
under.the Federal Act• 
The conmon law is to determine what constitutes negligence in 
eases under the Federal .Act. This ru.le is established in the caeo of 
Boebuck v .. Bailwa.y co.,. 99 Kmlo 544• It is alao a ro.le of this case 
that a erim~l asaault by one servant upon another does not cause lin-
'bil1t7 of employer unless· this is done within the scope of emplo3111ent. 
Roebuck• foreman ot e. section crew. was stabbed to den.th by o. :Mexican 
laborer v.bo uas employed llllder his direction.- Roebuck had previously 
0 t1red" tha Mexican as a ~ous character, and bB.d appealed to his 
superiors not to be asked to allow the ma.n to return to his employ. 
His . superintendent requested him to a.liow the nan to work and promised 
that no ham should come to him• ~e lower c0t1rt a.warded damages for 
his death against the compacy. The case was appealed to the .supreme 
court.,, \lil.iCh ra.led that the killing was not done· in the scope of' the 
emplOJtnent • Ur., ClU.ef J'U.Stice Johnst~ and 1lr. Justice West dissented 
fran this mling. (No dissentlns opinion given). 
Forbes v. Railway Co •• 101 Kati. 477, is a case involving only 
' 
the qu.eation cQf th& amount of damages. Chong \1ba Kim, employed as engine 
wiper by the Atchison,, Topeka end Santa ·Fe Railway, was kilied while 
working on an engine 1n motion,. when he ·was em.shed b~tween the engine 
am the edge of a roundhouse door. II:io estate was awarded $2.000 
damages. This was claimed to be excessive• in the appeal to the supreme 
Colirt, since the Chine.wm's wife,; f'or 'Whan the suit was brought, and 
I 
who. bnd been living in Korea miring thirteen years prior to the·· death 
ot her ·husband• had received only $UO from him daring that time.· The 
Supreme Court upheld the decision, :m.ling that Su.eh a measure of loss 
' . 
ns not a. fair one. 
The l'llle of' mitigation applies in the case.of Thomas v. Rail-
way Co., 101Ka.n. 528. Thomas0 a freight tmin conductor in the emplQ¥ 
of the Atchison, Topeka end sa.nta F8 Bailwa.y Co•., ·was killed When he 
was run down by a passenger tmin. He had stepped upon the track of 
the passenger train in trying to avoid water from the tender of his 
freight engine. He was strnck and kllled by the oncomm€ train. which 
he had not seen. Evidence shou:ed the engineer of the passenger. train 
had not given proper warning tha. t his train was aP.Proaohing. Also that 
the compa.ey was negligent because of the fnulty engiile tender of the 
freight train, which caused the conductor to step upon the main track. 
The lower ccnrt awarded a· Judgment o·i $1011000,but mitigated this amount 
by $5,000 on account of the contributory negligence. or' Thomas in not 
looking before stepping in frant of the passenger train. 
. ' 
UcAdow v. Bail~ co •• 96 Kan. 4251 involves the <FJ.estion of 
insurance collection for injuries. Y~Adow. a motorman of the Kansas City 
Western Railway co.• was injured. He had made an oml -contra.ct With the 
canpa.ny, tmt in consideration of the sum of 50¢ p~r month deducted from 
his wages, he was to receive half-time wages during time lost due to arcy-
1njuriee received. not longer than one year. },fcAdow broa.ght his action 
against the railway company 1nstee4 ot the insurance · c·ompa.ny, notwith-
.. 
standing JJ.e had recovered damages £ran them (the railroad company) in a 
p~vicm.s Slrl .. to: The defense pleaded that• in view of tho compD.iJY having 
pa.id·. the first avm.rd11 I.IcAdow could ba.va no further ri6ht of action against 
it bo..t action Should be against the insu.ra.nco company. ·The lower court 
returned a judgment in keeping with this contention bui; the supreme Canrt 
raled that there VJSS a right of action with the railroad COlll],)EmY on the 
basis of the oral .contra.ct. It therefore reversed the case and ·remllilded 
it for·a new trial• · 
. The rnle was established thnt a. company bas the right to make 
:such contracts f'or insura:nca ot its employees; that the fa.ct ot a.n o.wnrd 
tor, damages to en empl~ does not bsr his right to recover for h1s in-
su.rence. ~nts. 
~1s case was reviewed again~ 100 mm. 509. The plea, of the 
milmy company in this rahea.ring \1D.B that it bad the ri~t (Under auc-
tion s_ Chapter 149• Pa.rt 1. 55 u.s. statutes a.t Large) to set off a.gninst 
the ·~ ot the court :ror dannges.,. any sun paid to the employer tor 
inau.rrmce:> indemnity,~ or relief benefit• on account of the in.jury :for Vlhioll 
he bad been award.Gd damages. 
The history of the case from the begllm.ing is necoesary 1n th1a 
review: 1!cAdow was, injured and: recai ved s. Jud@llGl'lt f'or $7 0500 in Jackson 
County,, ·Missouri. ne later brought action 1n Wyandotte County• Kansas• 
for insilra.nce based· upon an oral. contract. (Sea ab ova case 96 Kan. 423). 
ne recovered Jud~ here also., 
The c~. destred to obtain a .Ju!!gmsnt for the amount of 
the instU'mlee Judgment. as· a setoff agamst the original. $7,500. The 
SUpreme Court ruJ.ed that vb.en ta. contract existed between employers and 
employee• as in this ca.ae, the ell3)leyer cOul~ have no right of aetoff 
for the :lnsurc.nce ~inst the· ·origintil claim. It ru.led th.at. from tbEJ 
evidence submitted~ such contraot had been made by the· c~ 'With ·vrc-
Adow thrOllBil the su.peirlntendent of. the 'comp~• ·s.nd this 'was a valid 
contre.ott binding upon the· company •. -' The decision was· therefore agamsh 
the company. 
· The question ~hether an· employee, a· freight train conductor# 
who is accustomed to use llis ·train caboose· se l1ia sleeping quarters, and 
who is ordered to pre];l0.re to' go Ou.t with his train, and ia htjurod. while 
preparing to go, \Uhen a car ms backed aga.inst hia caboose. is entitled 
to receive damo.ges9 is the qn.estion in :Brunstead V• Railway co •• 99 YJ:m• 
589. It was held that the accident wa.s riot within scope of' his emplo,.-
ment and hence .there was' no liability of the compan;y. 
Where the : clone,-er of an: a.ct is not realised: e.nd appreciated by· 
a workman.1 he does not bar his· right to reao'V'er vhen 11e · assnmes the risk. 
Thi~ is the. rale of' law established hi "the case or-I>Urrau v~- Hsilwey co.~ 
100 Kan~ 189• · Durre.no working in the 8hops ·of the 11.tchisan~. Topeka and 
Santa. Fe Re..ilwa.Y •co.• dimmntling ·a railwey coa.ch 'a:nd -'break:i:ng the -boards 
to 1lse in c. fa.mace. was injured~;~ :A sp1inter struck one 0£ his eyes ·Sna. 
injured it. ne ·was bre~ .the 'boards in.a. my. which we.a dangerous~: ·~ 
was allowed to recover damages beca.uee of·low· intelligence making it im- .. 
probable· that he comprehendad·his danger. TheStlpreme. court affirmed 
the ~t on a:imeal bo.t ur. Justice PoJ:te-.cet lir~ Juetice lh1:rch ·and Yr• 
/ 
Justice Dowson dissented. (No: dissenting opinion given)~ The authority 
cited was Barker v. Bailwa.y co.~· ea Kari. 767. · On :ehea.ring of the case, 
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the aama opinion was given •. with the same division in the court, a.s in 
the first hearing. 
The rn.le established in the case of Briggs v. Re.ilway co. 1 102 
Kan. 441 is that en experienced employee, fa.lly cogniss.nt of the dn:ngera 
he is incurring. e.sswnes risk ot them and is not entitled to damages, 
for injur;r or ~or death. :Briggs, a fireman, e.r.d his engineer, wore ea.t-
ing lunch, having stopped their train. in Topeka. Vlhen the e11Bineer hn.d 
finished his l'UllCh.. he went to his engine and started the train. The 
fireman boarded the rear of the train as it passed, and started forward 
to the engine on the tops of the care. In the darlmess he fell between 
cars and was killed.- The lCN1er court raled tha.t there was no negligence 
of the eompa.?11' and that Briggs assumed the risk o:r his acts. The supremo 
Court attirmado 
This case is an example of the application ot the la.w to assump-
tion of' risks as stated above. Barker v. Railway co.• ea Kmi. 767, 1.e. 
en employer may employ the d~f'enses of contributor.v negligence and assump-
tion of risk when he is not in violation of the la.w hhnseU. 
Vt1lere an employee knowingly violates a rnle of his employer, 
promulgated for his safety, he can not recover damages, for an inJury in-
curred, according to the rnle of Rosk v. Railway co., 105 Kan. 440. Rook, 
an engineer or a freight train which was approaching Hutchinson, Kansas, 
•' 
seeing tracks occupied at a switch,. did not slow his train in time to 
avoid a collision. He wa.a injured and brought action. He recovered in 
the lower court, but the Supreme court rnled that he had no right of 
action, -since he had assumed the risk, and that there was no liability 
Paga. 56.· 
of the oanpa.ny. 
The ce.ae of llcDougeJ.l v. Bail~ co.~ 106 Kan. 1556 is another 
ct.UJe of contributory negligence of an employee barring· recowry ot dam-
ages. The rnle of law we.a establiahed,, tbat, in ease of' an engineer 
being killed while leaning ou.t of his cab am. looking backward, when· hie 
head strn.ck n steol girder of ti bridge, end· where· the clearance: wa.s two 
feet, the· engineer had no right to recover BVJarda. since. he· assumed the· 
risk. cases were· cited as 1n point: Tuttle Vo l«lilwankee :Bail~• 122 · 
UtSe 189; Clark V• 1ilseour1 Pacif'ic Bail"WS.Y CO•o• 48 Kim• 654; Briggs 
V• Railwey Co. t 102 Ken. 4:41. (See also Waymire V• ny. CO•, 10? Kan .. 
90). 
A workman does not a.ssnm& the risk when he uses a~ tool or a. 
machine of a dangerOlls ohe.ra.c.te:r. without e. protest• 1mder the Federal 
statute. That is; the employer Shonld be, and .is~. responsible for the 
character of this machinery. ·Under the·· coomon-la.w ml.a. a workman does 
assume the r~sk if' he uses the ma.chine without a protest. Ulld.er the 
Federal statute, he mtlY see danger, and yet. if he does not··appreciate 
it very thoroughly, he does not assume the risk. The oase of' Smith 
v. Bailwe.y co., 108 Kan. 151. esta.blishetr these rules.· Smith was 1n-
Jured when he fell from a. .. ~·soa.ffold 'Vihile assisting to repair a bridge 
on a railroad• The lllmber of' which the scaffold -was ma.de -was defective, 
allowing the scaffold to collapse.· He was given a.n award for de.ma.gee· 
on the gronrd that he did not fa.lly sppreoiate his danger although aware 
of it, and that there was some negligence or the company in the matter 
of the· defective lumber. The Suprmie ·court on review ot the case 
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affirmed the decision. of the lower coo.rt. 
In the case of Mcintosh v •. Railway Co.• 109 Kan. 249, Mcintosh, 
a bralreman •. failed to c~ his tram order with that of the conductor. 
Later a collision occured. in which l!Cint·osh was injured. Ile brouBh.t 
action ~inst the eanpany tor damages due to the company's neBligenoe. 
The canpany conteitded that· lr!clntoah was. negligent due to fe.ilure to com-
pare :the tram orders, Tb.Sae being compnred later .were found to have been 
the· .same. The Suprane con.rt ra.led tmt failur.e to compare the o~era 
could ·not have ·ea.used the -~ollision-. This opin~on re~rsed the lo-oor court, 
wbich hEld ml.ad. tha.t this. failure should mitigate dennges •. 
An engine repairer is held to be within the lo.w when injured 
'Mlile making .repairs on an engine engaged .in interstate camnerce, oocord-
ing to the rule in Akins ·v·· Railway co.~. 109 Kan. 474. -The crew ot a. 
sm:tch engine ·1s engaged in interstate t\anmerce .when switching cars 1n 
the :raill.~ yards ot a city. (Soe Stice v. Railway 110 .xan. 763.). 
\Vb.ere a brakeman is forced to -stand between cars due to a de-
fective coupling, am is injured when he falls be~a.th the ca.r wheels, 
the -.railroad company is in violation of both the employers' liability 
a.et arid the Safety Appliance .Act. This is the ra.ling 1n the Caso ot 
Northcutt v. Bailmy co • ., ll3 Kan. 444. 
The .. employers' liability act permits_ of two recoveriae of' dam-
ages for dee.th ·or injury. Tile right of the injured person does not bar 
the right of' his dependents. The ·English Lord Cempboll Act does not 
pemi~ this doublErrecowry. In Goodyear. V•· Ra~Way Co., 114 Kan. 55'11 
this question· is discussed. , Tho, .Supreme Court ruled tbat the double 
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· liability feature should be followed in this case. (Sae "Javis v. Be.11-
WDN co ••. 53 Ark. 117 end nowor ~· Beston., 155 lhsa •. ~}. The Goodyear 
ca.so contains e complete dieeusSion of the difi"erenceo between the two 
acts, end a.loo a histoey of both., {See 114 Kan~ 657. ) .• 
As in Northcu.tt ..-. :Ra.ilway oo •• ebove• both the Se.fev Appli-
ance Act and the liability act were violated in the case of Flannigan 
v. Ra.ilw~ co"• 108 Ke.rt. 154• The l'Jlle ia ·important. The tower court 
ruled that action in such a .cane tnFJ.y be brought Under either. but election 
must be made a.a between the acts. The St!;prema Cmtrt raled that aati.on may 
be b~t under both. ·since viol.o,tidn of the se .. fety Applianae Act is also 
violation of the liability a.ct. 
Cm.P:mB VI. 
Kansas :Employers Lie.bility Ceaee 
'I'ha first employers' liabil:tty a.ct 1n Kansas wa.s passed 1n 
18'14,. (Lan of Kansas 1874,. Chapt~r 93 sec. 1 >• The law was amended 
hi 1905• 19051 190?,. 1909, 1911and1913. 
'l'he law provides tha.t all railroads or other common carriers 
shall be liable tor injuries to their employees where such in.Juries 
.a,re due to negligence of tlle employer in using dafeoti ve oquipnent. 
Details of the law a.re similar to tha Federal liability a.ct e:mept tha.t 
they deal with intrastate commerce. The rules concerning assumption of 
risk am contribu.toryneg:tigence do not apply quite as· 1n the Federal 
statute• The mmsas le.w eliminates these defenses entirely, when the 
comp~ is in violation of' the lav• under the Federal act they aro al-
lowed to mitigate the amount of de.me.gee• 
The· eases .arising under the Kansas law are very similar to 
those considered ttnder the Federal act, the only difference lies in 
the limiting ·Of the latter to intra-state comnerce. The Kansas cases 
. . will be merely listed for reference. Thia list is o.s follows. 
Law of 1874. 
'' '' Union Tru.st Co. v. Thomason, 25 Kan. 1 
Ho:o P. lily. Co. Ve lialey. :Adm, 25 n 35 
' ' X.P. Bly. Co. V• Pevvey, 29 n 169 
Solomon llly~ co. v •. Jones0c 50 " 601 
. ' . 
Bl~ Co. V• KingJJ Sl tf '108 
B.17• Co. v. Ma.ckeyo , 53 " 298 
(This case. attirme~ by u.s. SU.prams coo.rt, 121 u.s. 205) 
my. Co. Vo Harris, 53 mm. 416 
m.y. co. v. Koehler z7, n 465 
~:iy. co. V• Brown,,,, 44 n 584 
. Railway Co. v. Pontious:t 52. ft ·254 
(nff'1med by u .s •. supreme Court'.•· 157 u.s. 209} · 
Rouse v. narry. 55 ft 589 
Rtl.ilwe.y Go• v. schroedert 56 ff 751 
Bail~ co. V• Mede.ris~ . 60 n 151 
lla.ilway Co. v. D:dcker1t. 65 f1' 521 
Railway co. V• F.emJ.in,_ 67 n 476 
Rdl\'m.Y co. V• Sledge1: $8 tt 521 
Railway co. v. JohnooniJ 69 ft 721 
Brinkmeier v• Railway co.,. 69 t1 758 
Higgins v. Ra.ilwq Co.9 70 rt· 014 
Ra.11~ Co. V• Franko 74 :ft 519 
1u·g. 00-. v. Bloom,, 76 n 127 
Sewell V• Bo.ilway CO• o vs rt· 1 
Caspar V1t Lewin.ii 82 tt 604 
Law of 1903. 
Bo.1lwa.y- Co. v. Burgess, '12 Kans·· .464 
n· n v$ Little• 76 . " 716 
n fl V·• Green,. 75 " 504 
n " v. Schroll,, ''IS " 572 
Law.o'f 1905. 
nBilway co• v., Bastillgs. 
Smith· T• Railway Co.,, 
!larpar v. Ballwe\V .. Co ••. 
·· Ru.ckhold v• Railwa;; co.,_ 
.Dowe1l v. n rt 
YOttt?G· v. 'ff. tt 
:Brooks v .. ·u 'tt 
·Law o:f' 1911. 
1?al.ominov• Railway co.,. 
~-v •. · ' tt 
Defenbaugh v.' " 
Kaspar v. ny. Co.•· 
Hiale V• n tt 
llerwood V• · n ·n 
Q.uinle.nta.n v. By •. co.,, 
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79 Kan• 499 
a2 " 249 
95 ft 201 
97 " 715 
85 n 562 
82 tt 552 
95 " 732 
91 Kan. 556 
98 n 7Gl 
102 ft 5G9 
111 " 267 
91 " 572 
101 n 215 
109 " 111 
For ·.annotation of cases see Devised statutes of mmsa.a 1925, 
6&-255. P. 1050. ! 
CRAPl'ER VII• 
The Fedeml sstety Applianee eet tm-s passed by congress in 
1893, (27 u~s. statutes 531 CbBPter 196;. u.s •. Comp• Statutes 1918 sec• 
tion 8657). It has bean amended ·several times. The dates of' the emend-
' . . ' 
ments a~1 190~· .19081 1910t. 1911, OJ?-d 1915. sane o!f the provisions of 
tho o.ct a.re: 
,All cars mnst be e~pped, by all conmon ·carriers with devices 
to protect worlanen. These are grab irons,~ hand brake~• leil.ders1: holds0 \ . '' .. _ . 
e.utonatic ~oupl&rs" so that there ~11 be no necessity of workmen going 
between cars 1 e..nd. au.tome.tic air b~s• 
All locomotives,,.oxcept elect?-1c. and oil locomotives#·n.re to 
be eqQ.ipped with o,eh pane fo~ dumping a.shes without the necessity of 
workmen going llllder the engines, end must have dr1vi.11g wheel brakes,. 
All locanotives and cars are to be inspected befom being put 
into tmffic, a.'ld tmdergc» freqm~t inspection thereafter .• ~o. tba:h· no. 
. ' eqttipment will be Ut;ied if it io in bad t>rder, or ~efective.: , · 
A chief inS,Pector and tWo assistants e.re appointed by the Pres-
ident tor the ir.spoction of boile1'1l and equipment. TJ.1ese report to the 
InterstElte Comnerce Conmission a.nnually, ¥!1ich ha.a charge of rego.lating 
carriers and eatablis111ng standards as ·well as enforcing them. · 
. Ans carrier violating provia1~ ~:f the act is .liable for 
deznages duo to inJu:r:I GD death c.~- employees. where au.ch carrier is in 
violation, ~e def.cmse of ~ssumption of· risk may not be used. ' The common-
law ro.le of contribn.tory negligence holds however under the safety a.ppli• 
ance act, The cases a.rising often involve the Federal Employers Liability 
Act~ for, violation of the Safety Appliance Act is also violation of the 
liability act. 
irhe first case considered is .. Thorn.bro v. Railway co., 91 
Kan~· 684.. Tb.ornbro, a bmkama.n in the employ of the x.c, Mexico and 
Orient Ba.ilway0 was killed when he went between ca.rs to effect un-
cou.pling. In the lower court,. Sumner County, his estate we.s awarded 
danages for his death. The question in the case was not w:OOther t:M 
ccmpa.ey was in violation of the law, for this ws conceded• but whether 
Thornbro could be said to be engaged. in interstate conmerce at the time 
ot his death. Be was assisting in moving a car from a S'Witch to put it 
in a train. The car was· to move only within tho state of Oklahoma, o.nd 
hence it was oonte!ldad that there could be no interstate coIDOX9rce. 
The SuprGme Court ral.ed that in a.bsenoe of a. United Sta.tas 
Supreme coU.rt ruling decision, and in .. view of conflicting decisiono of 
various state courts. that its opinion would follow tha.t in the co.ea of 
~·"'> . 
Behrens v. Illinois Central Railway- Co., 192 Fed. 681. This oosa ruled 
that in ea.ch conditions an employee would be held to be engaged 1n inter-
state comarce. Other oases cited are: D8 Atley v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. 
Co. st 201 Fed. 591,. Lamphere v. Oregon n •. & Rav. Co. 1 196 Fed·. 536; Peder-
sen v. Del. La.ck. & western R.R. co., 229 u.s. 146. 
On the other side• i.e. ruling that snoh an employee wooJ.d not 
be in interstate c~rce,, is the case of VM. Drimmer v. T~ & P. ny. co •• 
190 Fed. 594. This case held that woh employee could not recover dam-
ages. The Kansas supreme Court held that tho former rn.le ms held in 
a ma.jority · ot cases and that the rale would be followed in this case. It 
therefore upheld the deoisien of the 10'm9r court. 
'The next caae is that of George Vo Railway co. 0 102 Jr.an. ?74. 
George, a brakeman tor the Atchison. Topeka. and stmta Fe Bailway co.,. 
wao injured when he was caught between two cars wllile 1l?!Coupling an air 
hose. The cars moved together when the brokes were released,. catching 
a.nd severely inJuring his head. He began action in the Cowley district 
oon:rt for.dranages on the ground of negligence of the company 1n not equip• 
ping coaches with butters; for having a defective coupling on ·one of the 
co.rs; and for ha.v.1.ng a. hose apparatus which necessitated workmen going 
between co.rs to operate it. The. lower court awarded a judgment for dam-
ages. 
Tlie supreme Court on review ot the ca.se, reversed the opinion, 
for the reason that the sSf ety Appliance Act makes no. provision for· bu£.,. 
fere in the list of safety appliances. nor for air hose equipment vlh.ich 
may be operated withou.t goin8 between cars. Another reason. was tbat the 
lower court disregarded the matter of the defective· ccm.pler. the i,nfer-
ence being, althonejl not so stated, that this ms the only ground upon 
" 
which a recovery cotlld h.El.ve been had. 
The next case, that of' Flannigan v. Railway co •• 108 Kan. 153 
invol veo queeti0ns as to application of the act and also ot the Employers•· 
Liability act. Flann!ga.n,. a switching-crew foreman, was killed while 
o.ee1st1ng in removing e. defective car from a bad order track to a rip 
track for repairs. The car had no drawba.r e.m was being moved with 
cllllina. Act ion was began in the Wyandotte. County COl.'l.rt. ~e case 
was a violation ot both of the above acts. The lower court reqnirad 
the pln.1nt1tt to elect between the two acts. He brought action under 
the .Flnployere• Act for violation of the ~afet7 Appliance Act,. and we.a 
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awarded damages. The lower coo.rt barred tesMinoey showing that the . 
· plaintift was engaged 1n interstate commsrce. The Snprane court an 
review ruled that there could n~ properl;y' be an awe.rd under the Em-
ployers• Act withou.t asoerbain$rlg tlw.t thf) worlana:n wa.e engaged in 
interatate commerce. The laser ccm.ri also barred ev!Clence ahmdng 
contributory !lBgligence .of Fla.mligo.n. The Supreme Conrt rtlled thnt 
there caald not properl7 be recowey under :he safety Appliance Act• 
unless this evidence be.d been allowed.. The Safety Appliance Act does 
not ·~ the comnon•law ru.le of contributory negligence. The supreme 
Court ml.ad therefore,. that the decision of the lower ccmrt wa.a incon-
sistent. am. remanded the cause for ·re-trial. 
The lower cmtrt was held tb .be in ,error also on the question 
of laws •. rnl.ing that l1lamiigan should not have been requ1:rod to oloct 
between laws bu.t that he •was privileged to go to trial on as lrlCllly grounds 
e.s the evidence warranted. Other ~es esto.bliahed were• 
{l.} That tho Federsl lD'nployers' liability lo.w can not be em-
ployed unless the carrier is engnged in interstate com-
meres. 
(2}. The sa:tety .Appl!ance does not allow the defense of o.soump-
tion of risk but does allow tha.t of' contribn.tory negli-
genoe. 
{5) The lower court shoald have allowed teetimoey as to con-
tributory negligence and as to interstate. conmerce. 
The above -ca.ees show the differences between the t!lo la.ws in 
the matter of assumption of risk and of contributoey negligence. The 
liability act does not abrogate the common-1.Sw ml.es except when 
employers a.re negligent or in violation of the-Safety Appliance Act. 
Contributory negligence is a partial defense in that it mitigates the 
amount of doznages. The safety Applla.me Act leaves the eanmon-!DM raie 
of contribn.to ry · neglit.,ooence llll.cluinsea, •. 
The laws o:r ID.\nsas with respect to safet3' appliances for com-
mon carriers are not so definite a.a the Federal statute, the.' provisions 
of the state employers" liability set covering the ceaes ae appliances. 
under the head of negligence oi' employers. 
l 
\Vorkmen's Canpensation laws began in 1884, in Germ:my,. and 
were soon enacted in most of the countries o:r Europe. The first lm 
of the kind in the United Sta.tea vro.s passed in 1902. Thirty-two uta.tes, 
Hawaii, the Canal Zone, end Al.a.ska now have such laws, The Kanoa.a la.w 
2 
was enacted 1n 1911. Thie was amended in 1915. 
some of the moat important provisions are a.s follows: 
Employers in "ha.zardou.e" 1ndustrjas9 that is. any industries 
wherein. dangerous machinery, or explosive or infiamable material. are 
used, a.re liable for compensation of employees illJured• Liability does 
not apply to injuries self-inflicted, nor for inJuries ca.usblg a loss of 
time of less than one •ek. 
sub-contractors a.re not lia.ble for inJuriee ot their employeoo, 
liability going back to contractors or owners. contractors rt1J,y sue e. sub-
contractor in case they (the contractors) ho.ve been forced to pay for in-
juries of workmen or a. sub-contractor. 
The law does not apply to emplo31llents not tmder tho control of 
state legislation, a.s for example those engaged in interstate conmercll 
nor to industries employing less than five workmen continuously for one 
... month prior to the accident. tllllese such industries elect to come within 
, .the a.ct. All mines are under the law. 
A guardian may sue 1n the stood of a minor or en incompetent 
l~ See He~-nold on Workmen's Compensation Vol. I. P. 5. 
2. · Laws of Kansas, 1911. Chapter 218. 
person and no U.mito.tion. ~~ .~im.O .()b~~~n while tbe person is a minor · 
or incompetent, ~d llsa' no gtlS.~t. 
In case of death the emmmt of compensation to dependents 
(totally dependent) is tlrree times his eamhlgs for· the preceding year. . . -
but not over $5600 nor less than $1200. It dependants a-ee not residents 
or citizens of' the United states or the Dominion of' Canada, p~t does 
not emood $750 (Thia ~la.use bas been held uneonstituticmal}•· ·If de-
pendents are only part1ally dependent, their compensation is in propor-
tion to the inJur:r to the dependents. If no dependents are left,. the 
I I 
oompens!\tion is the amount ot expense. and burial, ·noi; ·exceeding $100. 
' ' 
Marriage of a dependant, on attaining the ·age of' 18,. terminates compen-
sation for that person but not for others. For totnl incape.city • e. StJm 
eqanl to 50 per cent of e.vorage weeltly ee.rn1ngs. p~ble weekly, ia 
awarded. but not less than $6 pei- ueek nor more than $15 per· week. In 
partial 1nca.pc.c1ty, 25 per cent to 50 per cent, PtiWBble weekly,. of aver-
age weekly ee.minga. I:t person is a minor or earning less than $10 per 
week, peqment 19 not less t?.¥:m. 75 per c~t of' his average ,earnings;. not 
lees than $3 nor more than ,$12 per week, tllese p~nts to run net longer 
" . 
than e years. (sec. 11 ) • 
"Averag& ea.mhlgs" means the average rate of mrnings for the 
. ' . 
52 weeks prior to the accident. In ,case of part~ inca.PS.city~~':-'~ t~ pay--
ment eba.11 be eqtml to 60 per cent ot the dif~erence between th\l '\12.gSS 
before the accident em. wages afterward. (sec. 12)• Pa.~ents are to 
be pa.1~ Just as wages 81'8 paid• except that a Judge of arrs court having.· 
jurisdiction my prescribe different arrangements of_p!\)'ment •. {Sec •. 13·). 
~nts of compensation are not aesigna.ble except £or medi-
cine. madiCBl attention or nursiDg. "cs~c· 15 ). 
An «nployee ma.st submit to a physical examination after s.n 
inJUl.7•- by a physician selected by the employer._ The employee may 
however haw. his own pbysician partioi:Pa.te in e:xDmimtions. · Unlest{ \, 
the employee's physician is allowed to participate, the employer's 
. ' ' physician.my not afterward give evidence of' the condition of the. em-
~ : '. , . ' . . 
ployee. no other, disqualification of' physician's testimony, tbnn this, 
is to obtain •. {Sec. 1'1}. 
The court may order a neutral physician, (Sec. 18 ), 'Who nay 
examine employee in court (Seo~ 19) •· .Physicians· erBmining ma.st gi~ 
employer and ertwloyee certifioa.tee of condition (Sec. 20). netuOa,1 of 
; ·: . ' . 
examinat1~ by employee deprives of the right of compensation. (sec.20 J. 
Written notice of accident must be given within ten days by 
emplo~e t~ employer,. and ~ claim· for compensation must be made \'4 thin 
three months. (See,. 22). or within six months,. in case of death • 
. ~, ... 
Compensation .tnay .. be settled .by agreement. ·or by a comnittee 
agi-eeable to both parties, or by an arbi tmtor appointed by the conrt. 
The arbitrator ·is .not bound by ra.lea of P'iocedure but must be reason-
eble and fair·• llin t>ees are paid by parties to the arbitration and he 
has a. lien on ·p~ento tor hie fees. II1s awe.rd.a a.re me.de in writing., 
{sec •. 25-27)• and he ma.st tile award.ea agreements. and releases within 
sixty days _o~ de.te made" in the office ~f the 'distrtot court. (sec .. 28). 
I • 
. An award,, agreement or release. ma.v be cancelled by a Judge 
of' the district court, within one year of time of filing. if there is 
found to haw been fmud;i misconduct •. mutual . .miatat."9 of pe..rties o:r 
- .. •• • <" 
that it is grossly ~essive0 or grossly inadequate. {Sec. 29)1) 
A judge o:f n district court m£1'~· etay procee~U .. ngs, .if tm ··em-
. . . 
ployor makes a. bond for payment of the compensation or shows the cer-, 
t1t1ca.tG of an inS'i.1.l'allCe company tlnt the companeat1aa is :insllred .• 
. . 
Tbe Judge may a.lso awe.rd a ltunp-aum j'Udgment ot so~ ot' all psamsnts 
due. (Sections 50 and 51). Dnployer n£J.'3' after six months of piwment0 
pa;s 80 per cent of the remaiD.1Dg amount due end be discharged. from all 
11o.bil1ty. (Sec. 33) •· 
A workman's right to compensation my• in absence of agree-
.. . ~ ' ~ 
ment or arbitration• be enforced by ·e:r£1 court of compe"tent Jurisdiction. 
' ' 
The case will then be tried without a JU1'7 unless either ~rt7 requests 
a Jury. Payments ~1us provided may_be fore lump-sum of tbe ~l amount 
ot oom.Pensation due. with interest on those owrdue, or they may be 
periodical 11 in the discretion or the court. (Seo.. 56) •. 
All employers entitled to come w~~in the act are pre~ to· 
have done so unless tbey file with the secretary of otate. a.t Topeka.• e 
written statement of election not to come tmdar the act. :Notice ·of 
election sball be posted by employer about pl.Bee of business. 
Dnployera ahe.11 not plead -the def'enses of (l)· Co11tribu.tory 
negligence, (2) WOJlt of care of a. fe~low-servant, (5) Assnaption of ri~k 
by employee; where they llave not elected to cone :within the a.ct: nu.t if 
employees do so elect and employees ·elect not to cane lfithin the aot 
• • I - 0 ( 
the defenses will be allowed. (Sects. 47 and 46 ). 
The schedule of rates of compensation for loss of,, or injury 
to, members,, is e.s f'ollowai 
For loss of a,.thumb• 50% of average weekly wBges during 60 \"leaks 
ff tt tt "" 1st f~" " ft u n ti 57 n 
ft if " tt 2nd fl tt ft n t1 " n 50 " 
ft tf fl ft 3rd tt ft ft fl .. " " 20 n 
" ·n n tt 4th tJ ft n n fl " tt 16 ft 
Loss of a. first phalange , of' the thumb or any finger equals loss of 1/ 2 
of finger. 
Lo~s of a first phal.a.nge and arrs pa.rt of' 2nd phalange of a f'iDBer equals 
loss of 2/5 of a finger. 
Losa of a. first pha.lange and miy pa.rt of 2nd pbalange of a tlmmb equals 
loss of entire th1lmb. 
Loss, of first . two :phalanges. and any part of' 3rd of s. finger equals loss 
of entire finger .. 
Loss of a great ·toe• compensation is 50% of average weekly we.gee ·during 
50 wealte. 
Loss of ·e:n:s other toe. compeneat·ion is 50% of average weakly wages during 
10 weeks. 
The same rules obta.in in consideration of injuries to phale.nees 
. . 
of' the toe as in .those of a. fineer• 
For Loss of a hand• 50% of average weakly wages during 150 weeks. 
tt tt ff l!n a.rm n " n " n " 210 n 
fl n ft a foot tt n n n tt 1t 125 " 
" ff tt " leg tt ft n n " 'ft 200 tt 
n fl " n eye tt n n n ft ,, 110 tt 
ft ff " hearing of both·. eo.ra 50% of' average weekly wages during 
100 weeks. 
For Lose of hearing of one ~a.r 50% of average weekly wages ·during 25 weeks •. 
Amputation or severance between elbow a.n.d mist shall be con-
sidered as the loss ot a hand. Amputation at or sbaro the elbow slmll be 
considered as the loss ot an arm. Amputation between knee and ankle shall 
be considered t\8 the loss of' a. foot. Amputation a.t or above the knee shall 
be considered ns the loss of a leg. 
Permo.nent loss of use of e. member is to be telten as total loss 
ot a member. 
The cases appealed to the supreme Court under tl1e Workmen's 
Compensation Act are vera numerous, and a study of them will necessarily 
be confined to most important cases; these will involve qn.estions of: 
1. Constitutionality of the law, 
2. Inclusive and exclusive phases9 
3. Master end servant. relations; of fellow-servancy; and doc-
trines of' o.ssumption of risk,.. and contribUtoey negligence. 
Treatment will necessarily be brief., maey cases will ·be; omitted• others 
are referred to·leading cases• 
The first cmee revieWed by the Supreme court is that of Shade 
v. Cement co., 92 Kan.. 146. Shade was !nJured in th&. erriplq of the. 
Cement Comp0ll3', l!A'reh 15, 1915. The Workmen's Compensation Act went 
into effect on l~ch ua •. 1913. Thus it ·would be· presumed that. both the 
employer and the eniployee were under th~ provisions ot the·. law. The dis-
trict court (Neosho Connty) · rilled that this ms trne but tha.t the can.rt 
had no jurisdiction since Shade brought his action under the Factory Act. 
however not electing to be governed by the V/orkmen's Compensation Act. 
The ~mployers had elected not to be governed by the act, an Jlaroh 1711 1915. 
The looer cou.rt ruled timt this did not effect the eta.tu.a of the 
comp~. hoi."9ver. for both they and the anployee wore already under . 
the provisions of the act. It therefore dismissed the case bees.use ot 
lack of Jt1risdiotion. in that the case should llave been br~t under 
The supreme Coo.rt,. ravie"1fng the case, held that the lower 
court was in error in dismiss!De the case, tlnt it had jurisdiction. 
even throm the case was t~ under· i;he workmen's Compensation Act. 
The dee1s1on therefore ramnded the case for e lleW trial 'mder the Wol'k-
men's Coope...'1.sat!on law. 
The Supreme COlll:t uphel.d t11e lower court's raling that ·at the 
... 
time of the injury both employer a.nd emplol'Sr were under the Worlanen'e 
Compensation law• and that statements of' election were then too lnta 
to effect a c..lm.11g0 from the Workmen' a Canpensa.tion la.w.. This astnb-
l:f.shed the important ml.a tmt where neither employer nor employee htlve 
elected to come umer other laws. the Workmen's Compenotl-tion law w111 
govam. and this is the only prescribed r~ in such a caaa. 'l'lls.t ia, 
common-law liability will not be considered, nor liability ns tlllder other 
~ws. 
A rehearing was grented for this case. The opinion is sivon 
in 93 Kan. 257. The qa.est!on. here was the constiti.it1omlity of the law, 
in e.ddition to the qµ.estions in the orig!ml hearing. Tlia Supxema Court 
rsa.ff'irmed its opinion given in the former case as to the latter quoations, 
and ruled that the la.w we not nnem:istitut!onai. aa in violation of tho 
process· clause of the 14th amendment to the Federal Constitution. 
The basis of this opinion was the cases of l Diebekis v. 
Link-Belt Co._ 261 lll• 454. ;. Matheson V• l\fimleapolis. Street Ba.ilway 
co.,, 148 n.w. 71• The rule of these is e.11own in the opinion in t~ 
Lil'lk-Belt case. "Being elective,. the act does n~ become etteot1ve as 
to EJ:n'3' employer or employee uniess such. Om,PlOJer or empl019e chooses 'to 
come vithin its provisions, .Ha-v.tng once elected .to come within the 
provisions of thO e.ct, ns 101'18 as su.ch election.remains 1n force the .act 
is effective as to the party or :ie...rt;ies ma.king t110 election. mld in case 
an employer and an employee both elect to· c~e witllin.the provisions of . . '' 
tho act, the act itself ·then becanes a. pa.rt ot the· contract of emplo,ment 
held that t..ltio ra.le was to be tollcwed. since_ there could be no violation 
of duo process pf l.D.w when the matter o:f deciding as to the law was le ft 
a privilege to both parties•. For other eases cited in··· strengthening this. 
position see Kansas Repol"ts., Vol. 95. ·P· 261·~ 
?.!cRoberte v. Zinc co., 95. Kan. 564~ brings the question of· the 
exclusive feature .of the V!ortmen•s Cornpensti0n le.~ when it is 1n operation. 
Here both employer o.nd employee were \vitllin. the s.ctf'. but the lower court 
slloaod a verdict based on a. comnon-lawra.le of damges for pain am suf-
fering tb.ranejl.01.1.t lifetime. The suprune C9Uri. .overl"ll1ed ·this verdict 
l I < • 
end reversed the case bBcnuse snch a miing·was not provided.for in thG 
'r1orknlen' s· Canpeneat1on law, and this law i~ exclusive ·wb.en both parties 
are within it~ provisions• 
The case of' Gorrell v. Bottelle1' 95.R'an. 5'10,eatablished rules 
toot: 
i. Awa.rd may be 1n lnrap-m.un. 
2,. cani)ense..t:ton aurarded is for loss of earning power, duo to 
i.."lcapncity,. ~· shown by inability either to do work obtain-
able• or to obta.i.'1 work. 
Gorrell was injured wben n, piece of steel atra.ck one of his eyes. lia lost 
the s!ght cf tll.e f31es to such a degree tha.t he w.s rendered incaptLble to 
do wotk. The· court raled that he Sh.mild be compenao.tcd. at the re.to ot 
$6 per week for the period ~f··tota.l disability. 18 weeks~ ond at tl10 
rate of $3 for the r,ema.inder of the eight year period or seven yes.re and 
; 
thirty-faa:r weeks~ and that this ttMlrd should ba in lumirsum• The Supreme 
The question of conflict of the Compensation Act with tho ~ .. o..otory 
Act i$ found in Smith v.- Cement Co~, 94 xw .• 601. Smith brought nation 
under the latter act eJ.than@l electing to the 'form.or. The employers 
elected not to accept the act however, end this gave the risht to action 
' ' 
-tmder the Factory Act by the snplo:,'tlo·. Thia wns affirmed by tho Supreme 
·cao.rt• · The fnrther ?Ule es to the Faetor:v ~ot was that it was not re-
pealed 1>1 the Compensation law. but that it could not be employed by o. 
wo~ when he has elected to be gowmed by the Compenoat!on ·Act. un-
less the -employer Should ·elect not ·to be governed by the act. \'1l1ere 
. . 
- ' ' 
eit~er enip1o~r t1r employee ~jecta- the act no action can be su.stn.ined 
mider it~ {94 Kan. 505).· 
The questions o:t S.ssum,ution of risk and contributory negli-
. gence- are· raised. in Spottsville v. Cement co •• 94 Iran. 258. Spottsville 
wt.is injured in a. -qo.S.rry when a rock fall upon 1u.m. He wo.s tw.rarded a. 
J~ent of $1 but ms later granted a new trial. The Cement Company 
appealed from the decision in thin trial whicll awarded $5000 compensation. 
The grounds f'or the appeal were that the company'•s defenses of cont:ribu• 
tory negligence and assumption ot risk by Spottsville, were denied except 
1n mitigation of d.amages. The Supreme c~ affirmed the opinion hold• 
1ng that the company bad not elected to come within the provisions of 
the Workmen's Compensation Act• and hence were not allosed to use thesEt 
defenses. 
Thia case establishes ·the important rtlle with ~spect to the 
abow doctrines, viz., that employers ma.y not employ them unless they 
have elected to come within the law. except in mitigation of damages. 
The .constitutionality of this fellture ot the law is questioned 
1n the case of Hovis v. Refining Co. t 95 xan. 50fh It was contended that 
deey:lng these to an employer who has_ elected not to be governed by the 
\Vorlanen's 6ompenso.t1on Act, and granting them to the employer who elects 
to be govemed by the law. is unconstitutional• The Supreme Con.rt held 
that this contention was invalid however. on the authority of the case 
of' Borgu.ie v. Folk, 147 Wis. 527, a c~ae involving the eame question as 
the above co.se. The gµestion was con.,idered again in Potocan v. Coal 
co., 120 Kan. 526, wbare the abow 1'llle we.a followed·· (See also swoder 
v. Flou.rMills Co •• 105 Kan. 378). 
The quest ion of lump-sum award is conside>:ed in the case of 
Goodwin v. Pa.eking Co., 104.Xan. 747. In addition to the role in Gorrell 
v. Bottella above, that sn.ch an a.ward rmy be made, it wa.s decided in this 
case that, when an injury is not objectively ascertaina.ble. no lump-sum 
Pa.e;e 57. 
avm.rd may be made~· ·twnp-aum· awards mu.et only be me.de by the courts or 
by mutual e.gMemenit (Gil!nore v• AlininS co., 111 xan. 158).. Courts ma:s · 
awe.rd either m· l'Ump•sum or m· periodic pe.ymentsl (Ca.in V• Zina Co., 94 
Iran. 679; ·Anderson v. 01i arid Refining co. 0. lll KB.n. 514). 
Soo:e decisions relating to the application of' the law to in-
dustries a.re given~ withmit going.into a study·or 'the cases.in ·detail. 
Tlie law..· B:PPlies to ·only «espeoie.lly dangeraus" industries 
{ll!ou.sou V• Dottelle, 102 Ken. 208). Clerical employees in city clerk's 
office are nrit within the act (Udey V• City of Winfield 97 Iran. 279 h 
agricn.ltu.ral pursuits ·are exempt from the act (Bevard V• Cool co.• lOl 
Kan 207 h an oil well or a gas well .is not a "mine0 within the pu.rpoaes 
of the act 'Hollingsworth V• ·:aerey. 107 Kan. 544)J less then five em-
ployees ·in an induatry·prevent it fr~ being considered under the aot 
(Hollingsworbh ~· :Be~ ~07 ·Kan. 544); {Mcilva.11: v. 011 and Ga.a. Co., 110 
Kan. 266}; (Stover. v. Davis 110 Kan. aoa}J an independent contractor is 
not within the act., !Jongh.lelle •· Mining Co. (99 Kan. 412); (Mcilva.in v. 
, Oil and Gas. Co., · 110 Kari. 266); constmction of a sower by a city is 
withau.t the act (Roberts v. · City. of Ottawa 101 Kan. 228 h e.s also· a 
police officer killed on duty (Griswold. ir• ·City of Vlichita., 99 Kan. 502h 
nor· is street-resu.rfe.cing VJOrk under the act (Gray ·v. Sedgwick County, 
101 Kan• 195); neither is motor vehicle transportation, (Dodson v. Sales 
co •• i10 xa.n. 481}. · 
· · somewhe.t similar are cases· deciding \\bather certain acoidanta 
. . 
of an urmsual nattu'e e.re held to be·· comprehended Under the lmv. 
· A workman injured while going b-om one mine to another 18 
held to be without the act, .. (Bevard V• Ooa.l co., 101 Kano 207}; 
Accidents• to recover a.n award, mu.et have happened non, 1n:0 or a.bout". . ' .- , 
the operating plant; am this must be within the zone of. danger~ .. 
(Alvara.do V• nook Crasher Co•• l09·Kan. ~92); a truck dr~'V'er inju1'ed 
while delivering meat not "on. in or a.bout" the· plant is 'Without the 
law (Hicks v. Swift am Co •• 101 Kan. 760); an 1njur:f on a rollway between 
factories is held to be within the act~ (Godberry V• Egg case Filler Co •• 
104 Kan •. '12), aliens rre:y su~ unde~· the Compensation law, (Wolf v. PS:~k­
ing Co., 105 Kan. 517}J (Vietti v. F1;tel co., 109 xan. 1?9)., a:r;id.. are .~ 
titled to its benefits. 
Further co.see of a. more ·um1eua.l nature are considered in the 
following: A laborer :lnca~ita.ted as the. result ot en aseaul.t up~ him 
by his foreman,." cannot recover compensation imless his employer knew or . 
anticipated tha.t injury wtuld result if the men continued working to-. -~ ~ .. . : ,,.. .,.. ~- .. ~ ~ 
ge~her. (Pevvey v. contra.ctinS co.~· 112 xan. 657) {Rome.res v. ·Swift end 
co.• 106 Kan. 844). \jhera a W<?rkmml is injO.red by .Playfire act of a. . 
:fellow-emp~oye~, he is e~titled to recover canpenae.tion {Stuart v. City 
of Kansas City, 102 Kan. ~07). A workman who has .. long been QU.ffering 
from epilepsy can not recover f'or injuries ~during .an epileptic f'it eom-
r ' ; ' t 
ing upon h!m.While he was working,. (Cox v. Refining .. co •• , 108 .Kan· 520). 
But a sufferer from pleurisy• having this condition aggravated by the ' - _, 
nature of his wol'k, is entitled to recover,. {Vassar V• Swift & Co.• 104 
... . ~ . 
Kan. 198). Similar cases are: IIoag v. Laundry• 115 Kan.. 515; T~lor V• 
Swift and Co.• 114 Xan• 45l;Browzrrigg V• ·Swift & C,o•• 114 Kan •. , 115. A 
worlanan who was injured at tbs noon intermission while riding on e. truck. 
st pieg o. is entitled to recovers (1!thomaa v •. Ma.no.facturi:ng Co~, 104 
Xan1f; 432} •. 
Cases covering the amount of compensation to be ~ovoroo, 
and the eomputation of ee.r.nings as a basis for this are given 1n nevieod 
statutes o:f xa.nsas •. 1923~ Pp. 6941: 695. A complete annotation of flll 
wo~kmen's (lompensa.t1on cases may be found in CJ.1.Bpter 44, sections 501-
547•. 
Vietti v. Fu.el co •• 109 Kan. 199, considers· this pbo.ee, viz., 
amount of compensation. It also estab.11ahes the rnle of unoonstitution-
. ality of' that feature of the lav relating to compensation to dependents 
outside the United states. 11he' law (Section 5) provides tha.t in ce.se 
there are dependents who a.re ci.tizena of a foreign country, (other than 
the Dominion ot Canada}, .of a.workma.n in the United Sta.tee, these ms.y 
not reoeiva compensation in excess o:t $750. This was ruled as in 
violation o:f the spirit of the treaty between the United States and 
Ita.ty. end was declared invalid. 
The facts of the case are as f'ollO\vs: Victor Vietti. 18 yea.rs 
of age,. and eon of unnataralised Italian pa.rents who had been residing 
·in Xa.nsas du.ring sixteen 7e8.rs prior to the accident and action for com-
pensation»: ms killed ill the 'enploy of the !!a.ckie Fu.el Company •. The 
parents were citizens of' Its.~, having completed a part• but not all 
of' their. naturalization. !l.1hey began action tor compensation in the 
Cherokee district court :tor th~ death of their son. The· district court 
a.warded' damages for $5,455.12. ·The' case was appealed to the saprane .. ·, 
Court on the ground· that damages could not exceed $'1501 in the mooning 
ot Section 3 of the law. 
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The Supreme Court ·rnled that the provision of· sectto~ s,,. vllich (., 
states thnt dependents, not citizens of' the United States or Canada. and 
. . ' ---
re e id ing at the time of the a.ccidont 1n the United states or. Canada, mq 
not recover for more canpensation: than $750. The Supreme CO'l.lrt held tba.t 
the lower court had misinterpreted the law •. in that it bad found that 
through being residents of this cmmtry;: although not citizens,- they . 
were not within the provisiono of Section 3. The law states: "Citizens 
of', . .2_ residing - - - in the United States or the DQminion at Canada~, 
The Supreme Court held that unless both these conditions are met,. no 
recovery ot full canpensation could ber given. · These were not met under 
this case. The interpretation given by.the lower court was:: .noitisens of• 
. ' 
or rosidinG - - - in the United states or the Dominion of Cenada". - ' 
Du.t o.ccoztling to the ro.le of the Supreme Court$ this q31E>stion 
was not the most important , ruJJ.rig. tor the real q;:test1on was the· viola.t ion 
ot the spirit of existing inter.national tree.tieao The treaty nt the 
Uni tod States with the Italian government is quoted as ·:rollO\nU 
"The c1 tizens of each of the High Contracting Parties .. shall re-
ce1 ve in the states and Territories of the other0 the most constant 
eecur1 ty anl ·protection for their· persons and property and for their 
rights 1 including that f'om Of protection granted by Bny state or 
national law which establishes. a civil responsibility fpr injuries or 
tor death canaed. by negligence or fanlt,. end gives to rela.tives or heirs 
of the injured party a. right of action, which right eha.11 not be re-
stricted on a.ccO'llllt of the said relatives or heirs; and· she.11.cnjoy in 
this respect the same riejlts fl.n1 privileges as a.re. or ehal.l be, gre.nted 
to Mtionals, provided tha.t they submit themselves to the conditions im-
posed on the latter," (58 u.s. sta.t. 1670). The court held this trea.t;r 
to be a part of ·our own constitutional law, and binding on the con.rte. 
If. tllGl."e is e. conflic"t between the treaty and state law such law must 
be controlled by the treaty. Tha. Federal Constitutiori 1n the nooond 
clause of article six provides: 
"Tb.is .Constitution, and. the Laws, of the United States. which 
shall be made in pursuance thereof; and all. treaties mo.de• or. -which 
slla.ll be made• tm.der the authority of the United states shall be the 
supreme Law oz the Land; and the Judges in every· Sta.ta shall be bound 
' . 
thereby, a.nythin.g in the Oonatitution or· La.we of a.ey Sta.to to the con-
trary notwithstm1ding" •. .The Supreme Court. rtlled th.a. t this caas ma 
one as ~tended by thtt treaty· an1 that "plsintitts., wore entitled to 
be. placed upon en eqmlity with our own citizens as to the amount :re-
coverable as compensation" (Volo 109 !{an. Reports :e. 182). .O.a to the 
constitutionality of the la.w therefore, the Coo.rt in the sn.ne opinion 
said: "It mey be added that the sto.tutoey limitation ia a.loo in oontro-
vention of the fourteenth amendment of the Federe.l Constitution which 
profides that no state shall'ti.eny to any person within its jurisdiction 
the eqo.al protection of the laws•. Aliens lAwfnlly resident in the 
sta.te are within the protection of this clause. - - - It must be held 
that the statutory limitation in question cannot be applied e.o a.eainst 
the.plaintiffs {Sea ca.see: Wong Wing v. the United Ste.tea, 163 u.s. 228; 
The united States Ve Ylong Kim» Ark,_ 169 U.S. 649). 
The moat important case under the Workmen's Compensation la.w 
ia that of' Stefa.n v. Elev~to~ Oo., 106 Kan. 569. Stefan was injured in 
the employ of' the Red Star Mill ond Elevator Co., .in Sedgwick county in 
1917• ·and applied to his employers £or canpenaation. The Millers' 
Mu.tual Caau.a.lty Compeny took over the work of compensation by reasm , 
of be!nB surety for the Eleva.tor Canpany. .t.fter mkiD.g some ps;yments 
to Stefan,. the Surety Compa.ny ceased paying. Stefan complain.ad 'to . 
tho Eleva.tor COilll?o.ny, and asked arbitration, but tha comp~ refu.sed to 
arbitrate. Stefan then bSgan action in the courts e.gamat his employers• 
The lo:1ar court returned a verdict for $5-296 .. 40. The emplo39~ appea.led• 
Stof'a.n' e ~iuries · reaul ted in· pa.rt ia.l pa.rolysi.s end n.lao in a 
permanent injury to the eye. The injury to the eye was such that it 
caused doo.blo vioion mid hence it was' iieceaaary to keep the injured eye 
closed in order tlia.t there might be s1gb.t from the other. mhe levier 
court did not reeero the injuey to the eye bu.t ma.de the awara. on tlle 
basis of the pa.rtitl.l. pe.ra.lyaia of the inJw;ed man. Thie ~a 1n keep.-· 
i?J8 Ylith tho contention· ot the defense that pa.:,iment of compensation 
for one in.Jury stops ~nt for any other. The ·~premo Court held~ 
however, thnt U11der the meaning of tho le.\v this coUld not be the case~ , 
"The legislature evidently believed the loss of a specific meliber or 
organ deserved the compensation stated, whatever. .else occurred• If'• · 
however, 8.dditional. injury ahouid. increase the workma.nts partial dis-
ability, either permanently or temporarily,. he shcm.l.d''receive additiOna.l 
compenaa.tion". (Vol. 106 xan. Reports P• ~73}. 
The opinion of the Court was. then, that Stefan was entitled 
to canpense.tion. in addition to that e.vm.rded: for paralysis, also for 
the permanent loss c£ his eye, ·end reversed the ce.se and rema.nded it 
for new trial of this award ·according to the op~on. · It affirmed the 
awe.rd DJ.ready mde, but held tha.t· this \188 1nsuffie1ent. .The· rule of 
laws was established that a. workman is .entitle!i t!l· recover compensa.~ion 
for each speei£ie injury contrilin.tins to 1.isol>ility • 
. A farther pllase. ot the cene is ~a.t the emount of compenaation 
could not be determined by the schedule of rates for disability. The 
law. {sec. 19} provides ror ~isi "- - - In ca.se of partial disability 
not. eovered by schedule the .workman sbD.11 recaive durine; such period 
. . . 
of partie.1 disability. not exceeding e years, GO. per cont of' the dif-
ference between the e.macmt he was ear.ning prior to aa.id injury ns 1n this 
aet provided and the amount. he is able to oo.rn after mlCll injury", but 
where this amount is less than $5 per week f'or this period• he is to re-
. ceive this latter e.maunt.: ttThe compansa~ion to be . 1n no. cc.so lo ea than 
$6 per -we~k nor· mom tlla'n ~;12 per woelt" (See. 5). This allmvo • a.e will 
·be ~hown later. n recovery of a· gre~ter ainaunt of' .. com;pensation for ptJ..r-
tial disability than for total disability. -
The case of Clase v. Mining co., 105 mm. 257 » first ra.iaod 
this question. The opinion of the. court in thio cw..se (105 Y~. 258) 
states this fa.et of the law: "It ~well be that the loss of' a leg 
· might• in some instances work less incapacity for eern.1ng wages thlln 
an !njui;y tl1ereto; at D1:J:3 rate• ·the schedtll.e of the section s.lreo.cly 
referred to exproaaly allows for the loss of the leg 50 per cent of 
the average weekly wages du.?'~ 200 weeks. wllile the same section, so.1>-
diri.s!on 19,. :provides that - 'In ·case .or partial disability not cowred 
by. sehedu.1e8 -the workmtm shall receive during sa.ch period· of pa.rtio.1 
disability• not exceeding eight ( 8} :iears,, 60 per cent or the differ-
ence between the amount he VID.S earning prior to said ,injury. SS in this 
act provided• and the amount ha in e.ble to earn after such injury.' 
The trial court in following this provision· com:nitted no error 
for this the law is written". It is further treated in mu.bsequ.ent 
cases and the amounts o:r differences are given in dissenting opinions 
in these ca.sea. They will )_e studied. 
In Emry V• Cripes 110 ·rom.. 695, the ttGO% rule" as established 
1n the above cases was applied. fury, a minor, brougllt action through 
his father tor da.mges for injuries to hie hand,, wh1ab. was crushed in 
a bres.d-mouldi?lg machine in the bakery of A.T. Crlpes. The lower court 
awarded damages for $1500. This a.ward was ma.de a.a for a permanent 
pa.rtia.l disability, amounting to 50}'& to 75% ot total disability, am 
therefore deserving 507~ to 757b of the compensation allowable for total 
disability 1 which is 50% of the average weekly wages ov~ a period of 
a yea.rs• The average wage being $20 1n this case, 50% ·ot this for 8 
yes.rs would be, 52 x 20 x 8 = $4160. Allowing 50% of' this for pro-
2 
portional disability, the award since it was allowed on a proportional 
basis• ehou.ld ba.ve been ~$4160 or $2080. The plaintiff therefore ap• -2 ' 
pealed bees.use the award was too small, while the defendent appealed on 
the ground tho.t it wa.s too large. The plaintiff also contended for the 
6o% of ditterence rale. 
The SU.preme Court l'llled that no such proportien•to-total-
d1sab111ty award was le.gal, but tha.t the GO}'b ru.le would operate. The 
case was remanded for a new trial •. The opiniou. of the catt.rt ".ms not. 
unanimous however. A dissenting opinion given by Mr. Justice Dawson 
with the concurrence of' Mr· Justice Lta.rsha.11 end -Mr. Justice Porter 
was in brief as follows: 
"I do not assent to any result which ca.n lead to an e.llOVlallce 
of two or three times as mu.ch for e. permanent partial in.jury to 
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pleintitt• s hand as tlle legislature· has specificnlly fixed for the tota.l 
loss of it or a total. loss of its use. I cannot assent to thru.stins into 
the schedule a case not· covered by· the schedule and one· expressly excluded 
therefrom; and while I would by no means.disregard an express statutory 
provision. I. deem it proper, e.lwqs, to search for an interpreta.t~on of 
a statute which will a.void ·giving it an 11logica.l result. Take the ex-
ample of the lost thumb again. The min1mwn allows.nee is ~:360;· the mo.x-
i.mum ·is $720; but for a permanent partial loss of it, the minimum, uncler 
the ru.le here apPlied,ma.st be $2496 and this mininmm mu.st be a.warded how-
ever aU.ght the disability• if'. it is sufficiently serious to require vny 
compensation a.t· all• To this extent I dissent". (110 Kan. Reports Pp. 
697-698). 
'Elis division of opinion ot the Supreme Court is continu.ed 1n 
the case of Anderson V• Refining co. 111 :Knn •. 514. Anderson was oo.u.eht 
in ma.chinery of the Company's .Plant with the reault that hie arm was 
broken in six places, a namber at ribs broken and his body bodly bruised. 
A fragment 0£ a broken bone punctured one of his lunge, and other injuries 
were su.stained-.; · The· jury returned a verdict for $7,435~65. Th.is the 
lower court awarded partly in lump.-sum and partly in periodic payments. 
Tlie Supreme Court on review. affirmed the aua.rd. overruling the c:onten-
tion tbe.t it we.s excessive, al.though it was in excess of the emount of 
compensation for total disability .. 
Dissenting opinion was made by Mr. Justice Dawson with the 
concurrence of L!r •. Justice Marshall and Mr. Justice Porter. This is 
as fol~owst 11! am not unm1ndi"al of the potency end general usefalness 
of the , rule of stare deeisis • that a. judicial principle repeatedly 
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decla.i-eCl. should be followed until' the legi,elature corrects -or c.b.anges 
it - - yet this court bas repeatedly emancipated. itself from the bond• 
nee of' a. prior fallaoiOllB ruling or precedent" we ga.10 a typical ex-
Dinple. of' this not long a.go in Adkinson •• Noonan, llO Kan,. ~35'.• where 
ari important provision of the state constitution came up for re•e%.9.l?lina-
Hon. and in which the interpretation glwn thereto in P:Cuitt v·. Sqn.ires·, 
64 Kan. ass. twenty years befol'e,, we..s overra.ledlt · In that case. the.re .was 
room for debate as to which was the proper interpretation• Here a.~ l 
understa:nd it. there la no room :for debate that the interpretation of 
sub-paragraph 19 of' section 3 of the Vlorkmen's Compensation Aet as given 
. in the Stef'a.n case is erroneous" • - ·..,as a general rnle of interpretation. 
applicable to all ca.sea.:: It was not until the ~ipea case came before 
us· a month or two aeo that the interpretation - - - ·was discovered to be 
' ' 
1nca.pa.ble of' general application without doing violence to Justice am 
leg1als.t1 ve intent~ I therefore submit e. tabulated computation ct the 
· scheduled allowances· tor partial loss or partial disa.b~!l~ty of members 
ot the body, nnd also the allowances for partial loss. or partial ·dis• 
ability under ~he rule of the Stefan case. to demonstrate -that the rule 
works injustice and obviously perverts the legislative intent not occas• 
1onnlly as suggested in Clase v., 'Mining co.,, snpra~ but in every ease 
which can arise, (Laws 1917 Ch. 226. Pp. 506-507}•" 
l., Thumb 
2. 1st finger 
Table of Compa.ta.tion of Compensation 
· Statutory allowanc.3 f'or 










statutory allowance for Stefan rule a.Uowenca f o:r 
total loss or total dis- partial disability. 
ability. 
Minimum lla.:rlmuni Minimum Max1mnm 
5.- 2nd finger $180 $360 $2496 '$4,992 
4. 3rd " 120 240 ft " 
5 •. 4th .ft 90 180 " " 
?. Great toe. 180 '560 " n 
a.· Jmy· ·other t'oa GO 120 '! " 
ll~Hand 900' 1800, " " 
12. ·Arm 1260. 2520 · .. t1 n 
iz.. Foot 'l!?O lpOO. " n 
· 14. Leg 1200 2400 tt " 
15· :E11e 660 1320 n n 
16• lie~ing {both 1200 n tt 
ears)600 
l?o " (one ea.r)l50 500 ,, " 
/ 
''Th.e precedents relied on are: so recent, and so clearly wrong, 
that they should be disregarded and subMpa.ra.gra.ph 19~. section 5 ehould 
. ~. . . . . 
be simply construed to mes.n that for a;ny partial disability not covered 
by the schedule, the workman• s compensation .should be 60% of the diff'er-
.ence ~tween the. a.mount he was ea.ming prior to· ea.id injtlry, and the 
. amount he is able to earn after au.ch injury ~ - - du.ring such period ot 
partiSl disability not· exceeding S years. withou.t any maximwn or. minimum 
restrictions, wllich are neither within the text nor the intent of the sub-
paragraph pertaining thereto". ('110 ~tan. Pp. 516-518). · · · 
~ 1 
- The Stefan ro.le is followed. however as~b.eing the msj ori ty rule 
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of' the court. although this doea allow in some cases greater award for 
partial diea.bllity than :for total disability. The. Sttpreme Court bes held 
that the ma.tter of changing this feature was not for the courts. bu:t. for 
the leglele.ture. 
The cases reviewed in this chapter have been a few o:r the most 
important. Ca.sea are too n;mneroue to permit of' a more thorOt>.gh review. 
Tho rules of' law e.s to the abrogation of conman-law rules have been shom 
~ this hno b~en en important aim ln the sttl.dy ot the· cages .• 
Page 68. 
Industrial Welfare Comnisaion caaes 
The Industrial V/elfa.re Conmiesion is important in that it is 
the torertUm.er of th& Kansas Oonrt of Industrial Relations. Some cases 
a.rising under its functions were transferred to the Industrial Court 
and ·for· this reason a stuc.13' of the Industrial Welfare Conmiasion is given • 
....... 
The Coomissionwas established by the legielnture of 1915,·to 
" enforce provisions of' a.n act prov.iding for fixing of wages, and determin-
ing hoo.re and stand.a.rd conditions of 1ebor,. particularly f'or women, 
lea.mere. apprentices and minors employed in industries in Xani3a.a. The 
Oomnission functioned tmt11 tho enactment of the law in 1920, creating 
the Cottrt of Industrial Relations.··:. Thereafter· the work of the Comnio-
sion was taken over by the Industrial court. 
In order therefore to fally appreciate the duties of tho court 
ot Industrial relations, it will be necease.ry to review those of the 
Industrial Welfare Cormnission. These are prescribed in the Le.we o:t 
Kansas,. l9l,6, Chapter 275. 
Section 1 of this chapter states public policy of the State ot 
Kansas in regard to employment of' women. learners, apprentices and minors 
as follows: "That the State of' Kansas exercising herewith its police 
and sovereign power, declares that inadequate wages, long-continued 
hours and unsanitary conditions of labor, exercise a pernicious effect 
on the health and welfare of women, learners. apprentices and minors". 
Section 2 provides: "That it sball be unla.wfal to employ 
women. lea.mars, apprentices and minors in industry, or occupation within 
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the State of Kansas under conditions of labor detrimental. to their 
heo.lth or welfare, and it shall ~e '1lllawful to employ women, lea.mars, 
apprentices and minors, in any industcy vrlthin ·the State ~f Ko.nae.a at 
wnaes which n.re not adequate for their maintenance and for more hours 
in a.ey day then is consonant with their health ·and welfare• except as 
hereinafter provided. · 
The Commission o.s provided in section 5, was composed of· three 
members,, one of' mom we.a a. woman. 'The Commissioner of Labar was e. member. 
under the provj.aione ot the act. 'Tho other members were e.p:pohrted by 
the governor. 
The duties of the ~ommissionwere,. chiefly# to inquil.-.e into. 
and investigate labor conditions with respect to such features as were 
comprehended in the a.ct. o.ni to te.Ice such steps as were necessary to 
remedy conditions found to be detrimental to pu.blic poli~y as stated in 
the lath ·The Comnission had power to subpoena witnesses; comJel the 
production of evidence;_ a.dminie~er oaths; compel the testimony of em-
ployers ond E>mployees; a.nd to conduct hearings ot a public nature for 
consideration ot conditions. ·The Commission was able to compel ·an em-
ployer, or employers, to present their books for the scru.tilv ot the 
Corr:mission. It was authorized~o issue licenses authorizing the~ 
ployment of certain classes of persona o.t a ~~ less than that fixed by 
the Comnission. 
One :of the provisions ot the act was that a woman receiving 
less than the minimwn wage authorized, could bring suit to enjoin en-
. . . ·;~:_ : ; 
forcement of. the lSooal wa~- notwithstanding her agreement to work for 
less, and to recover wages due as well as attorney fees end costs of 
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action in the courts. 
'l'he Cmmiss!on had p0\1er to appoint a ".Board" consisting of' 
at least seven members, three from the industry• and representing it• 
three representing the employees, and one or more representing t~e pn.b-
lic at la.rgeo The Dos.rd had power to make findings concerning wages, 
hours. and eanditions of labor, and to make reports to the Conmiosiori, 
which reviewed the report end approved it, or re-submitted it tor far-
ther consideration. and a.ltemtion• A "report having been approved,. the 
Comnisaion l?llblished weekly, for a period of at least four weeks, a 
notice in the official state pa.per that the Commission would conduct a 
public hearing,. on a g1 ven da.y. in which all persons interested 1n the 
cbanfffels in the given industry could be heard by the COI?lllioeion·. Thus 
employers and Employees, as well as a.ey other parsons had the r1dl~ to 
appear before the Oar.mission to make complaints or reconrnendat!ons. 
The Comnission~ after completing the hearing f o:mmlated a.n order embody-
ing the proposed changes; and requiring obedience of employers, under 
penal ties preseribed by t11e law fo .. r violations. Action in the courts 
might bt) had by the Comnission to' enforce its orders. 
As he.a been said, the Kansas Court of Industrial Rele.tione Act, 
transferred the 1':lnetione of the Industria.l Welfare Commission to the 
Court o:t Industrial Relations, abolishing the Commission. The Indus-
trial Conrt thereafter directed all investigations i~to labor condi-
tions. which had.been the duty of the Industrial Relations Conmittee 
prior to the passage of the Industrial :rt:lations court Act. 
l. See 119 Kansas Reports Po 12. Also Laws of Ka.nsa.s 1920 Chapter 20. 
sections 3• 5 and 7. 
'.i:ho caoos .of !mportance here· nl'O tbom of two Topekaf5 lranMS~ 
coopan1os viz • • tJ.1le Topaks tnm'tdl17 Co·•·· ard tho "Topaka I'scklvg Cch~· ·v• 
Tlle ttanane coo.rt of ll1dustrial llelo.tlih"'lflt 119 noo• 12• 4Ulasa cas:-es begQll 
uttter t...'lo \7olfo..re canm1uo1oa ·end -\mi~ dispoaed of b:,r the· ~ SU.i>mma· 
Court, under tho tom-.re of tllo court .of Industrial Hclo.t!on1!Mt 
The h!atoey o~ the carias in ,detail is no fol1C\1s.t tXhe· ~ 
trial nolfb.re C03:\!osion issued 01.'{tera to 'thtl Topeka Lnundr:! C·~ 
mJd tl10 Topolm. ?ooldne c~, rcap.ecttng lnbor oonditlons 1n these: 
plants, and f~ m1n!mam ~s for women empl039d• The :ccmpan!as 
nttomptod to enJoin tho Ca:mdaaion's orders an thO ~that they• 
rmd. t.l:le statute ootbor1ning thCr!l~ ·were not within the police powa~ of 
tho etnta and wi-a 'ri.olatiw of' the Ponrteenth ;.~t to the Comt1* 
-tntion of th,,. United states.~ CXllO distliiet c~ (~'lbD.mlGtt Conney) •. ~ 
tainod tho oldor.o an£l. tho compealas nppented to tl1e Sll~s· court. In 
tho 1ntor1m• tho Iniustr!nl r1olfara. Canniaslm ,ceased to enet e.nd the 
notion uaa tnksn over-· by tho neut'\ 9g Induotr1a.l !role.ti.one~• The supreme 
.• 
Court roviewod both cv..oos in o. einsle opJnlon (119 Eml• 12)• 
t;:ho omora of' the Imo.atrial Canmtesian ~ere based on cenoml 
1nveot1ca:t1ono !nstltu.ted 1n 1920• ~eso 1nvestf6nt1a1s were ~oncem­
inG uoc):n3. hours tJf labor~ em1. canditions of· wm:khls w~ in r~~­
'1110 Ca:t=l1aa1on hnd obtained the coopere.tlon ot tlla ·women''B 3are&u of 
Un1tod states ~ ·of Labor# flt·~ a .su.rvey ·of corA.it1ona of 
~ labor 1n Y..anoesf. '.rhia Sn£ormt1on · camp1led9 wns· V..tbl!slioo 1n a 
report •. oo bulletin nunbor 17 of tl1e wmsen•s Dtu'Gau of' the ~nt 
·under order ot'_the Court of' Industrial Relations en 1nvest1go.-
tion relating to the cost of' living of wa.ge-eerning women in Ka.ns~s, 
was made in a. report. to the coo.rt A~~at 1921, under the title: "Coat 
of Living Survey of Vlage-eaming·women ·of the state of l{ansa.s". Sub-
sequently th~l court ordered hearings to· be held in various cities of 
the state. At these hearings the t'"Wo surveys were introduced in evidonoe 
·.a.ni anployers were permitted to cross-examine end to introduce evidence 
in tlsir awn behalf• At the·conclusion of the haa.rin5s and on April 11, 
1922,. the court rnde a preliminary fin.ding. that in certain occupations, 
inc1uding laundries and fa.otor!ea,, the c·onditions, wages, etc., wero 
prejudicial to the health and welfare of a substantial number of f'emaJ.a 
employeaa, end that wages were i:nc.dequate to supply the necessary coat 
of' living and maintain the workers in health. A public hen.ring wa.s 
ordered., Wllioh, after due notice. was held. on f.lJ3:1 9th. On 1&l;y 19, 1922, 
the orders in controversy were pramllgeted. . They required that a.11 c.dult 
women employed in laundries end feotorios were to be paid a.. minimum wo.ee .. . . . 
of ~ll per week. 
The action to enjoin enforcement of' the orders commenced-on 
July 17 • 1922. The Topeka L&md.ry Company employed e>..!)er1enoed. workers 
who wel."$ not able to earn the m1nimom wage. The order interfered with 
a plan to reorganize the company• and es o:ne effect,. required the pay-
ment of $10 per week to one grade ~f employees. The. compatlY' we.a required 
ponding the an.it to deposit the difference between wages paid end the 
minimum wage prescribed. The Topeka Pecking Company likewise deposited 
this wage difference w 1th the court. Upon denial of the inJunction, 
the cases were appealed to the Supreme Conrt {119 Kan. 12). 
The companies WOtlld have been subject to fines if they had 
not obe:;ed. -They vrore not obliged to do so. in the raJ.ing of,the court, 
unloaa this vma leg-el. This involves a consideration and interprets.• 
tion of the fourteenth amendment. The Supreme Court !n its review of 
the cases held this fact to be one of the questions to be decided and that 
another was• whether tho legi~leti ve intent was being follo.ved in these 
orders and thoir details. 
Commenting, the court as.id in its opinion: "If the court were 
frao to exercise its independent judgment it would a.newer these questions 
in the affirmative and wonld hold the statute and the orders pursua.n.t 
thereto valid. 'l'ne coo.rt is not free however to deal with the subject 
independently. Tbs Su.pre::ie Cou.r-(; of the United Ste.tea is fina.l inter-
preter of the Constitution of the United States. Its decision interpret-
ine the constitution nre binding on this court and the decision in the case 
of Adkins v. Children's Hospital (261 u.s. 625}~, holding.the minimum-we.gs 
a.ct of' Congress for th£ :Oiatrict of Collllllbie.t to be violative of 4the 
fifth amendment to the Constitution of the United States makes it neees-
so:ry for this court to declare the minimum-wage law ot this state to 
be void as contravening the fourteenth amendment•" 
The decioi~ of the con.rt vm.s g1 ven by :Mr~ Justice Burch. Mr. 
Chief Justice Johnston tmd Mr. Justice Hopkins dissented but gava no 
opinion. Mr. Justice He.rvey dissented .on the· grmmd that the case of 
Adkins V• Children1 s Hospital d.id not a.pply to these cases. 
The diasonting opinion of Mr. Justice Harvey held that the 
review of ce.aes within tlie District o:t Columbia by the United states 
Supreme Court was more persuasive than authoritative, that is, similar 
to the jurisdiction of any state Supreme Court over other courts within 
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th.9.·h state~ The question in the caae cited related to the vm.ge--·fL'tlnG 
statute es applyins to women workers in hospitals a.nd in paaseD£;er ele-
•. . ' 
. va.tora •. · This 'Work ia not to be reg!l.rded as analo~ol1a to ·the work in 
m~.naas factories~ end cs comprehended in the Y;anasa Minimum Ws.ur-e Act~ 
The opinion ei tes further deeisi01w i:n suppo11i or this position, 
ah.owing that tlle stetes generell.Y ha.vs upheld statutes or orders of 
authorized commission with reference to hmu~·a of sei.~ice, and workil'ig 
conditions ·made to prom.ate tl'µ3 t;enere.l welfBl-O under the police pot~r 
of ·the governmento {Holden v. lhrdy 169 u.s. 36G; Euntine; v. Orocon, 
243 u.s. 426; Muller v. Oregon 208 u.s. 412; Rodioe v. Eew York, 2G4 
u.s. 292.J~ 
It also cites similar statutes of the other atatea which have 
been upheld. More than e. dozen states havo statu.tes fixi.ng a minimum 
wao~ for women:> and minors~ or autho71zi.ng. su.cl1. fixing by oozr:misoiona. 
These are: 
.t\rizom, Laws of 1917 Chapter 30 
Arkansas; " n 1915 n 191 
Calif om.ta. tt ft 1913 " 324 
'Kansas t1 " 1915 n 275 
Massachusettn n " 1912 tt 706 
Minnesota. " ,, 1913 " 54? 
Ijorth Dakota n ft 1919 " 174 
·Oregon " " 1913 ft 62 
1. Since declared unconstitn.tional by the United States SUprema court 
Feb~, 1927oc ~· 
South DD.kota, Lavi·s of 1923 Chapter 509 
Tczn.e tt tt 1919 ft lGO 
Uta.'h ff tt 1913 ff 65 
Washington fl ff 1915 'fT 174. 
Wiseor..sin " .n 1913, tt 712 
In at lea.st five, constitutiontz-lity o:r these laws ;tiaa been 
' 1 ' 
esta.bliohed in the. courts (Stato v. 01 .. owe 130 Ark~ 272) , .. (Holcombe V•· 
Creamer, 231 J.~ass. 99), (Will!runs v. Eva.ns, 139. iJinn. Z2), ·(Stettler 
' v. O'IIara.. 69 Oregon 519);, (Simpson V• O'P'J.Bro~ 70 Ore. 261)~ ·(Larson 
v. Ric.a.. 100 Vin.ah. 642 j. 
'.rha Oregon oases were appealed to the United Sta.tea Supreme 
Court and affirmed by en equally divided court (245 u.s. 629). The 
United Ste.tea Supreme court has upheld statutes fixing the amount. 
time! and mn.nner of payme11t of wages ~ f edul t men employees (Wilson 
V• New, ~1:3 U.S. 532); Patterson V• Bark J:iu.dOrA, {190 U.s.; 169); Mo-
Lean v. 11.rkansea (211 u~s. 539 .. ~ !. Fin.ally i!J:!. Justice liarvay aaidi 
"OU.r statute has been in effect ten years. Generally speaking it heJt _ 
been ben~ricinl both to employees and to employers. Also to the pub-
lic-at-large - - - Y:e shatlld use our judgnem a.a to the validity of .,. 
this ste.tu.te~ rather than to be oontrollru by a docision of another 
jurisdiction which at best, is persuasive ·rather than authoritative"• 
The supreme court, in majority opinion ,thus upheld the con-
tention as to the validity of the wage-fixing law 0 ma.de by the companies 
... ·~ . 
o.ne. .ruled the orders 0£ the Industrial Welfare Comnission, e.nd the 
1. Since decl.Bred 1lllCOnstita.tiona.l by the United States SUpreme Court 
Feb •• 1927. 
le.Ari granting tihese powers, ail.d the Court of Industrial Relationss in 
this respect, :lnvali.do 
. The cases e.ra important as hel:p:i.:ncr to def'S.ne the functions 
oi' the Conrt o:f L"1dustr!al Rela.tions. t:11lieh waa likewise. o.long with 
the law creating t11e court, declared tmconstitti.tioMl~ by the United 
states Sitpreme Coa.rt;. The ea.sea Ui."'l(l.er the Court of Indnotria.l Rolo.-
tions ·will be considered in a foll9\'Jing chapter. 
CRAJ?TER X. 
The Kansas Conrt,o:r·Industriel Relations Cases. 
The Court of Industrial Relations is unique in the field 
ot labor legislation ~ regtl].ation of labor dispa.tes in the United 
stntes. created by act of the special session of the Kansas legi&-
lature of 1920, it was intended to meet the demands of disturbed in-
dustrial oond.1 tions existing in Kansas at that time• These 1.1l1.Settled 
conditions had been occasioned by strikes in the Kansas coal mines 
1n 1919 • and tlle law was intended to forestall a repetition of such 
disturbances, and resn.lta.nt harmful. effects, in the future. 
The pu.blic hnd been aroused as the result ot the coal strikes, 
o.nd the struggle between .capital and labor. V1han the production of 
coal wa.e stopped. due to inability of employers and employees to agree 
as to wages and conditions of labor, practically all other industries 
in the sta.te were suffering. · The sentiment of the people of Kansas as 
shown by the Industrial court Act was not against either capital or 
labor. so ma.ch as against both. The feeling was expressed tba-t the 
pa.bl!c. the third partner in industry, was being made to suffer unduly 
from the look of harmony between the other partners. This resulted in 
a plan whereby the public would be protected while disputes between 
employees and employers "Were being settled by arbitration. Both em-
ployers and employees fought the act and later the Industrial court. 
This tight was never stopped until the courts declared the Court, and 
the ls 1ll1Constitut1onal. 
It is probable that the act providing the Court of Industrial. 
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Relations could never· have been· enacted 1n a. nonnal stac;e of industrio.1 
conditiona~ · Otberw1ae the features of' the J.e.w which a.re unconstitution-
al wao.ld have undergone closer.· scrn.tw..y., a.ni it is probable that they 
would not haw bean a.doptedo But · i:n a condition of. die~~rbed industrial 
relations. such defects passed into law ~ore ea.e1ly beca.use of the faot 
that the public. wa.s biased in favor of regul.e.tion, on account of their 
· The court had maey friends,. however who regarded its functions 
as constita.tional. William Reynolds Va.nee. Professor of Law, Yo.le Uni-
versity School of Law, ea.id of' it: · 11So fur· ~Om being B.."l inJury to the 
employees. the Kansas Act if it. is wisely administered by a court of 
sense and vision, end supported by a etrong executive, will prove an 
inestimable blessing to them. A man with - - - e.n intelligence of the 
cave-man grade. will very e1nc6-rely .believe that the mo at effectl ve 
way to se-cmre a satisfactory settletnel'.).t · 1a to approach his neighbor 
with & club prepared to beat him to dee.th if the does not comply with 
his demands. But a more intel:\,:lgent cla1mant would perceive the pos-
sibility cf violent resiata.nce by the.neighbor - - - with seriou.o con-
sequences to himself• - ,_The strike is a. ca.vo-man, remedy, am has no 
proper place in the twentieth century. \111.ere access to a. competent 
court of industrial relations exists, the pursuit of' soc1al. bettorment 
by. direct action substitutes force for law. violence for right, coercion 
for education by persuasion mid enlightenment, sectional danination for 
the seli'-gover.mnent. of t~e comnm.nity. - - - The Kansas experiment - - -
must encounter - ft - many difficulties - - - but it is tande.menta.lly 
. l ' 
rl@lt a.nd will prevail." 
l. Yo.le Law Journal Vol. ZO Pp• 476,477. 
'' 
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This optimism was .shared by~ others. There was bitter 
antagonism by Labor however,. ·as show.n in the following statement of 
Samuel Gompers, then president of the American Federation of Labor, 
VJriting in "The American Federationist" for November., 1920 ( page 1011), 
he so.id: "It (The Ka.naas Le.w) is a. le.w calouleted to prod~e what its 
proponents call 1ndustr1~1 'peacet. yet there has been no more bitter 
industria.l warfare in the United States than in Kansas since this law was 
enacted." 
There was mu.oh regret that the "Ktmsaa experiment" vm.s declared 
not in keeping with the Constitution. for mny looked upon it as a pos-
sible solution to the, problems of adjusting industrial relations• 
The Cn.na.die.n Industrial Dispu.tes Act of 190'1 and the Colorado 
Act of 1915, giving eta.tee compulsory p011e.ra for arbitration of' indus-
trial disputes. afforded precedents for the Kansas Act of 1920. Aus-
!'': 
tralin and New Ztm.land also have laws for compn.laory arbitration. The 
Court oi" Conciliation end Arbitration. ot Australias established in 1904 
ho.a e.11 the IJ0\7ero of a. court ·of record and in vhieh all the functions 
of' such s. court" a.re e~rcised. Strikes and lockouts are forbidden and 
1 
arbitration is enforced by the courts. 
The mmsas Court had no such prerogatives as the Australian, 
Court. however, and there was no intention to exercise compulsion to such 
a degree as in the latter. The word "Conrt11 was in fa.ct a misnomer, 
since the Court had no judicial functions, nor fUr9 other than purely 
l• see Yale Law Journal Vol. 50. Pp.- 468~ 469. 
mc;e so. 
ot 'tho Indnatri...111 tl'eltaro Ca:m1ss1on• tha.n of o. court of Judicial poworol 
L'l oph1im of tho :sanaas St\.ll'reme cou.rt (109 Y.tt..'l• P. Z~2) • otntoo tho 
attltua of t:tio,· aoo.rt ne follQ!fr.n nTbe court of Ind.11str1Bl nela.t1ona 10. 
in fe~t,, a pnb11e service ccm-;dan!on, tho oord •court• ha.vine boon cr::i-
~· . . 
plo10d merely e..a o. nnttor o:r leglolati ve etr:o.toay - - r.::he o.p1~llc.te 
Jur1edict!m of thle coon not beillg nvo..11.eblo beco.n.oo tho court or ln-
duatrinl Reiationa is a n~Jud!oicl. b0t\y0 its constitutio1ial .jur1&-
d!ct1an in mm1domn.s tms ut11:faea. Thia Jttr!sd.iction io procJ soly tho 
s&J.'J.& .so ,tl:ln t ot row other. court - ... - thnt ia to fla::/, l?loncry, rno.y bo 
exerc!aod to control the action of inter!~ tribn...,'ml£J." 
· '11le Court as prescribed by lo.n· consioted ot threa t!lOmbors • 
j~e,, nppo1nte6 by the governor,. by .and with tl1e consent of' tl\o senate, 
tor a term of three aonrs~ ln mch tnam'lE>r thct <Jne Ju.dul".OQ would bo nppoL""ltod 
nnmm..llyo ~e preciding Judge of th& COT.U't vzoo th9 mm'.lber lnv!ng tho lor.c-
est service in the Court. Tim duties of the Court• in po.rt•· were to bo 
those ot the !1l.bl1e serviee Cor.m1sa1on. wbich it abolia!led. (Lo.wa 1920. 
Ch •. 29~ see. 2l· It a.loo, as ll!UJ been aoon. took ovor tho i\lnctlono of 
It1€lnatr1n1 i~alfc.re Cormission. t;'.b.e Ct:ra.rt ®a thus dual in ito intont, 
ba.vttt.g poworo in ~Mitton .to rega.lnt!ns ptt.bl1c utllitios, to control nnd 
r~~.te conditions in tllo fi w mQJ or !nwatrles in E.nr.sao 11 w1 th ixmor 
to eon.duet h1wstiga.t1on and iaau.e ordOl"a to employero to mlte chOZJGOs 
which :the Court ~oo.ld deem necoasr~., er ndviso.ble. The letter powers 
are thom or t!te !nduatrlel Woltaro C~sion. t'f'he courts ®re to · 
be employed. 1n enforcing 1to orders. 
The lav provided that 8Zf3' person viola.ting the a.ct in refa.s• 
ing to be. guided by the Industrial court. or by bringing pressure to bear 
upon BD3' pero~ who was being ga.ide~ bJ' the Court's orders,· should be 
subject to tine and imprisonment or both. 
The a.ct did not prohibit strikes by employees. but for seek• 
1ng to induce others to quit work, tor the purpose ot hindering. delay-
, ' 
ing, or ca.using Sttspcnsion of operation of ·r.my industry. or by intimida-
tion, abuse or picketinc, to delay, or seek to delay, or reduce produc-
tion, the penalty was fine or imprisonment or both. While not ostensibly 
a meo.na of oompulaory arbit~a.tion, the law was in effect, of such a nature.-
The Court could compel obedience to its orders; it could make any orders 
it mir)lt find to be commensurate to needs. . Thia power therefore easily 
amounted to compulsion 1n adjusting of wage disputes. though not neees-
) 
sarily doinB so. A strike, though not necessarily illege.10 was nearly. 
certain to be 1n defiance of a Court ol"der, and then it v10ttld. become il-
legal. 
Organized labor therefore, fought the Court because it threatened 
to take avio.y the chief weapon, viz. the atri~e. Employers fought it be-
cause it infringed upon wage-flxing prerogatives, au.ch infringement, it 
' . . . 
wo.s contended by them, being e. viols.tion ot the 14th amendment~ Cases · 
were b1 tterly fought both in the lower courts and in the supfn-ior Courts. 
The teats of unconst1 tutiona.11 ty were a.pp lied .in some degree in nearly all 
these oe.oes. 
The Court continued to function from Feb. 2, · 1920 to October 
1924, when the la.w wa.a finally declared unconstitutional. Certain features 
of the law had already been condemned, in previous decisions. These will 
be given in a study 0£ cases. 
The court eontinued to fo.nction from Feb. 2 0 1920 to October, 
1924. when the law we.s finally ·declared imconatitutiorm.1. certain 
features of the law had BJ.ready been condemned, 1n previous decisione. 
These will be given. :i.n a study of cases. 
In taking over the fa.net ions of tho Pa.blio service Cornmieaion. 
created in 1911. (Laws oi' 1911., Chapter 238; Gen. stat. 1915 Ch. 1917), 
the Induatrial court had power to review tho f7ield of Public Utilities 
in· the seme manner as that conmisaion ba.4 fnnct ioned. "I!ad the statute 
boon enacted 1n this form (i.e. separate statute)• there would have been 
two tribunals,, each hD.ving jurisdiction over a district end separe.te field. 
section 2 and e. tying-in sentence in section 4 .• were simply injected into 
this sehane of l~~slati~· The reon.lt is. tho.t while the publio util-
ities con:m.iasion was aboliahod, ita jurisdiction was ccm:'1ittod 1n whole 
end inte.et0: together with appropriate methods of procedure and review, 
to the court of Ind:u.strial Rele.,ti0i~• VJhile the court of' Induotrial 
R~letioI'..s under the m~ld~ power conferred by both the Public Utilitieo 
f~at and the. new law, .will doubtless have but one procedure for itself, 
orders me.de in the pu.blic utilities field are to be reviev.-ed no before 
- - - nnd orders in the ·field or industria.l relat iona nre to be reviewed 
a.cc<?rdine to t11~ metJ::tod • .- - prescribed by the new lew" (Vol. 107 
Ken. Rep.arts . Pp. 172 ,,l 73). 
~ it is. seen that the Court of Industrial Relations bad 
Jur1sdict1011 in the case of' Telell"b.one Association v. Telephone co. 
107 Kan. 169s a cese involving the PD.blio Utilities phase of the law. 
The case was the reau.lt of action to compel one telephone company nt· 
Clay Center. Kanaas, to allow another canpany a. switchboard connection 
in th.at city• The matter was referred to the ·court of Industrial 
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Relations which denied th~ ric;it of the applying comp~ to su.ch a con-
nectio~ exce~t by contract agreement. It he1d that the Industrial 
c curt wanld have no jurisdiction 1n this case 1nvol ving only a. matter 
ot contract. The Supreme Court e.i'firmed ·the de,eision of the lower court. 
The importance of the case, the first to be reviewed by the 
supreme Court under the Court of' Industrial Re lat ions Act, lies in· thEL' 
fact that it is a. ta.cit expression of the ri~t of the court. to ·regnla.te 
public utilities. rl'he case above, involved no question of public interest 
anl the Court held that it did not merit interference by tho court. No 
question of constitutionality of the ~t was raised, and. in th.is matter;: 
the supreme court ea.id: "The constitutionality of a statute is inquired , 
into no farther than is necessary to the determination of the ca.ea before 
In the escond case t,o cor,ne to the SUpreme Court, The State ex. 
rel. v. Howat, 107 Kan. 4238 the qtiestion ot constitutionality is mis0d 
and rulincs of the Court are made on the poi'nt. The facts are: 
Alexander Howat_ a.nc1 three others were adjudged ga.ilty of con-
tempt of c cllrt in Crowford County in 1920 • and were sentenced to je.11. 
• • • I ! > ' ' ' 
The. district court had issued subp.oena.s to Howat e.nd the others to appear 
before tbe Industrial court. They refused to obey the district court 
ord~rs. on a trial for contempt of court they were found guilty and 
sentenced to jail. Tiley appealed to the Supreme Con.rt on the ground 
that the court of Industrial Relations and the a.et erea.ting it were 
unoonst~tutional, and hence the district c0t1rt had no power to compel 
their attendance upon th~ Industria.l court. 
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. It was the contention of the .defense that the court commingled 
legislative. executive o.nd judicial tunctions,. as ha.d ·the court of Visita.-
t!on and which ha.d been declared· unconstitutional (61 Ken 803 ).. It was 
f'u.rther contended tha.t the Industrial Relations Court interfered in the 
field of Federal jurisdiction e.a intended by the Clayton Act (Part l 58 
u.s. Stat. ·at !large 750), which ,forbids federal courts enjoining strikes 
of .workmen• and the ·Lever Act h:)a.rt 1 56 u.s. sta.t• at Large 276) • provid-
ing· for governmental control of the production and distribution of :too~ nnd 
tu.el lllltil termination of tlie.(World} \Yar. A further plea we.a that the 
governor bad no authority 'to call for special leeisla.tion for au.ch tl. law 
SS the Industrial. Cao.rt Act• 
The opinion of the ·Supreme court on these contentions was, tho.t, 
the federal. statutes, while limiting the action of eto.te courts in this .. 
field do not bar their action to such extent as to :render· the Kanaa.s Act 
unoonstitutioml {P. 455 }. , The Supre:ne Coil.rt also held that the Industria.l 
Court had no judicial function,. ~d was purely ·aaminiatrative, and thus 
could not commingle· ftmctions. ·If the Industrial Court had possessed 
Judicial 1'tnctiona it wOuld not .have been necessary for the district court 
t() int,~rvcma. . The Court had· the power to compel a.ct ion in the eourts 
(Laws 1920 Ch. 29, soc. 11 h .. This answers the qu.est ion of corrmingling . 
of functions. As to the governor's power to ca.11 a. special session for 
enactment of the Ind'1strial Court Act, that power was ·?'lll.ed to be in the 
discretion of the governor himseif and not for the courts to decide. 
(P .. 430) (Sae also Farelly v. Cole 60 Kan. 556. ). The Supreme Court 
the ref ore affirmed the Ju~nt of ·the district court, establishing the 
following rules of _ltWt: 
l• Tlltlt the Industrial Court was constitutional. 
2. Tl10 Court did not corzmif!Ble functions. 
5. The Act vms not in conflict with federal statutes~ 
4. Courts of jurisdiction could be employed by the Court of 
Induetrial Relations to enforce its orders. 
A case of identical title with tho above case vms reviewed. in 
109 Ktm. 376. The case ie not a continuance . ot the above, but is a dif-
ferent cnoa, althon.gh involvine· the same persons, e.nd similar questions. 
The facts are e.s. follows: 
District Ihunber 14 of the United !fine Workers ot .Amerioo . com-
prises the Ka.nso.s cou.n.tiee of Cherokee. Crawford and Oaa.get end in these 
counties are most of the coal mines of' Ka:nsa.s. In April 1920" AleT..and.er · 
Uowe.t was president of District 14,. Augu.et Dorchy we.a nee-president~· 
and Thomas Hervey was Secretary-treasurer. On .April 5, 1_920, act ion was 
begun by the State /1ttorney-general against District 14 and its officers 
seeking an injunction ega.mst these officers> stating t..lta.t, they were- con-
spiring and confederating with others to block the wo~k of the Kansas 
cOll..rt' of Industrial Rela.tiona. President Howat of District 14 had stated 
toot he intended with the help of 12,.000 miners to fi~t the Court until 
it vm.s nullified. The plan to be llUJ.'SU.Od was the calling of e. goneml 
strike in all the coe.J. mines in Kansas. 
A temporary injunction was granted against the .officers and 
tru.stees of District 14• which on final hearing was made permanent •. 
In Febraa,ry the officers called a strike in two minos, Hos. 
498 ~ 310, which was carried through by the miners. The district 
court of Cm"ford County received an affidavit charginlS Howat and the 
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othe;r officers with contempt· of eon.rt 1.'1 violating the injunction. 
After a hearing the court 01--d.ered their arrest. and .the.t they be breu{;ht 
into court to answer t.ue affidavit. The Court then ordered that a. formal. 
indictment bo filed age.inst Howat and sane of the tru.ateea of District 14, 
tor contempt~ liervey and others being dismissed. On final hearing, without 
a jury,, the Con.rt ordered them to be conmitted to Jail f.or ono year and 
that the7 pa.,y 'cos~s of the prosecution. They appealed to the supreme 
court. 
. The grou.nds · for· tb.G appeal \'Vere~ that their legal counaol 
being u.na.ble ·to attend the court .proceedµigs, they allould not have been 
arrtiigned• in the a.beence ··of counsel and that they vJere compelled to 
testify against themselves which ·was not legal. The principo.l . oon-
tent~on of their ccunsel however, ms that the act creating. tho court 
of Industrial P.elations· was. aga;inst the Constitution of. the Ste.to of 
Kansas an wall ~s ag.tinst the United Ste.tea Constitution, in tll.o.t it 
violated the Foa.rteenth iunendment,, in infringing upon personal privil-
eges and deprivir..g employees as well as employers of property o.nd r1ehts 
withont due process. of le.w •. For this reason it was contended tha.t the 
ir>..junction of the district court and all its proceedings in the ease 
were invalid • 
. The Supreme court" considering these, ruled that the proceed-
' ings of the district con.rt were the usual proceedings in cases of contempt 
of court, citing the case of Eilenberger v. Plymouth County 154 u.s. 51 
as authority. As to the validity of the injunction, the ruling.was 
that although: the writ was erroneous,. that Howat mid his a.ssociates should 
have employed tha proper channel for correction, v.nieh is appee.l to the 
Supreme court, rather tho.11 defying the authority of the district co~­
Tho disobedience of ITowatp tmrefore. v;as held to constitute contempt ., 
of court notwithstanding the error~ (State ex. rel. r>iercell\ _ 51 Ke.n. 241}. 
'rhe cesoe cited by the defenee. (State v. Va.~ 81 .Ark~ ll 7, and The 
People v. Condon 102 !11. App. 449} were l't1l.ed to lw..ve been misinter-
pretod no constru.irig too narrowly the cases of !17i\gler V• Ire...neas 125 u.s. 
623 end In. Ro Deb a l'eti tioner • 158 U oS(I- 564~ The letter eases def'ine · 
the COUl~'s power to issue injunctionu abating a. nuisanc~. On the author-
ity of those the defense ho.d :pleaded. that ·the lower coitrt, being a eon.rt 
of equ.ity, hP...d no authority to enjoin criminal eat.ion. The Supreme Oo-1.iril 
held that the cri.sen cited a.dmit of no suoh intorpratation9 bi.tt tliat they 
grant such po~r _to courts ·of equity. 
The contention of u.nconatitut1one.1ity o_f the Ind:n.ntrial Court 
Act was diemissed by. citation to( the opinion gfven in The state e;x. rel. 
v. Howo.t, 107 Ken. 423. The Supreme Cou.rt, however, in e lengthy opinion. 
defended 1.ta former ru.lL"'lg upholding the validity of the Court of Indus-
> 
trial Relations. As authorities.for pocrera to decry strikes, and as a 
plea for the Industrial court, tho Su.preme Court cited the csae of United 
States ·v • .Debs, 64 Fed• 724. Commenting upon this opinion the Su.pi~eme 
1 court acid: "The Debs pattern has been used for many a ~bsequsnt strike" 
and further: "Bet\1ean April 6:. 191? and November 11, 1918,, tlie period of 
our participation in the World war. tl1ere we~a more than 6 9 000 strikes in 
the Uni tad Sta.tea=> soma or which imporiled winning the war. \\·hen the - - -
1. Vol. 109 Kan. Reports P. 599. 
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flower of this COllntry went £orward as willingly as a brideBroom goes 
to .his bride to hurl tbamselves into the raging pit of Hell in Western 
EU.rope,.. their fa.te t11ere depended upon :patching up strikes a.t home." 
Still further 1n the opinion: nsometimas under the etreaa of genuine 
emotion,. ~anet1mes in. rout, ai'ld aametimaa in mogi1ided ignore.nee. labor 
speet.'11 of its '1•iBftt' to strike o.s 'God-given~. Right to strike is God-
given in the same sense that ri@1t indicated by the word 'property' is 
' . ., 
God-given - - - se 111 the ca.ae .of property, abuse and misu.se a.re not to 
ba tolemtea..n 
That the, Ste.ta ha.a authority to ragnlnte induotry, is held by 
the Supreme CO'tU"t on the basis of the ca.sea o:t Munn v. Illinois, 94 
u.s. 113, end Germari Alliance Insurance co. v. Kai1aao, 235 u.s. 589• 
a.nd this fact ·is quoted e.s e.uthori ty for tho Industrial Conrt . la.vi. The 
decision of the 10\"1er court -:m.s therefore affirmed with no dissenting 
opinions. This opinion uphel4 the former ru.le of l.a.w. 
This case come before the Supreme court o..gnin in November 1921. 
The lower cua.rt bad comnitted Howat and the other officers to jail after 
the above ruling or the Supreme can.rt. The basis of the appeal v.ns. n.ao.1n, 
tha unconstitutiomlity of the lmv. '11he Supreme Court merely cited its 
former opinion, {See above), e.nd affirmed the action of the district court. 
The case was then a.p:pealed to tho United states supreme Court 
for review 0£ the R'&"'lSas Supreme Court's decision in both its hearings. 
The grounds were unconstitutionality of the Industrial Court law and the 
Court proceedings in the ca.sea of the state ex. rel. v. Uova:t. The u.s. 
Supreme Court. (Howat v. Ste.te of· Kensaa,_ \two cases}, 42 Sup. ct. nep. 277) 
dismissed the plea of' unconstitutionality in the caeea as not being 
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demanded by them, but l'llled that as to the injunction order of the district 
court, that Howat and his associates should have obeyed it, regardles.s 
ot whether the act was invalid or valid. This was s.n affirmation of th~ 
opinion of the Kansas Supreme coUrt.: ·The opinion was given by Mr· Chief 
Justice Taft 1n October 1921. with no dissenting opinions. This decision 
put en end to the Howat cases for a time •. A later .case arose" h®Jever 
' ~ • ,.j. .. ' • ~ ' ' ••• ~. 
involving Howat and Dorchy. Thie will be studied later. 
A ca.se wh.ich began ea.rly in the hietoey of the court of Indus• 
trial Relations and which is importe.nt ae deciding the unconstitutionality 
of the Court and the law providing it 1 i e that of The Court of Industrial 
Relations v. Wolff Pe.eking co.~ 109. Kan~ 629. Like ·the above case. the 
Packing Company Case. had a long and turbulent life., alternating between 
the Kansas Courts and the United States Supreme Court until final decis- · 
ion by the latter. 
The case began earl.11n 1921. The Che.a. Wolff Pa.eking conwany · 
or Topeka, was ordered• in :March .,1921, by the court o.t lndustria~ Rela-
tions to institute a certain wage sea.le. and to obaerye hOa.rs of labor· 
as prescribed by the Court. ~e Packing Company refused and the Indus-
trial Court instituted c;>riginal proceedings in mandama.s in the Kansas 
Supreme Court to compel compliance. In the hes.ring. t~e Packing Comp~ 
offered a.s defense• that: 
1. The Induetrio.l Court. he.d no power to sue in its own name. 
2. Manda.ma.a ;proceedings were improper,.. since employees should 
have brmigb.t suit against the Compa.ny for wages due them. 
' .. • t ~ . -
rather than through the Court of Industrial nele.tionth . . 
5. The Industrle.l Court and hence the supreme court, exercised 
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legiS1a.tive rather than judicial fuiictions. 
· 4.; The orders of the Industrial court were not, effective 
until affirmed by .the tto.nsas Supreme court, ·and· no e.t-
t'irmat1on. ha.d been secured. 
5•' The Industrial cou.rt could not legally regule.te wo.ges 
·~ .. 
except in eme~genay • and none existed here. 
6. The Industrial Courtj and the la.w providing it, were un-
constitutional. 
The sUpreme· Court ruled on these contentions as f'ollO\Vs: 
1.·· 4l'he Industrial CoUrt had authority .to bring the a.bow 
action in the Su.Preme cOurt.. n A person authorized by. 
statute may bril'l8 an action without Joining with him 
the person for whose benefit it is prosecuted"• 
. (Section 27. Code of Civil procedure). The Industr!al 
Con.rt.was so authorized by statute •. (See also sections 
8446.844?. 856'1; Gen~ Statutes~ Kansas 1915). 
2 •. lJfandamu.s· proceedings were7 proper by the Court, since the 
action was, not ,to compel pa~ent ot wages, but to compel 
the Packing Company to obey an ardor by the Court. 
z. The power ot the supreme Court is not legislative. since 
it does not have power to determine rates but to compel 
the Industrial Court to determine ra.tes- etc. Hence .the 
Industrial Court's power was delegated, and. was not 
legislative. 
4. An order of the Industrial Court was effective when given 
and did not depend upon the Supreme Court's .Affirmation. 
5. The Industrial Court found that e.n emergency existed du& 
'f;o the dispute between employers and employees 1n the VJolff 
Packing Company plant and its orders therefore were not un-
constitutional. 
6. ~he Industrial Court and its orders were not, iuiconst!tutional. 
Cases where mandamus has been resorted to in compelling 
.canpliance with orders are muneroue and the. right is un-
questioned. 
492J Cit1 of Potwin Place v, Topeka Ry. co •• 51 Kan. 609J 
,City of Topeka V• \Va.ter Co •• 58 Kan• 549; l3rooks•Scanlon 
Co.-1 v. R.R. Connnisoioners 2!?1 u.s. 596; Atkin v. Kansas 
191 u.s. 207;° Holden v. lhrdy 169 u •. s. z~,. and many others. 
(See Pp. 640•643 Vol• iog· Xansa.s Reports)• . 
'l"heee cases est~blish the authority of the. s,~ates to regulate 
industry and this wa.s the intent of the Industrlal court Act• The con-
stitut1onali ty of tho act was upheld in the Howat Cases, and the supreme . ~ ~ 
Court me roly .. referred to these opinions. in answering the question. The 
supreme Court therefore ordered the Packing Company to obey ·the orders 
or the Court of Industria.l Relations. 
The Con.rt of Industrial Relations, pursuant to this order 
sousht to enforce its orders to the Packing Company. These were as fol-
lows: 
1. Open shop policy to be observed by the Packing Company. 
2. Employees. whether organised or 'Un.organized, to receive 
. schedule wages as prescribed by the court. 
5. The eight-hour day, with time and one-half for overtime. 
to be enf'orced. 
4o Sufficient vsork mll.8t be tu.rnishad to enable workers to 
earna·fair wage. 
5. \~'hen plant was not to. operate• employees were to be noti-
fied if possible. 
6. Chailge of hours ot beginning the day's work were to be 
told emp1oyees. 
1. .Enforcement of "seniority rule" ~ould b~ undertaken by 
the Company. 
a. Rules and re~tions of labor0 hours, etc. viere to be 
PC?Sted a.bout the plant. 
9.. Womez:i V!Orkers were to .be paid the same wages as men for 
the same work. 
10 •. Women's toilets and dressing rooms were to be 1n chnrge 
of women • 
. ll· Piece-work rates were to be pe,id sccording to schedule. 
(The Court's) · 
i2·. Details causing griemncee, wore to be referred to a 
committee ot employers. and employees. 
13. Women were not to work longer than 9 hours per d8\Y and 
54 hours per week. 
14. Workers by the week were to be pa.id at the same rates as 
other workmen. 
l!,io The Court's temporary order we.s to stand until changed. 
{Aia.y 1921) • 
16. A Bll.itabla lun~hroom to be su.pplied by the Compa.ey apart 
from certain ·parts of the plant. 
17• :f."lforCement ot a oehodule of: um1mam ~u was to be on-. 
BOrvOO• 
1e. lU.~ei- u~e tll&n tl1a m1nir.:lt.lm were to be paid when deslr-
a.blo •. 
19• t~11oro ·depc.rtmente opomtoa eontL"lttmmJ.7, nisbt an4 tJA:/ir ··the 
orivloyeeo uere to ho.vs one de3 ott POl" 'WOok-. .and t1me and 
ono-l~lt fat- ~rw·r.do.ya and, lego.1 holide.fs• 
r;:t1e ?oo~ Cm1~ avponled to tho sup~ CatU'fi. fore. ·:rehae:r-· 
J.ne. on the eranna. thn.t no emergeney.e:.dsted ln the. plant •as contemplo.ted. 
in tlio act. The zupromo 00-t't.l:t 1'o.led. homwer. tha'h V!;.em Di eontrovers;v 
l>.ad e.r1eon fln.\ tl10 cmpl0300s were fl.boot to stl'ika •. bu:t olooted to anbmit 
the1r cl.Gica te> tlle cattrt o~ ~trial nele.tiono. ht.stead. suc?i e.n em-
erGODOy dic.l exiat am the Cf'J'art had pmJar t.o· ~eulate.. · ~ op!n1an held 
that po.l"B61.'o.phs i. u. G111 'I. e. 10• 12. and 13 o,t· the crdon were not 
within tho Jur1.sd1et1on of the cau:rt .. of Inductriel Reh\t.ions. ·a.ue to 
fnllure to give props:i notice to the emplo:rora with respect· to them •. 
The Supmno court atfh~ the o..ct!.on of·. the Industr!s.l· eaa.n with :tie-· 
epoet to tho othera. hooevar. e-m issued s J)erctrJptor;r writ to tbs· rnc?t-
ine Compmiy to obey t110 rom1n1ng ~i:ths. 
?'ran this op1n1on:. given b3' 1~tr. Justice ~ur8Ml1. !;ir~.· JuatieG 
1>urch d!aoonted with the eonetUTOr~ of ?lr. JilStiee POrt1.ur. The. dis-
oont!no opinion held that 1n view Of tbe saoJ.l sirie of' the pl.a:1ta them 
\Troe 1mprolmb!lity ·of e etrll.te resaltins at. nl.l._ orA 1n vlt"m of the laws 
acnL'lEJt p1eketi::~, thore was ioprobab111t;r of micl1 d...~ reeu.ltmg 
evon in event of s otrlko •. ·as to ?'Ov.4er the sitm?.tion eti en1ergonoy .• as 
contemplated in tho law• Hence ur., Justice Burch with t.lie cOJlClln'Qnce 
of Mr. Justice Porter, held that no emergency, was threatened, a.ni that 
there· sh0t1ld have been no interference by the court of Industria.l Rela• 
tions. 
The Paeking.Oompn.l'lY' ~ppealed its case to the United Sta.tee 
supreme Court• ~!ch 1n m opinion rendered by 11r. Chief' Justice Te.ft, 
(Oct~ber 1922• 45 Sup. Ct. Rep. .P. 630), reversed the opinion at the 
Kansas SUprema o~t. This opinion held that t~e Industrial conrt Act 
insofar. as it pemitted wage-fixing tn the Wolff' Pacld.ng Company' o 
plant was unconstitutional. ·viola.ti1lg the Fourteent~ Amendment. The 
grounds :for this ppinion were that, the conditions of railroads, public 
service. corporations and those charged with< the public interest, are 
not snal.ogous to those in a small packing plant. Tha.t is, the latter 
1& not charged with the public interest in the sense that the railroads 
imd others a.re, and as canprehended 1n the case of M\Um V• Illinois and 
others cited by the Kansas Supreme Court. 
The ca.se Vias remanded to .the Kansas Supreme Court with tho 
following proviso: 11Tha.t this cause be and the same ·is hereby remanded 
' :r • . . 
to the Supreme CoUrt of Yiansas for further proceedings not in.consistent 
l 
with this opinion"• Instructions were given to· strike on.t clauses of 
·the· Kansas Court's opinion pertaining ·to' this f'eatur~, if the section 
in question were separable from the· general law.. It not eepe.re.ble, it 
rendered the entire ls invalid. 
In July 1923, the Kansas Supreme Court obeyed this mandate 
l• 45 SUp. Ct. Bep. 830 and follotd.ng. 
and gmnted the writ of' ma.ndmml.s, thus modified. (Coo.rt ot Industrial 
Relations v. Packing co •• 114 Kan.· 304 ).. T".nis app11ed to. only three 
of' the original nineteen paragraphs, ·viz •.• 5.,. 14,, 19• From this de• 
cision of' the Kansas Supreme court. issu:ing ·the· modified ma.nda.te, .. Mr· 
Justice Durch agai.11 dissented :as in 111 Kan. 601 •. Mr.: Justice Haney , 
dissenting• believed tha.t .tb.e me.nde.te re.qa.ire<l a complete r.eversal of 
the formar decision.· 
The case was age.in· appealed to the Kansas Supreme Court {Vol. · 
114 Kan. llep. P. 487) 0. by both the Packing Company.and the· Industrial 
court. The Industrial Court asked :that paragraph 5• relating tQ over-
time be roinsto.ted.1. this hav1Dg been omitted in the former deois1.on. 
The Suprane Cau.rt reinstated.the pa.ragra.ph holding th.at the provisJ.on . 
for overtime wages is not price..;.f!xlng. Mr. Justice HarVey dissented,, 
holding ths.t overtime wages.· was a. pa.rt of wage-fixing•- He also re-
stated his op.inion giwn in 114 Kan· 504,. tmt the former opinion of the 
Kansas Supreme Court Bhoold be reversedt1 Ur. Justice Burch maintained 
his dissent, that no emergency had. ensted and hence the action was. in-
valid. 
The Pa.eking Company contended· that the Kansas supreme court . . 
no 1onger hn.d Jurisdiction 1n the ease attar the United States Supreme 
Court ha.d issued :t.ta mandate. The Supreme Court' overruled this however 
on the ground that the mandate did not preclude the possibility ot cor-
rection of error. The, Packing Company again carried its cause to the 
United States Supreme cour:t (1924). asking that the Kansas SUpren:e court•s 
opinion be reviewed, At the same time it entered an appeal from the 
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original opinion ot the Kansas Supreme conrt. B~h were considered 1n 
Packing Co. V• Caa.rt of Industrial. Relat1~ 9 (45 Sup. Ct. Reporter 441). 
The opinion in the first. the appeal from, the la.ter decision of the Kan-
sas, SupJ:eme con.rtJf, was that the Kansas Court's decision 'Jl8.S t!Dal, rind 
left nothing for review. · The appeal was therefore, dismissed. 
Tb.e second case• i.e. e.ppae.l fran the original opinion of' the 
Kansas Supreme conrt, ·ms tried upon the contention of unconstitutionality 
of the law providiilg the Kansas Court of Industrial Relations. ".Ehe Uni t.od 
Sta.tea Supreme Court had already ruled that price-fixing ale.uses in the 
law deprived employers of property and liberty of' contract withOllt due 
p:focess, of 1• and hence were. unconstitutional. The opinion was now 
giwn• rendered by Mr. Justice Van Devsnter. tb.a.t the entire law was 
unconstitutional becanse the Xa.nsss Industrial Court under the law 
cau.ld compel erbitration a.nd that , this and other features at the lo.w, 
viz •• price-fixillg.- h~s of labor, were not separable from the act, 
ba.t were a. necessa.r,y part ·of' a general schema. of' compulsory arbitration. 
The opinion in pa.rt is as follows: "\Ve recognize the.t 1n its usual ac-
cepta.nce,, the term (''arbitration" l indicates a proceeding based entirely 
upon the consent of the parties• and we recognize also the.t this act 
diapensea with their consent. ·under it they have no voice in selecting 
the detemining agency or iri. defining what that agency is to investigate 
a.nd deteim1ne1: a.Id yet the determination is to bind them, even to the 
point of' preventing them from agreeing on ~ change in the terms fixed 
therein, unless the agency approves. To speak of. a proceeding with 
such attributes merely as ·a.n arbitration• - - - The system of compul-
sory arbitration which t~e act establishes is intended to compel. and 
11' au.Stained will compel •. the owners BDd employees to contimle the · 
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business on terms which a.re not of their 0\171 ma.king. · . It will. constrain 
them, no~ m~rely to reepect tho· ~ems if they continue the business, 
bu.t will constrain them to continua the bnsiness on those .. terme.,.. - _: 
Suoh a system in:fringes the. liberty . of eon:t1~t and rights of property 
guaranteed by the du.a process of law cl.a~· of' the ·F~eenth Amendment. 
- - - The authority vmich tp.e, ac~ gives. respecting the_ fixing of hem.rs 
of labor is merely ~ f'ea.t~re of the system of· compuls017 arbitration. 
end has no separate purpose - - - It follows that the:_.state court should . ' . l 
be.ve declined ~ogive etteot to mv l>a.rii .of' the order o~ the. ~ate agency." 
This dec~eion definitely put an end to ~e powers of the Coo.rt of Indus• 
trial Relations tor compulsory arbitration. ~e unconstitu.tionality of: 
the ~w would no d~t Jutva been ruled.UPOJ;l earlier in tll.e history· of 
the Industrial court~ but .cases appeal~d to the United States SUpreme 
Court did not question the validity· of the la.w. and it -wa.s ruled tbat 
no. ~ocialon upon validity of. the_ la.~ would be given unless the ~e 
merited it. The fmal case however broUght this- qa.estion forward with., 
the resnlt as given in the above_opin1on. declaring the law void as in 
violation of the Faa.rteenth ·tJAendment •. 
soma other ce.ses will .be given, however,. for one, at ·1east1 
is important. This is.,. Sta.~e of Kansas v. Do:rchy ll2. Kan. ·255. This 
was a. recurrence of the t-roubles of the Mine Unions· in. District 14• 
which were involved in the Bawa.~ ~ases already· studied. l Host and 
Darcey had already lost two cases against the court of. In~ustr!al 
nela.tions, ond this case. a.rose £ran. defiance .·or the OOurt· · The 
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point which ma.de their conviction inevitable was that. they also defied 
the district c~ o~Cherokee County. thus being ~onvicted for contempt 
of court.- This fact destroyed a.ll force of their fight against the 
Court of Industrial Relations. 
The ts.eta of' the case are;; Dorehyp Howat and others, off'icora 
of District ?lumber 14, United.Mine, workers ot America, a labor union, 
were sentenced. to serve six ·months in the Cherokee County Jail, and to 
pay a fine of $500. for calling; a strike in violation of' an order by 
the Court of Industrial Relations. (See 112 Ke.n •. 255 ). The Kansas 
supreme Court affirmed the opinion~ 
l'iorchy appealed to the United States . Supreme Court• 44 SUp. 
Ct. Rep. 5251 _on the ·gronncls that his arrest and the court proceedings 
were unconstita.tiona.l. The Wolff Packing. Com~ case hnd not yet been 
decided, but the opinion had been g1 van that the act was invalid in the 
respect ·to price-fixing in Packing plants. (See above)• The decision 
in the- Dorcliy :case was given in 1925• Thia decision was that section 
19 of the law was invalid 1f it was an intimate part of the system of 
compulsory arbitration declared invalid. in the Packing Company case. 
Since this opinion {i.e.· Pa.eking Compa.n~" case) was rendered after the 
xatlsas Supreme Court had rnled on the DorchY case• the case was . reversed 
and sent back to the Kansas supreme court with the ma.nda.te to vacate its 
original opinion in order to ascertain whether section i9 was SJpa.rable 
from the general scheme of compulsory arbitration. The opinion was 
given that 'the whole scheme was invalid if this section wa.s not thus 
The Ktlnons supreme ooun pursuant to the ~~te Gt the· 
United Sto.tos Snpr«lle conrt,. vacntod. 1ts orlglnal :oplnlon .. end ft<w> 
v1o\?Od the csse SBBin• in the light. cf' the 4oc1s1on of. the tatter 
court 1n the l'acldz3g c~ csse. fhe .opinion in tl1!..s rehearfnG 
voe given 1n July, 1924. Sta.to v. Howab et.: al• 116 ~ 41!., It 
hold that section 19,. in question ms co fe,r eoverat>le ttom the~ 
ornl oohonte ot 1QG1slo.t1on e.s to constitute en tmsper.~ent.: :atatato• 
'rho Rc.nsaa Su:prme CCJlll't eave cs mthoritJ' for tllie op!rdon. the CGses 
of tllo state ox. rel. v. Romt.,. 109 Xen. ~VG,, am. the Court ot Ind'lUJ-. 
trtol Relnt1one v. Pncldns co. 1 114 X1ln• 487 •. no based -epon section 
28 ot tl1e IndustrW COD.l't net. 1lb.1s oectton to as .follouat nit fJ:tr3' 
ooot1on or proviolon of th1o act ahall ~e fotmd !nW\114 bi 8.!W ooon,, 
it ebnll bo concluslvely presnr.sd thnt th.le .act wOtlld ha.Wt been passed 
by the 1 eaiolnturo w1thoa.t BtlCh 1nve.'lid section or provleion,. and ·the 
o.ct as a whole ahnll not be found to be inva.lld by &<ff'f9· court." · (Revieed 
stntutea l~cnaaa 1925, 44•G20l• Tb.ls mte wo.s followed 1n tl\.o above 
case and tho V.e.nacn Supreme court rnled tho.\ tlle sect tons held lnw.:U.d 
by t.'1.o Un1tocl States supreme court. did not nilder: the ent1!G. act void• 
'1"110 or161ml opinion mo roaff11'tled. 
~ eo.se vas appealed to tho t1r"1ted Sta.tea, supreme c~ and 
1n en opinion g1ven 1n October :m, 1926 (u.s. sup. ct. ~ld.wme Op1..~lme. 
!iovcribor 1, 1926-192?. 71~.eei. ~ne 23 • .l. that cwrt- aff!mod the op1n-
1Cll of_ the Ks..'lDas SUprome r.oort. nie cpinion, wna hold that section 19. 
hnving been mled by the KMSSB Cm.u.'t as, sovomble from tha .seneml. 
scheme of legiolntion.. end bavinS tho. leeol :force of oo independent 
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statute$ would be thus regarded by- the United States supreme court. 
The rule established was that "The Supreme Court of' the United States 
is bound by the eona·t;ro.etion given state sta.tutea by the COllrtS Of the 
state'• (see Syllabus Paragraph l)•. The opinion hold therefore that the 
®ly question was whether section 19'° standing a.lone was unco~titutiona.l• 
The op1n10n is iniportant as defining the power of loBiela.tures 
to enact le.we against strikes. The rules were stated in the syllabus: 
.5. Interference without juat ca.use, with the right to carry 
on business ia unla1tlf'u.l• 
4• A stri!te may be illegal because of its purpose• however, 
orderl)' the manner .in which it is. conducted, both at com-
mon law and under the Federal Constitution• 
s• A strike·to collect a stale claim of a fellow-member of a 
· labor 1Ul!on. who wa.a formerly employed in the bu~iness, is 
unlawful• 
?~ The legislature may subject to punishment officers ot a 
labor union who use the power or influence incident to 
their office in the union to ol'der a strike for the en-
forcing payment of a stale claim by a foxmer employee of' 
the ·business, f'or wages 'alleged to be due and imp.aid • 
. The Supreme Oou.rt {U.s. ) . hel\l tha.t the ootiop. of' Dorchy vs.a 
uncon&titutional becau.se · of ,J1is purpose. in calling the strike in · 
Dietric.t 14. Tb.is purpose wasr· to force the employers to pay a chim 
for· wages ma.de· by e. :former· employee.. . The opinion as rendered by Mr. 
Justice Branders., ls ln pa.rt as £ollaws: 11To enforce payment by a strike 
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is clearly coercion• The legislatare m.ay make such aetion_pu.niSha.ble 
cr1tdna.ll.y, a.a extortion or· otherwise,. Com.par~ People v. Barondesa, 8 
?l.Y. Crim. Rep. 234J 41 n.y.s.n~ 659; 16 N.Yo Sn.pp. 436; 155 E'ttY• 649; 
51 R·E· 240. And it may subJecrt.:. to pu.r.nisbment him who· uses the power 
or infiuence incident to his office I in & union to order the strike. 
Heither the comnon law, nor the 14th Amendment~ confers· the absolute 
ric;ht to strike. Compare Aikens V• Wisconsin, l.95 u.s. 194, 204, 205; 
49 Led. 164, 169• 160; 25 Sup. ct. Rep~ 5"• The section 19• in question 
was therefore given the ·e.ffect: of an independent statute, and held to be 
constitutional.. The decision of the Xanss.s Supreme Cat.U.-t 'Was therefoxe 
upheld. There were no dissen:liing opinions. 
. . 
Dorchy end IIov.a.t were therefore· ·ordered. ·to ja.11 to serve th~ir 
sentence. . They were both pardoned later however before completing their 
sentences. 
Thero is a seeming conflict of· opinions in the ~eo ot Wolff 
. . . 
Packing Co. V• Court of Industrial Relations. and the Dorchy case. Ae 
has been seen. the United States Supreme ·court ruled ·in the former the.t 
several parts of tl>.e Induatria.l Cmirt · lmv were not .a·evarable from the 
general schema of compulsory· arbitration, and hence sOOring in their 
l . 
invel.idity of the vhole. : In the Dorch7 decision. above, given after 
the Packing Company decision, ·the . validity of Section 19 of the a.et as 
based upon section 17 of the same ,a.ct, .was upheld. It will be ·remembered 
however that the Pa.eking co. decision fonnd th& lmv in its entirety void• 
after the dedision o:t the Supreme Co-art of Ka.naas bed declared section 19 
i. see Wolff Packi:ng Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations 69 u.s. L.ed. 
785; 45 U.S. Sup. Ct. Rep. p. 444 •. 
seveml?le and having the 1egal force of e. complete statute. section 
19 ·therefore ceaaed tG be an intimate part of'· the Induetr-ia.l court 
Act~ when the Supreme Court ,of, the United Ste.tea held 1n the Dor~ 
case,. {.Syllabus. R. i •. ), tint tts.e state coUrt's constrnction of the 
statutes of the state w6uld hold in the United States Supreme Court, and · 
when t...lie ·Y~sa.s Supren:e Court's decision thus became final, this ante-
dated the :United States Supreme Cou.rt's decision in the ~cki?lB Compll.?\V 
case by, three months, (July, 1924 ~ October, 1924.J• The power of tho · 
legislature. a.s defined by sections 17. and 19 is therefore· held to be 
constitutional.:. as they applied to the Industrial Court Act speai:f'ic-
all7 an1 as intimate ~e tl1eywere not valid,bu.t being set forth 
as independent Statutes. they were thus held to be valid powers, 1n 
that they. had universal. application and validity a.a guaranteed undor 
the conmon .. Jaw, and were not in contro'!ention of .the 14th Amendment• 
The dissenting opinions of l.1ir• Justice Durch and 1.1?-. Justice 
Harvey. in. the. matter of severability of section 19 of the Industrial 
Court ;Act, are". interesting ·though not important ao to the fitml ruling 
opinions. 1:r. Justice ·Harvey _believed that the United Sto.tos supreme 
court. opinion rendering the ·Industrial· Court Act invalid as applyinB 
tothe·smployera in industries supplying food, clothing e.nd f\lel, 
tacitly implied 1rivalidity·a.1so as applying to employees in those 
industries. That is, releasing the employers, the ·1a.w should. not bind 
the employees.. · IIe therefore .held ·that the Kansas supreme court· should 
have reversed 1 ta original opinion. 
Mr. Justice Burch· held$ the.t 1n ruling section 19 severalty 
from .th~ act, ·~he majority ot .. the Kansas Court were upholding a. provision 
only, o.:tter the law as a whole hBd been rendered .useless, and hence' 
. . . . . 
the provision itself was virtually useless~ 
Other cases ·under the a.ct .are illlportant '~y as showing the 
. -
power of the Con.rt of Industrial. Ilela.t ions Act. "Picketing" wa.e the· 
qu.eetion raised in the State ·v. Personett. ll4 xe.n. 6s1. T• L· 'Per-
. . ' 
sonett was ad.Judged guilty of' picketing. by the Franklin district 
court• He attempted to persuade wormnen to quit work' when the. Carmen's 
,. 
Union dedla.red a strike at Ottawa, Ka.nse.s hi 1922• , In the cmlrt action 
he .contended that this persua.di.ng of workmen did not· constitute picket• 
ing. The lower court, however, ruled that the term "picketingn in.;., 
eluded such persuasion. and returned ·a Jud@Ueilt a.gs.inst · hiin. HEl e.p-
- . 
pea.led to the Supreme court' mere the Judsment wa.a· e.ttirmed•- • 
Ur. Justice Harvey dissented however, holding twit &·definition. 
ot picketing did not permit of such constru.ctioti', ae the courts had 
gi van• He said that "picketing" consisted· of po$ting members at ap-
proaches to works 1n order to uae. such hinu~nca in their power to 
prevetl:t . wor?en from cont1m.ting 1n
1 
their emplOJment • . He did not '.bG-
lieve that Personett bad violated this-. mee.nh'ig ot the· law,: end there-. . 
tore that the. opinio~ should have been reversed. 
The State Ve Scott 109 Kan. 16p was en early ~ase under the· 
Industrial COlll't Act. Action was begun in 1921 raising the gµ.est!on 
of unconstitutionalit7 of the law# e.ilE!ging 'a duality of fa.notions 
of the ~ourt of In~str.ial. Rele:ti ons. . Scott was chSrged with' viola-
. .. 
tion of the la.w in attempting to induce others t·o ·quit work· ift ind.us• 
tries charged with public. interest. Action was began in the Wyandotte 
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district court. Scott took a motion to qua.sh the proceedings of the 
state, on the ground that the law violated the provisions of the Konsa.s 
constitution reqlliring tbat: "No bill shall contain more than ono sub-
ject which shall be olea.rl:;' sta.ted :fn its title"• The lower court 
,sustained this motion to que,ah and _the state appealed to the Suprane 
court. 
The Supreme Court ru.led the contention that the Court ot In-
dustrial Relations posseased judicial ftmctio:na was groundleao. The 
word "Courtt• was not to be understood in a teobnioe.l sense (State ox. 
rel• v., llowat, 107 Kan. 425). It a.pplied only in the sense tbn.t the 
. . 
term ''Municipal Corporations" apply to townahips, which are merely 
qua.si~corporationa. The Induatrial .court was ruled to .have power to 
malte so.ch orders as necessary to regula.1a irtd't.tatris.l relations, with-
out exercising aey Judie~ power. 
The court· held that a title of an act .is not objectionable 
on the ground of generality• o.s long ns its scope and purposes are 
tairly indicated and was surreptitiously pasaed. "Everything connected 
with the ma.in purpose and reasonably adapted to secure the objects 
indicated 'by the title• may be embraced ·in the a.ct withou.t violating 
·the ~~nstitutional inhibition" (SeeLynch v. Chase 55 Kan. 567). It 
was ruled therefore. that the title of the. a.ct creating the -Oourt o:t 
~ndustria.l Relations was on this authority•· brotid enough to cover the 
prohibition o£ the acts charged ~inst ·Scott. It therefore reversed 
the action of the lower court. . 
The importan.t rnle established wns that the title or the 
Court ot Industrial :Relations law was broad enough to cover the 
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prohibition of conspiring tC? induce workers to quit wo1 .. k in industries 
clothed with public interest. and making mch inducing• or conspiring 
to induce, a miademeanor punishable in the courts. 
These latter cases are not a.s important as those given above• 
The Howat and Dorcliy cases w·ere given in sucession, in .all their stages 
in order to show their progress ~rane;h the courts. Thia· is tme also 
of the l's.eking Company caee. The Industrial Court cases thus could not 
be reviewed 1n the ol.'der of their appears.nee in the Kansas supreme court. 
The Court or Irl.duetrial Relations Act was declared. unconstitu-
tiona.1 ·tor the res.son that the industries which it intended to mga.late 
by compulsory arbitration. were not sufficiently clothed with the public 
interest to J1l.st ify their inclusion in the category o'f' such 1ndustr1es 
' 
as defined 1n the .United Sta.tea supreme C<rart rcl.ing in tlie celebrated· 
case of ~-unn v. Illinois, which controls. 
l 
In Lhlnn v. Illinois. the ra.le was established that the Sta.te 
has the r1£9it under the comnon law and consti tutiona.l. provision to regn.-
la.ta industries charged with the public interGst •. Thi~ right· eomes 
from the English com:non law and has nwnerou.s· cases as ·precedent so The 
question 1n the l{L111m case was whether grain elevators in the city o~ 
Chice.g"O were clothed with the pn.blic interest to the extent that .stor-
age rates for grain could be regulated and prescribed. 1by the Illinois 
legislature. The Illinois Supreme. Court in a majority opinion decided 
that such was tru.e. The United State~ Supreme court, likewise in a 
majority opinion, affirmed this decision, holding that the strategic 
1. 94 u.s. 113 (1876) . 
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position of the elevators :in controlling the passage of' grain from the 
Western states to rerketa, constituted a "virtual." monopoly of' proces-
sing features and hence were clothed with the pub~ic interest to such 
extent as to·· justify ·reguJ.a.ti·on. 
The five major industr:ia s of' Kansas included only two wllioh 
might be cla.asi:tied e.e coming within the scope of P.ublic interest in-
dustries.. Tbe:Je. railroad.a p;nd public utilities a.re largely coo.trolled 
by other agencies than the individual state. The remaining indus-
tries, viz., those providing fuel,. clothing end food, were held not to 
occupy su.ch a strategic position as to constitute than in -e:rrs sense 
monopolies. and therefore not to be clothed with public interest• 
~e unconstitutionaU.ty· of the compu.l.eory arbitration feature 
of tlw Kansas law. hinged ~pon this distinction~ . so tlw.t the theory ot 
the court of Inµustrie.1 P'°latiom;law is J.u1sou.nd only in that it inter-
preted "Public interest" too liberally• infringing upon the rights of' 
private property, as defined in the Munn case. 
That this is true· mey ba· seen in the Ka.,,Sa.s supreme Court 
opinion in State ex. rel •. v. Howat. 109 Kan. 57&. where the theory 
·ot the act e.s interpreted by .th.e c-Onrt was given e.s followsi Here-
tofore the industrial relationship bas been tacitly regarded as exist-. . 
ing bet\vetm .. two ·l'!:tembers. industrie.l ma.mger and industrial worker" 
They bave J o;ined Wholeheartedly 1n excluding others. ·'?he legislature 
proceeded on the ~heory that there is a. third member ot these indus-
trial relat ionahips which ha.ve to do with production,. preps.ration and 
distribution of the neoeasarie a of life - the pub lie. The legislature 
' 
also proceeded on the theory that the public is not a silent partner. 
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Whenever the dissensions of the other two becottie :fl£l.oc-ra.nt, the third 
member may see to it the.t business does not stop". 
Page 108.· 
CRAP.CF.lt xr . 
Criminal Syndicalism Cases. 
The Kansas law against criminal syndicalism was passed by 
the special session of the legislature in 1920. which enacted the 
Court of Industrial Relations Act. The two statutes were the result 
of pub lie sentiment age.inst organized lsbor• This was aroused by the 
coal strikes and by the activities of the Industrial workers of' the 
world, a labor union advocating violence in effect 1ng its aims and ends. 
The Criminal s111dicalism law is protective 1n 1ts_1ntent and 
is directed against such violence and predatory practices as the 1.w.w. 
were em.ploying in Kansas. It ia designed to protect owners of property 
~ anployera,·The protectiw legislation that has been studied thus 
far, has been designed to benefit employees• 
The activity of' the I.w.w• in agricultural industry and in 
oi~ industry in Kansas was thought. to threaten the welfare of property 
owners in these industries1 and to be seriously interfering with pro-
duct ion• The 18\'f was intended to drive from the state such syndical-
ism practices as the I.w.w. were enploying, by providing heavy peno.lties. 
or to prevent interference with production in Ka.nses industries. 
Th.a law we.a defined as follows: "An a.ct defining criminsl 
syndicn.l.ism, end the word "sabotage"; prohibiting the advocacy,. teaching 
or affirmative suggestion thereof; and prohibiting the advocacy, teach-
ing or affirmative suggestion_of' crime, physical violence. or the com-
mission of any unle.wf'ul act or thing a.a a. means to accompJ.ish industrial 
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or politica.l ends, chnnge or revolution, or for profit; and prohibit• 
1ng o.esembla.ges for the' purpose of such advocacy, teaching or sugges-
tions; declaring it unlawful to permit the use of an:a- place, building• 
rpome or premises for such as.semblages in. certain ca.sea; and providing 
l 
penalties for violations thereof" •. 
Crimina.l s311diee.lism ia defined as "The doctrine which advo-
cat es crime , physical. violence• arson_, de~tru.ction of' property. sabot-
age, or other unlawi\11 acts or methods, as a means of ac~omplishing or 
effecting industrial or political revolution or for profit" (Section l). 
Sab·otBtitit8 is defined as ttMaJ.icious; felonious• intentional or 
unla.wfa.l dams.ea injury or dea:tr:u.c1iion of real or peraotlD.l property of 
any employer or owne~ • by his or her employee or employees or by e:ny 
employer or employers. or by e;ny·pereon or persona, at their ovm in.-
eta.nee or et the instance. reqn~et or,inst~gation ot such employees. 
employers, or tJ.r1Y other persons" (Section 2). 
#i Viola.tors · a.re those who practice s311dica.11sm. and sabotage., 
or aid or abet their being practiced, either by word of' mouth or by 
using the press, or by p~inted ~tter. These a.re guilty of a feloey 
and are subject to imprisonment 1n the state penitentiary for a period 
~. 
o:f"~f'ran one to ten years, or to Pf.W a. fine of not more than $1,000 
on being senter..ced both to pay fine and to imprisonment. (Section 5). 
OWnere of buildings,. rooms 9 or places where S\l.ch doctrines are 
practiced or taught under ·eny of the above cOnd.itions; if they knowingl7 
permit it, are guilty of a misdemeanor, and are subject to ·less severe 
1. Laws of Kansas Special Session 1920 Chapter 57._ 
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- penalties of fine end imprisonment. (Section 4). 
The law went into effect early in 1920. There wa.s no case 
for review by the Supreme court until Je.nua.ry 1921· ~e first cn.ee 
was. the state V• Berquist 109 Kan. 568. c. E· Berquist wne cbnrged 
with viola.ting the crimina.l s~1dicalism law in being· a member of the 
1.w.w. in Kansas •. which ·organization teaches syndicaliam. · The lower 
court I' 1"i1ontgomery County"· so.stained a. motion to qa.a.sh the proceedings 
tor the,reason that 0 It, (the information) fails to state that the 
defendant was a member of such organisation which teaches or advocates 
said unlawful doctrines as mentioned in the intorma.tion1 within the 
sto.te of Ke.nsa.s or within the Juriddiction of the Court". It was also . . 
contended that the information was defective because of its omission 
to state that J3erquist ·became a. member of the organization referred 
to, in Kansas. 
The Supreme Court upheld the opinion of the lower court f'or 
the- reasons that the lower court gave, holding tha.t these reasons viere 
not in error. ~e opinion of the court as rendered by ur. Ju.stice 
Mason ise in part: "The statute makes. it a felony for a person to be-
come a member of a society 'Which .. teaches what is defined as criminal 
s~icalism. The essence of the offense is the uniting with such or-
geniaation, joining it• and thereby assuming a.n obligation to cooperate 
with its members in e.ccanplishing its pnrposes. In order for this 
e.ct to .be punishable in Kansas,. it mll.Bt take place here. Bu.t where a 
person joins in this state. a society of tha.t character. he could not 
escape liability by showing tha.t it had never ma.de Kansas a field of 
its propaganda. - - - The informtion however, does not allege that the 
' 
defendant in Kansas became a member of' tbe Industrial workers o:f',the 
world - but merely that being in Kansas he was a member' of it. Under 
its allegations it may be tbat he: joined the society in some othe:r 
sta. te - - - and tha. t he· has nOt within. this . jurisdiction. conspired or 
conferred with others concerning them• The mere coming into this sta.te 
of one who had theretofore become a member· ot such an organization e.s 
the statute condemns does not 1 according to its terms" render him snb-
jeot to prosecution here ~ ~ • We hold the information to be wbject 
to a motion to quash because· it does not allege that the defendtmt be-
came a member of the Industrial Workers of the world in this state. - • • 
The judgm.ent is affirmed".· 
The case wont off on the question of being a member _o:t· the 
1.w. w. in Kansas and becomirut e. member in '~saa. The .opinion held 
that a prosecution of a person coming in~o ·Kansas. and who ba4 been 
a member of' suoh eyndioalistic society J;)rior to his coming might be 
expost facto and hence illegal. 
The opinion shows,· also, the difference ·betyleen the Kansas 
statute and the similar statute ·of the State of Washington. 'Qu.oting 
the opinion on this point: . "The correctness of this conclusion 18 
the mom evide~t fro.·;1 the tact t..ha.t tha l~ of cur statute is 
diff'eront - - - from the.t of tlie Washington act which obviously wae 
to some extent consulted by the dra.ughtsMan in framing it. There the 
penalty is imposed upon whoever shall organize or help to organize., 
give a.id to, be. a manber ot_ or volunta......fly assemble with, 8n'3 gr~p 
of persons formed to advocate, advise or teach crime:1 sedition. violence. 
intimidation or injury as a means or way of effecting or resisting e:tr3' 
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industrial., economic. social or political ~a.nge (Laws of \7ash1ngtcn, 
1919, Ch. 174). Because of the use of the expression 'be a member of• 
a.s d1stingaished from 1becotte a member Of', the Washington court ha.a 
held that a. prosecution '\Ulder thls .. cla.U.se may be maintained in a county 
other than that in which the defendant· joined th.a organization {Stnte 
v. Hennessy (Wash.) 195 Pac. 211 1 217-218). Thus in Washington, a 
member ot the I.w .• w. could not but violate the law if it hnd been held 
".,-, 
that the 1.w.w. is S3D-dicaJ.ist1c, that is. the fa.ct ot his boing a mem-
ber would be a vioia.tion., !for :could a. member in another state remove 
to Washingt-on \Vithou.t becoming. in violation of the law, under the a.bow 
condition• Hence the 1.w.w .. must be regarded as non-syndica11.st1o by 
the Courts of \Vashington• Under the Kansas statute as shown ho\Vever. 
the stress ot importance is upon becomi,!!6, a member of SU.Ch syndicalis-
tic society i!i Kansas. In neither state could such a society exist 
but the Kansas statute waald allow members in other states to enter 
the state whereas the wa.~ington statute does not. 
The· next case VJas The State v• Breen, 110 rom. 817. The Trego 
dis;t;rict' court found Breen guilty on. three counts of violation of the 
criminal syndicalism law. He was charged, also, wt. th having become a 
member of. a syndicalistic society in ~a.a, but was acqa.itted of this 
. charge. The second cbilrge we.a that of aff'irmative suggestion and e.dvocacy 
of sy.ndica11sm and sabotage as a meana· of' effecting social and political 
revolution-. The third count was that Breen with three others was a. mem-
. ber of' an assemblage o:f' persons in Trego County, assembled for the pur-
pose of' teaching sabotage. The fourth count '1as an accusation of the 
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I.w.w. in Trego county as beinc syndicalistic ·and engaged in distribu.t• 
·' . 
11'lg prin~ed materials advocating the doctrines held by· the I.w.w. Breen . 
was a member of this organi·zation. 
The d1~trict court acquitted him on the first oaunt but found 
him ga.il ty of the other three. The caee was appealed t·o tha supreme · 
C~t.. This. c~ l'llled t~t th~ iack of precision in tlle manner- of 
drawing up the case ,defeated its purpose. Thia lack of' precision was 
in failing .t~ follow the.~. of the s;tatute so that it. Via.a impos-. 
sible for the . lower ~o~. to have folloued the law. miie coo.rt reversed 
the case. on account· of the inconsistency. with inatruc,tion to qna.sh the 
information due to look of evidence. · 
• ! l • 
The state v. ?JurpJli, 112 xan. 816, is a continuation o~\,j;lle 
Breon casa. L!urp~ was convicted·· on the same charges es ·were lodged 
against Dreen but had a. separate trial. Ilis appeal was ma.de upon the 
same contentions as in the Breen case. and the s~.evidence was used. 
Tho same opinion was given,. vis.• tlla.t the case be reversed due to fail-
uro of l~videnca to show an offense. 
The· Sta.to e:. rel. V•· Industrial Workers of the world• 113. 
Kan. M7. is one ot the mQst important cases under the S~dicalism 
Act. .Ms.icy- facts ooncerriing the organization. methods,end teachings 
of ~he. ~.w.w. are shown. Tho spirit of the Syndicalism statute is 
interpreted by the Court as condemning the I.iv.w. 
~ 
Th~ case began :ln 1913· ill the Butler district eou.rt when a 
petition. for an injmiction against. the e.ctiv~ties of the· I .. w.w.- in 
Dutler County \1as granted •. The purpose of the inJunction was stated 
as follows: "To restrain conmission in Kansas of depredation against 
property, inimical . to· the. genara.l wel:f'are, by the Industrial Workers 
of the world• its executive boa.rd and its officers., agents and mem-
bers-." A demurrer to the petition for inJunction wc.s overruled by 
the lower court and the case wa.s appealed to. tho supreme coo.rt. 
The I·aw .• w. in its organisation and administration was de-
scribed a as well as the br~ches operating 1n Xansa.a, as: ".Agricul-
tural workers Industrial Union NO• 400"; "Agrimµtura.1 t!orkers Or{!llll• 
imtion ·o,f the 1.w.w. No. 400"; "Oil Workers Industrial. Union 11.o., 450"1 
and o.w •. I.U. No. 450".: certain practices of these were held to be 1n 
v!olai;ion of the syndicalism statute. 
Large numbers came .to Ke.nsa.s after the court action began in 
.Bu.tle:r: County, and, oommel'lCed depredations with the· intent to put a 
stop to work in the wheat fields end in the oil industry 1n Ko.nae.a. 
and to form conspiracies to effect their purposes. The petition for 
injunction stated rtTh.at if the purpoa.es ot said defendants are a.ccom-
pliehed, the public health and the lives of the people of the state 
of' Ke.nea.s will be endangered, production will be decreased and a great 
amount ct personal. and real property - ~ - will be ma.l.ioiausl.y and 
wilfa.lly destroyed by ea.id defendants, for the purpose of carrying out 
the plans of their organisation• and that each end all ot said defend-
ants are illsolvent". 
The opinion of the Supreme court. rendered by lirr. Justice 
Durch, was in pa.rt as follows: "Kansas ranks fourth among the states 
of the union in the production of petroleum· - - • rr.ansa.a produces 
more wheat than mrs other state in the union - .. - These sto.tistice 
-
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are given to show why misguided and miscreant members of the Indus-. 
trial Workers of the world swarmed into Kansas Ju.st before ·the v1lleat 
harvest of 1920. If successful in their efforts they could paralyze 
two essential industrJe a, not only of the ·state but of the nation • 
. " 
while the country was still suffering from the disastrous strikes of 
1919 end 1920. The action wa.s one to enjoin them fi-an execution of· 
their nefarious designs." 
'''l1he a.rb'"Utlent in ·support ot the demurrer to the petition con-
• " ,, l 1 ' 
sists of variations upon the theme 'A court 0£ equity ha.a no powe~ to 
enforce a criminal statute by executive order' • l'fi is Sa.id• - •no 
property rights of the state of Kansas were affected; the proceeding 
was e.n attempt to inflict invol'Ulltaey servitude on members of the order; 
a.nd the proceedings were violative of constitutional rights of the de-
fondants under both the state and Federal statute~•:" 
"The theme and variations were considered in the State ex·~ rel. 
V• Howat, 109 Xs.n. 376 - - - The action had nothing whatever to do with 
administration of the crimll:lal law and an authority of the Howat case, 
tho Can.rt holds the petition stated e. cause of action as against all the 
objections urged - - - The judgment of the district court is a.ffirmedn. 
The state v. Fiske,. 117 t{a.n. 69• is the la.st case to be reviewed 
by the Supreme canrt. · It vas appealed from the Rice dietrict court in 
July, 1924. Fiske was convicted of violating the Syndice.l~m law by 
teaching syndicalism• and by seeking to obtain members for the 1.w.w. 
1n Rice C0W1ty. lle solicited e.nd obtained two members.. Ile admitted 
this fact, but contended that, since he had done _this work in Reno 
County, the Court ot Rice Connty could have no jurisdiction. He fur--
thor urged the invalidity of the Syndicalism Act. as violating the 
Page 116. 
Bill of. Rights or the Fodars.l Constitution which guarantees tho right 
ot free speech and froedom of the press. In s.ddi'tion 1t vm.s contended 
tha.t the ls.v violated the Fourteenth Amendment. 
The opinion o:f the Sup:reme Court. rendered by Mr. Juatioo 
Mason" affirmed the decision of the· lower court. A part of tl>.ia opin-
ion states that: nstatutes penalyzing'the advocacy of violence in 
·bringing about gover.nmental Changes do not violate gua.ra.nteee of free-
dom: ot speech. Their wisdom and justice are matters for the datormina-
tion .o~ tho legislature". The other contentions were dimniaaed as 
being contrary to evidence. The decision of the lower court was a.ff1rmod. 
Miscellaneous Caf:1es. 
In thia grou.p will be included several cases involvtng 
other laws then those stated in the.foregoins pages. 
The first 'of these is the ~a.se,. The State ir. Coppage, 8'1 
Kan. 752. It involves the violAtion of sections ·4074 and 4675 of the 
Gcnernl Statutes of Kansas 1909,. \ihich prohibit employers br~!ng 
pressure to bea.r upon enployeeo, to. induce them, as a condition of 
emplo,mant to refrain fr0m memberships in e. labor llnion. The facts 
of the case are: T.D. Cop~ge, Superintendent ot the n!lrisoo" ra.il-
way in 1911,. attempted to peraue.d.e A·R· Hedges. an employee of the 
Railway Company at Fort Scott, Kansas. to sign a written Se"'Teetnent 
to withdraw from the Switchmen' a Union9 a labor· organization• Hedges 
refused and was discharged~ IIe begw.1 ac·hion against Coppo.ge in the 
Bourbon district can.rt. A motion to. qua.sh the information on account 
of failure to shov:1 offenae, was. overruled, and the c~se wa.a appealed 
to t11e Supreme Cmtrt after Copps.g~ via.s convicted in the l.ower court. 
The supreme Cao.rt on review, cited the case of Adair v. 
United States, (208 u.s. 161) i • In this case en employer had dis-
charged en employee on account of membership in a labor tmion. The 
Federal Oourt ruled this action e.. crimina.l offense. The United 
states Supremo Court on appeal. ruled the opinion ot the Federal . . 
court. unconstitutional, and s.n act o:f'. Congress of 1890tt making snch 
discharge a criminal. o~fenee ~ invalid. /mother caae • <1lhe State v. 
Daniels (Minn) 1~6 u.w. 584, was also cited. The :µan1e1~ ca.ae, wherein 
an employee wa.s induced to make an agreement not to remain a member · 
Page 117. 
of' a union, was decided following the rule in the_ Adair case, that 1st· 
that em,ployers have the right to make SU.eh demands as a. condition of 
emploj1ll9ll.t• 
The opinion of the· Kansas Supreme Court . in the Coppage co.ea 
held that the· Adair ca.se and the Daniels ca.~e were ~ot to be followed. 
It held also that the cases of Brick co. v. Perry, 69 Y...an. 297J Rail-
• - - • ~ • .. j • 
wsy Co. v. J3rown, SO Ken. 312; and state v. Julow, 129 Mo. 163, which 
rale that statutes treJd.ng discharge of' employees on account of member-
. . 
s11ip. in a labor union a criminal offense~ are imconstitutional, do not 
apply to the Kelmas statute under 'Which the Coppage case. a.rose. Tho 
reason is· that the Kansas law is very d~~erent from tho other eta.tutao. 
The latter place the emphasis upon mal;ting dischar{)tl ot employees a crim-
inal. offense. and this is held unconstitutional. Tho KD.nsaa la.w makes 
criminal. tlle ~oero~ of emplo1ees by employars. The dec1e1on of the 
., ~ ,- ' 
lower court: was therefore o.ffirmed• not followiJ\g the above cases. The 
'. . 
opinion of the Cou.rt was given bj' llr. Justice Smith. 
j -· .__ 'I ' .. 
,Mr. Justice West dissented. giving no opinion. I•'lr· JUBtico 
Porter dissented0 g!vw..g the opinion that the Adair ca.ae and the others 
~ . .. ~ . ' 
quoted show conclusively the emplo~er• s right to diache.rge laborer a for 
any reason •. and that membership_ .~ a uriion mey be a lnwf'a.l reason. 
The case wes appealed to the United States supreme can.rt, which 
in a. bare majority opinion. (256 u.s. 456• 59 L·ed. ) reversed .. the judg-
ment of the Kansas Supreme Court, on the ground that the Ke.nao.s law a.b-
ridges the freedom of contract of employers. 
The second case in this group is Railway Co. V• Brown, 80 Yan. 
512 .• , This invol vea thE! v,iola.tion ot· the law ~nst black11at1ng of 
Paga···11e. 
employees by enployeirs {See Chapter i44. Laws of 1897). A.w .. Brown 
' ' 
was employed by the Atchison, .Topeka and Santa. Fa Railway Comp~ as 
brakeman. The Company employed a. detectbe, Wio. garbe.d as a «tramp ·** 
boarded the train upon v1hich BroV11l we.s employed• ostensibly stealing 
a "ride"• Brown was reported by the detec;tive~to have received i"orty 
cents from him as fare. and that Brown e.ppr,oprls.ted this ~o his own use. 
Brown wo.s 'discharged by hie company. He demanded a statement in writ-
ing, of the tru.e ce.use Of his discharge. The statement of the Compe.ey 
was that Brown v:ao ''Discba.rged for cause". Brown p ~aented this state-
roont to several o~lwr companies applying tor work ~t all reta.~ed em-
pl~ent. Ha brought action against the Santa Fe Company and recovered 
an award of $500 dame.gee• The case was appealed;. . 
The Supreme Court overruled this decision on the ground tho.t 
the spirit of' the statute did not intend that employers fhOt\ld be 
forced to lqr themselves open to libel cha.rgaf1 as they might do ~t 
they etnted the real ca.use ot discharge •. 
There is a la.w (Ch •. 187 Le.we of xansaa 1893 (ReVif!led 1925)). 
in the statutes of Kansas 'Which provides that a.11 corporations except 
those engnee~ 1n farm and da.~1"1 production must· pa7 their employees 
voekly. not later in the week than Friday •.. steam rail~ys and ~e 
above-mentioned corporations make p~ment semi-monthly • In case of' 
delay of pe.yment certain percentages of ~s must be paid in addi~ 
t1on a.a penalties. \~re an attorney is emPi·ol'Sd ~o. ¢ollect wages,. 
the fee. of the attorney we.s to. be pa~d by .the employers, in addition 
to the other penalties. 
l'age 119. 
Under this law. the case of Anderson v.· Oil Co •• 106 Kan. 
· 463• is given. This establishes the 'Ullconstitutiona.lity of the clause 
relating to attorney's fees. '1.b.e case of Howell V·• Machine co. 86 
Kan. 557 established the rule. that when an employee accepts pa.~ent 
in fa.11, even though payment was delayed, ho may not o.fterwe.rd recover 
for the amount of the penalties. 
Olaim for wages are superior to material-men' e liens, and 
mechanic's liens,_ when the assets of empl~yers are liquidated by a 
~eceiver for assignment .for creditors• Wages are to be pa.id frcrn the 
first moneys eoming into the hands of receivers• (~ee La.we of Kansas 
1901 Chapter 229 sec. l•l• In Geppelt v. stone co., 90 Kan• 539• 
the receiver of the stone Company did not pay wages cla.ims from the 
fir.st moneys,- Action was broa.ght and the case appealed to the supreme 
court on the qnestion of contimiity of the claims. 'l"'h.e ra.le was eo-
tablished tllat failure to pay• did not defeat the claims nor render 
them Yoide 
A few cases are given in brief which involve the status of 
workers under the mining laws. The ce.ee In Ra Williams, Petitioner 
bivolvea the const1tUt1ons.lity of Chapter 250. I.a.ws of 1907, rele.t-
ing to the sale of blo.sting powder to miners. The law prescribes that 
powder Bl1Sll be sold in original pa.ckages containing 12'} pounds of 
powder• Williams wtis fined $50 for violation of this law. He refused 
to pay hie tine mid was conmitted to jail. He sued a writ of Habeas 
Corpus and petitioned directly to the SUp~eme Court pleading the un-
constitut:tonalit7 .of the e.ct. The Supreme Court ruled that the right 
of the state to govern mining regnlations va.s established by precedents, 
and remanded the I>etition. 
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Employees in m1.nes assume the risk inherent 1n ·the mining 
bueineaa. (Coal Co. v. Britton. 3 x.,\ •. 292) •.. VJhere employers are 
in willful violation of mining statutes they may not ·employ the .. de-
fenses of contributory negligence and aeawnption of risk~ (LeRoy · 
Ve Railway Co. 91 Kano 548 ). This case $lSO establishes the rule 
tha.t liability of exJWloyers ia not shifted by negligence of.an un-
truetwortey employee. For nnnota.1;ion ot these ca.sea· see· Revised 
Statutes ot K~lµJ 1923, Pp. 749-751. 
The laat case ~o be giwn i~. state v. Johrulon e~.~ a.l. ·~f..: 
ticers of the Court of Visitation of .the Stta.te of Kansas, 61 Kan. am~. 
The Court of Visitation.we.a established ·in 1898 (See Laws of Kansas, 
1898 Ch. 28), for the pnrpose of regu.la.ting railwayth 
The .. Court ·was composed of three members. a. chief Judge and . 
two associate Judges. e. ma.rah.al and a. court clerk. Th& Con.rt wa.e . 
authorized t.o try.· all cases rt?la.ting to freight rates~ switching and 
demarrage .. ch~ges, and ot11er charges. made by carriers; to apportion 
charges between connecting roads or carriers and .to regulate cbar6-es for 
pnrt-co.r-loa.d e.nd mixed-ca.r-lqad freight lots; to regul~te railway con-
etru.ction and facilities, operations and service; to regulate cross-
ing intersections, the movement ·of tra.ma ~ the safety ~f employees 
and the public; to force railroads to obey their charters. The ·oau.rt 
had power, as a court of eqn.1 ty. to summon ·juries and to select juries 
a.s directed by roles of its own choosing •. · 
A e~te ·solicitor was provided,. by the law, to be appointed 
by the governor whose duty it was to receive all complaints to the 
Court of Visitation eml' to present these as information befoxe the 
court. The Canrt through its clerk• issued a. citation and a copy ~f' 
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the complaint to the aherli'f' of the county in· which the defendant 11 ved. 
The· county sheriff issued this as. e. summons chm'ging the usual fee. The 
defendant was reqa.ired to answer the citation within 25 days. Aftor th:ls 
time• the information vaa listed on the docket of the Court whether ans-
wered or not. The trial was set. for a ~ in the succeeding month. The 
Con;rt was authorized to issue any order in keeping with the above pro-
visions. F.efu.sal. on the part of re.ilwa.y companies, to obey Court ordera 
woald result in sequestration of. the Company's property. ~d the appoint-
ing of a. receiver to control the property in complia.nco with orders. 
Final review by the Supreme Con.rt was~ .. provided. . The con.rt was in con-
tinuons: session at the State Capitol. 
The case in disCllssion came about as follows : In February 19001 
the state solicitor filed an information with the ·Court to determine 
charges and ra.tes for shipment of cattle on the Atchison, Topelr..a, B.nci 
Santa -Fe railway in Kansas, to mke a schedule of rates tmd to enjoin 
the ra,ilroad company from ml.ting O.I\V other, and eta.ting thd.t tJle mil-
... 
road Canl'BJ11' ·was mald.ng excessive cha.rgea.. The Court refused to take 
steps 1n the matter. holding 'that such action would be abuse of' its 
powers.· The State Attorney-general then filed a petition in the Suprane 
Court praying a writ of' manda.rm.\s to issue to the clerk end judges of 
the . court commanding them to hear the , case. 
The opinion of' the Sllpreme Court on this petition was in pa.rt 
a.s follows: ''The framers of the Constitution of the United Sta.tea were · 
influence~ by the doctrines of' Monteaquien, then in the height of its 
influence, tba.t the powers essential to governments should be distributed 
among three separate bodies of' magistrates, viz., tegisla.tive. Executive 
Page. 122. 
and Judicial. - - - All writers on Constitutional law are agreed that "the 
" f\motions ot the three departnente should· be kept as distinct and sepa-
rate as possible. The Coo.rt cf Visitation is endowed with complete 
; \ 
co~on•law end equity powers, lavishly conferred. - ~· - The attorneys 
1 
for th.S state unitedly agree that the Court o~Visitation is a judicial 
tribunal end that the :powers conferred upon it are hi large part, purely 
-I· 
Judicial - - - Being a court, the vital question "'9·- - is whether such 
tribunal has been endowed with legislative powers to an extent destru.e-
' t1ve of that separation of governmental functions ordained by the con-
stitut!on." 
"Vie start - - -· in considering the boundaries of judiaieJ. and 
legislative power m.der· ou.r Constitution and system of government, from 
a fixed mormment • to determine whether the legialati ve. power "to make 
rates mo.y be conferred upon the judicial tribunal known a.a the Court of 
Vieita.tion.n 
"The rate-making power, being essentiaJ.ly legislative. in its 
nature - - - can no more be imposed on or 'be exerafsed by the Judicial 
department than can the pardoning power of' the governor o~ e:ny other 
distinctively· executive function. It is a cardinal principle of repre-
sentative government that the making of laws and ral.es regu.lating the 
. future conduct and fixing the rignts of parties belongs to the legis-
lative department - a power which can never be reposed or exercised by 
the judiciary." 
"The power to fix rates and classifications is withau.t doubt 
conferred upon the court of Visitation by the terms of t11e law under 
consideration - - - The statute llllder consideration is skillfully ~ 
l' 
' .• .. ~"' " . 
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constructed to confer legislative power upon the Court ot Visitation 
to fix rates. - - - This tribunal possesses the extraordinary power 
ot proclaiming - - - schedules \1hich are me.de conclusive in the future; 
s.nd al\y.iUture controversy.which,might arise between the shipper and 
the· railroad company. baa thus been prejudged and determined. IIere ia 
. ~: ~,~:.:- ~.:~ ., 
fcnmd a combhra.tion of the legislative and judicial functions"• 
0 we thb:ik~· that by the several provisions of the statute 
under .consideration, legislative. judicial and edminietrative powers . . ~ ' 
~e ao inextr~~ably ":1terwoven an~ bound up t~gether as to render their 
sepa.ra.~ion impossible. - - , - Vie mo.st hold therefore tho.t .: said Court of 
'\. .. !• • ... 
Visitation is wholly without that authority and jurisdiction which the 
. ' 
legislature appears to have intended to confer upon it - - - The per-
emptory writ of .mandamu.s will be denied"· 
This opinion was concurred in by Ur. Justice Jolmeon with no 
opinion. given. Mr· Chief Justice Doster dissented an the grOlllld that 
such powers ae the Court of' Visitation had were perm1eaible on the 
authority of me.ny cases. ~ instance of _eommineling of powers was 
quoted from section 12 of the Act of .. Congress, 1804, creating the Ter-
ritory ot Laa.isia.na., and commenting on this U.r. Justice Doster ea.id: 
"The judges were not only authorized to assist 1n the ma.king of the 
laws but were authorized judicially to administer them when ma.de - - -
Nor i~ the lodgxnent .of dual and even tripartite governmentel ·powers in 
a .single tribunal lacking in .illus~ration among the decided cases. In-
deed the decisions in which it has been al.lowed e.re almost as nUmerou.s 
as those which declare the general theory of' distributive powers." The 
diasent~ng. opinion wa.s that for these reasons the statute should not 
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ha.ve been annulled. 
The coorl. of Visitation case help·s to define the field of 
. .. .. 
re6llla.t1on of industry. This decision above, haCl some bearing upon 
tho formation of the Kansas ).:Ubiic Ut111t1ea Comniss!on, the Indus-
trial Welfare Co~ssion, and the Court· ot· Industrial E~~tions. 
t'[e.ey"of the nrgumenta against· the last-Damed,. _we~. used ,against the 
c~. of Visitatiori, viz.• commingling of i\mctiox;s·· 
In the State Vo Hov1a.t canes this argument wa.a ·answered by the 
supreme court:. nThe opinion in tmt case. (state V• Johnson) was writ-
ten while .the principles controlling the place in government ot admin• 
istrotive boards was 1n the process ot development. It is possible that 
la.ngange may ha.ve been there used vh1ch might require some modification 
before its acaepta.nce e.e having tmiverea.l e.pplica.tion. But the vital 
grounds upon which the statute there considered, was held void. do not 
. . 
exist here. The present law bears internal evidence of having been 
drowned with a. view to a.voiding the features of the Court ot Visita-
tion Act, upon which the decision cited was based. The function of a 
tribunal of the· general· cha.meter of the Court of Industrial Relations 
has becons so fully recognized that we do not regard it ae necesae.ry to 
undertake a review of the subject at this tim~·" (See 107.Kan~. 451}. 
This seems to be consistent with other decisions in the· matter 
of regulation, and the development of present. public acceptance ot the 
powers and prerogatives of such bodies as the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission. and 'the Public Utilities Conmissions ot the several states. _ 
It is also in keeping with the opinion of the Ita.nsa.s Supreme 
C·ourt 1n the case of Telephone Associa.tion v. Telephone Company, 107 
Kan. 169. On page 174 of this decision it was said: •1Tho.t case 
(Larrabee v. :Bailwa.y Co.• ?4 Yum• 808) , was decided many years ago, 
when public utilities ragnlation in this state was confined to rail-
roads• A tribtma.l "With tlle Jurisdiction and powers of the Court of 
IndU.stri&l Relations was beyond the range of legisla.t ive vision, end 
e.11 remedie_s were regarded as unusu.a.l am out of the ordinary course, 
which did not follow ·closely the pa.the of' law ·and equity - - - It is· 
now clearly perceived that what ie most needed in the field of business 
intercourse is expert edministro.tive adjustment and not court o.djudica.-
tion• P..dva.ncing step by step a.ccording to that principle. the lesis-
lature superseded the boa.rd or railroad conmissioners with the public 
utilities commisaion1 ga.ve it authority to regulate public utilities 
generally_ end then superseded the· pu~lic ut1lities comm1s~1on w1 th tho 
Cea.rt of Industrial Relations and gave it greatly amplified powers. 
The policy has becone the settled policy of the state •. 
As ha.a bean seen the ttgreat~ amplified" powers ot the court 
of Industr:is.l 11e1at ions were condemned only 11:1 that they were mis-
directed. The. word ncourtn did not s.lt·er the co~t1tut1onality of 
this body bo.t proba~ly hindered its influence. It. was merely a public 
service commission misnamed a court.. The Con.rt of Visitation however 
was ~damenta.lly a court• and the other fa.notions were e.dded. It is 
very probable that the Court of Visitation would have been declared 
inva.lid even 1n the present day. 
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